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Summary 
 
Neuroscience faces the challenging task of developing and implementing objective 
measures of consciousness that can be applied to patients who are unable to interact with their 
external environment. The standard clinical assessment of these patients relies heavily on the 
subjective distinction between voluntary and involuntary or reflexive movements and 
electrophysiological and neuroimaging protocols have been recently developed to improve 
diagnosis and probe for signs of awareness. However, because the ability to unambiguously 
infer the capacity for consciousness through these novel techniques is determined ultimately 
not by consciousness itself but the awareness of a specific stimulus, their use to diagnose 
consciousness at the single-patient level is challenged by difficulties related to the application 
and interpretation of results. Clearly, the diagnosis of brain-injured patients could benefit 
greatly from a scientific investigation of the bases of consciousness that could give evidence 
not only of the neural correlates of particular conscious perceptions, but mainly of the 
conditions necessary for supporting all and any conscious experience.  
This thesis addresses the possibility for investigating the brain’s capacity for 
consciousness following a path that has not yet been explored. General considerations about 
what constitutes the content of consciousness and the hypothesis that the brain must be 
involved in sustaining conscious experience led us to hypothesize that consciousness depends 
on the brain’s capacity to sustain causal interactions between different areas of the 
thalamocortical system. To investigate this hypothesis, one should employ a perturbational 
approach, directly stimulating the cerebral cortex, avoiding possible subcortical filtering or 
gating, and recording the neural effects of the perturbation with the appropriate temporal 
resolution. Today, such a perturbational approach to explore causality in the thalamocortical 
system can be implemented non-invasively in humans, thanks to the combination of navigated 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and high-density electroencephalography (hd-EEG). 
In a series of recent papers we developed standardized and data-driven procedures to 
TMS/hd-EEG signal processing, demonstrating that this technique allows exploring particular 
properties of stimulated circuits, rather than stereotypical and/or random reactions (Casarotto 
et. al, 2010), such as natural frequencies of cortical oscillation (Rosanova et al., 2009; 
  
 
vi
Pigorini et al., 2011), thresholds for cortical activation, cortico–cortical delays and patterns of 
neural connectivity (Casali et al., 2010). We applied these methods in the study of the cortical 
activation evoked by TMS in healthy subjects during alert wakefulness (Rosanova et al., 
2009; Huber et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2011) and anesthesia (Ferrarelli et al., 2010), 
confirming results observed previously during slow-wave sleep (Massimini et al., 2005, 2007, 
2009). In all cases, what fundamentally distinguished TMS-evoked responses when 
consciousness was clearly present from responses in conditions in which consciousness was 
unambiguously absent was an overall reduction of the spatiotemporal complexity of the 
cortical activity induced by the TMS during loss of consciousness. Moreover, performing 
TMS/hd-EEG measurements at the bedside of brain-injured, non-communicating patients, 
who gradually recovered consciousness from the vegetative state (VS), we observed that the 
spatiotemporal complexity of cortical activity consistently increased during the recovery of 
cognitive function underlying the evolution from VS to minimally conscious state (MCS) 
(Rosanova et al., 2012). 
Therefore, aiming at an objective evaluation of the brain’s capacity for consciousness, 
we developed and tested a feasible measure of spatiotemporal complexity, the Perturbational 
Complexity Index (PCI), which is high only if many regions of the cerebral cortex react to the 
initial perturbation quickly and in different ways (Casali et al., 2012). Remarkably, in a total 
of 116 TMS sessions collected from 19 healthy subjects and 17 brain-injured patients, we 
invariably found high PCI values in conditions in which consciousness was clearly present 
and low PCI values in conditions in which consciousness was unambiguously reduced. This 
difference was able to reliably discriminate between conscious and unconscious healthy 
subjects, producing disjoint distributions that were independent of the stimulation parameters, 
the strength and the extent of the cortical activation. Moreover, PCI was able to detect 
progressive changes in consciousness, such as those that occur while a subject is falling 
asleep, and to discriminate between ambiguous consciousness levels in patients suffering 
from disorders of consciousness (MCS) from both lower (VS, sleep/anesthesia-LOC) and 
higher (LIS, healthy wakefulness) levels of consciousness.  
The spatiotemporal complexity of the cortical activity evoked by TMS is a single 
number that can be calculated at the bedside with little a priori information. Because this 
measure aims at the brain’s capacity for consciousness, instead of behavioral or neural 
correlations of conscious perception, this technique does not depend on the willingness or 
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ability of the patient to engage in assessment protocols and can be employed bypassing 
sensory pathways and subcortical structures to directly probe the thalamocortical system. Our 
results support PCI as an appropriate tool to approximate an objective measure of the neural 
correlate of consciousness with the potential to assist the diagnosis and prognosis in brain-
injured patients and with unique theoretical implications to a science of consciousness. 
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“One of the amazing characteristics of nature is the  
variety of interpretational schemes which are possible.” 
Richard Feynman 
 
 Chapter 1. 
Introduction: Consciousness and the Brain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Her mind still rising and falling with the sea, the 
taste and smell that places have after long absence 
possessing her, the candles wavering in her eyes, 
she had lost herself and gone under. It was a 
wonderful night, starlit; the waves sounded as they 
went upstairs; the moon surprised them, enormous, 
pale, as they passed the staircase window.” 
(Virginia Woolf, “To the Lighthouse”) 
 
 
All our experience occurs while we are aware. What we think, desire, feel, dream, 
imagine, believe and doubt, all objects, properties or feelings, only have meaning for us as we 
are able to refer to them consciously. Consciousness is, as stated by Nagel (1974), “what it is 
like to be something” and since we can not be anything out of it, it is no wonder that the 
question of its nature has covered the entire history of Western philosophy, is in the center of 
religion and art, and still remains one of the greatest mysteries of mankind. 
For the nature of consciousness, a subject previously considered outside the scope of 
empirical science and relegated to purely speculative areas of human thought, today is the 
center of a discussion involving the medical diagnosis of extreme conditions and ethical 
issues that deal with the treatment, life and death of patients suffering from disorders of 
consciousness (DOC). Chances of recovery for critically ill patients, diagnosed in the 
vegetative state (VS), are close to zero three months after nontraumatic brain damage or one 
year after a traumatic lesion (Royal College of Physicians, 1994) and, in these cases, withhold 
or withdraw of life support may be ethically justified (Andrews, 2004; Laureys and Boly, 
2007). However, the diagnosis of such severe conditions is based on clinical behavior that 
rely heavily on subjective interpretations: VS, characterized by the return of arousal with no 
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evidence of awareness, is diagnosed when the patient, who is unable to communicate 
functionally, has no voluntary movements but only reflexive or automatic ones. On the 
contrary, patients who are still incapable of functional communication but show signs of 
voluntary, reproducible movements, even though inconsistent, meet the criteria for the 
minimally conscious state (MCS) (Giacino et al., 2002). The prognosis of MCS patients is 
significantly more favorable than VS patients (Giacino, 2004) and currently no consensus on 
the duration of this condition has been established in support of end-of-life decisions. 
Therefore, such important and difficult decisions, as well as other issues related to quality of 
life of brain-injured patients (Boly et al., 2008), end up being based on the subtle distinction, 
from the clinical point of view, between what can be considered as a voluntary movement and 
what should be classified as an involuntary reflexive movement.  
There is currently no consensus or convincing scientific evidence allowing for the 
establishment of methods to differentiate, in an unambiguous and objective way, automatic 
movements from those that show signs of consciousness. For instance, in a recent study, MCS 
patients with visual pursuit did not track the moving objects frequently used in routine 
examinations, but presented unambiguous signals of visual tracking when exposed to moving 
mirrors (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2008). Neurobehavioral rating scales such as the Coma 
Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) were developed specifically to better differentiate MCS 
from VS (Giacino et al., 2004) and recent studies comparing the clinical consensus diagnosis 
to diagnoses derived from rating scales assessments, performed by research staff, indicate that 
the rate of misdiagnosis of VS has not substantially changed in the last decade: more than 
40% of patients diagnosed with VS based on the clinical consensus were found to be in MCS 
following standardized assessments (Schnakers, et al., 2009; Andrews et al.,1996). In fact, 
well-documented cases prove that if voluntary behavior, when present, is sufficient for the 
inference that the person is conscious, its absence, by contrast, does not necessarily imply 
unconsciousness (Boly et al., 2007; Laureys et al., 2004; Monti et al., 2009; Owen and 
Coleman, 2008). Motor impairments, as observed in the locked-in syndrome (LIS) where 
patients may be fully aware but unable to respond (Laureys et al., 2004; Schnakers et al., 
2009b), fluctuating arousal level, or even ambiguous and rapidly habituating responses may 
impair behavioural assessment in brain-injured patients (Gill-Thwaites, 2006; Giacino et al., 
2009).  
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For these reasons, electrophysiological (Kotchoubey et al., 2005, Fellinger et al., 
2011) and neuroimaging protocols (Owen and Coleman, 2008; Monti et al., 2009) have been 
developed to improve diagnosis and probe for signs of awareness. Studies of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have shown evidence of conscious perception in patients 
diagnosed as being in the vegetative state, when they were exposed to sensory stimuli in a 
hierarchical order, beginning with the simplest form of stimulus processing and then 
progressing sequentially through more complex cognitive functions (Owen et al., 2006, Monti 
et al., 2010). In addition, electrophysiological studies recently demonstrated that the recovery 
of residual cognitive function in brain-injured patients can also be accessed by both early and 
late event-related potentials (ERPs) (Schnakers et al., 2008, Faugeras et al., 2011, Kotchoubey 
et al., 2005, Boly et al., 2011). 
Although protocols employing fMRI and ERP have important clinical and scientific 
implications to the diagnosis and prognosis in brain-injured patients, the acquisition, analysis 
and interpretation of results are not without their difficulties. For instance, in particular 
circumstances, interpretation of fMRI activations may be prevented by alterations in the 
normal coupling of neuronal activity to the local haemodynamics in brain-injured patients 
(Hamzei et al. 2003; Rossini et al. 2004). In addition, late ERP components such as P3b can 
be absent in patients who show behavioral signs of consciousness (Holler et al., 2011; Monti 
et al., 2010; Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Bardin et al., 2011), and some studies suggest that early 
activity generated at pre-attentive level can not reliably distinguish conscious from 
unconsciousness in healthy subjects (Simpson et al., 2002) or MCS from VS in brain injured 
patients (Fischer et al., 2010). Finally, studies have shown that aspects of human cognition, 
including those related to semantic processing, can be present even in the absence of 
consciousness (Bonebakker et al., 1996, Dehaene et al., 1998). This may also prevent the 
correct interpretation of the results: a “normal” neural response observed in patients unable to 
communicate effectively does not necessarily imply evidence of awareness (Davis et al., 
2007), and false negatives are very common even in healthy volunteers (Owen and Coleman, 
2008; Bardin et al., 2011).  
Apart from the difficulties in the application and interpretation of results, the ability to 
infer unambiguously the capacity for consciousness through the methods mentioned above is 
determined ultimately not by consciousness itself, but the awareness of a specific stimulus. 
Therefore, false negatives can also be obtained in patients who, even after partial recovery of 
Introduction: Consciousness and the Brain  
 
 
5
high-order cognitive functions, are not aware of the stimulus due either to a fluctuation in the 
level of consciousness or blockade of ascending pathways, but also by attention problems, 
given the complex paradigms required for unambiguous interpretation of positive results.  
It is clear, therefore, that the diagnosis of brain-injured patients could benefit greatly 
from a better understanding of what is indeed relevant to consciousness. What is required, 
ultimately, is a scientific investigation of the bases of consciousness that gives evidence not 
only of the neural correlates of conscious perception of a particular stimulus, but mainly of 
the conditions necessary for supporting all and any conscious experience. In principle, it is 
expected that methods can be developed to investigate the brain's capacity for consciousness 
independently of the subject's willingness or ability to engage in assessment protocols, the 
integrity of sensory pathways or motor functions. Such methods could therefore avoid the 
problems of interpretation associated with both the relationship between specific brain 
activations and specific contents of consciousness, as well as between specific contents of 
consciousness and consciousness itself. Current methods depend on neural correlates of 
specific contents of consciousness only because, scientifically, consciousness itself is very 
poorly understood. 
 
1.1 - Towards a Science of Consciousness 
Should a proper scientific approach to consciousness start empirically in the absence 
of minimal guidance to what really matters for consciousness or from theoretical 
considerations that reduce consciousness to structures or properties of the brain?  
  
1.1.1 – Empirical Findings in the Absence of Theoretical Guidance 
Motivated by the important advances observed in techniques of neuroimaging and 
neurophysiological records, part of the research on the neural basis of consciousness is 
developed in a purely empirical way. It is hoped that monitoring of neural activation in the 
presence of sensory stimuli can reveal brain structures or properties that are essentially 
associated with the presence of consciousness itself. If, on the one hand, stimuli that remain 
unconscious are still able to affect the brain at different levels (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007; 
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Van den Bussche et al., 2009b), several brain processes and structures at high levels in the 
hierarchy of sensory information processing seem to be involved only in conscious 
perceptions. fMRI studies on visual perception have shown increased activation during 
conscious perception in higher areas such as fusiform gyrus (Haynes et al., 2005; Polonsky et 
al., 2000; Williams et al.,2008), and associative cortical regions such as the inferior parietal 
and prefrontal cortices (Dehaene et al., 2001b, Haynes et al., 2005b), while differences of the 
same magnitude were not observed in the primary areas. Several electro and magneto-
encephalographic studies indicate a correlation of conscious visual perception with a late 
component (> 300 ms) of ERPs (Babiloni et al., 2006; Del Cul et al., 2007; Fernandez-Duque 
et al., 2003; Koivisto et al., 2008; Lamy et al., 2009) that seems to be associated with 
activation of areas such as hippocampus, parietal and frontal associative cortices (Halgren et 
al., 1998; Mantini et al., 2009). Similar results were obtained with other types of sensory 
stimulation, such as hearing (Bekinschtein et al., 2009a; Diekhof et al., 2009; Sadaghiani et 
al., 2009), where conscious awareness differed from unconscious by the presence of late 
potentials in associative areas. Conscious perceptions were also accompanied by increased 
synchronization of the phase of gamma oscillations between distant regions (Doesburg et al., 
2009; Melloni et al., 2007; Rodriguez et al., 1999; Schurger et al., 2006; Wyart and Tallon-
Baudry, 2009). Intracranial recordings during visual paradigms have confirmed these results 
and also indicated the presence of a marked increase of causal interaction between cortical 
areas during conscious perception (Gaillard et al., 2009). 
These and other similar studies open up a new perspective in the investigation of the 
relationship between brain function and conscious perception. However, because conscious 
perceptions occur in a subject who is already conscious, attending exclusively to the neural 
correlates of conscious perceptions could not possibly give us all conditions for 
consciousness. Indeed, in the absence of a minimal guidance to what really matters for 
consciousness, advances towards the neural basis of the phenomenon of conscious experience 
could not but progress slowly and in ambiguous directions. Those aspects of brain activity 
suggested by these studies as measurable determinants of the level of consciousness, such as 
high levels of cortical depolarization with gamma band oscillations (Llinás et al., 1998), long-
range synchronization of fast-frequency activity (Engel and Singer, 2001; Tallon-Baudry, 
2004) and activation of a widespread fronto-parietal network (Dehaene et al., 2003) were not 
found to correlate in all cases with the level of consciousness. For instance, widespread 
cerebral responses to sensory stimulation were observed during anesthesia-induced loss of 
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consciousness (LOC) and non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep (Kakigi et al., 2003; 
Kroeger and Amzica, 2007). Gamma activity and synchrony was found low in rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep - when subjective experience is usually vivid - and high in 
anaesthesia (Vanderwolf, 2000). Also, intracranial recordings show that gamma activity 
(Destexhe et al., 2007) and gamma-coherence (Bullock et al., 1995) persist during slow-wave 
sleep. Brain metabolism and fast rhythms can be high when consciousness is abolished by 
some anesthetic agents (Imas et al., 2005; Långsjö et al., 2005, Maksimow et al., 2006) or 
when consciousness is lost during the tonic phase of generalized tonic-clonic seizures 
(Blumenfeld, 2005; Blumenfeld et al., 2003). Together, these results support the claim that 
empirical progress in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) can not 
dispense with theoretical considerations but should be guided by what is really relevant to 
consciousness itself. 
 
1.1.2 – Towards a Theory of Consciousness? 
Aiming to establish, from first principles or based on empirical findings, a 
neuroscientific theory of consciousness, there is a recent profusion of a variety of theoretical 
formulations, emerging with different assumptions and from different approaches to specific 
experimental results. One reads, for example, “consciousness corresponds to the capacity to 
integrate information” (Tononi, 2004); “consciousness is the gateway to the brain” (Baars, 
2005), “the global availability of information through a global neural workspace is what we 
subjectively experience as the conscious state” (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001);  “a subjective 
state is a transient neuronal assembly of varying degree, recruited by the activation of a hard-
wired hub, or network of neurons” (Greenfield and Collins, 2005). Also, necessary and 
sufficient conditions for consciousness are affirmed to be “coherent semisynchronous 
oscillations, probably in the 40-70 Hz range” (Crick and Koch, 1990); “the formation of 
dynamic links mediated by synchrony over multiple frequency bands” (Varela, 2001); “a large 
cluster of neuronal groups that together constitute, on a time scale of hundreds of 
milliseconds, a unified neural process of high complexity - a ‘dynamic core’” (Tononi and 
Edelman, 1998); or even that they “may be expressed by only a small set of neurons, in 
particular those that project from the back of cortex to those parts of the front of cortex that 
are not purely motor and that receive feedback from there” (Crick and Koch, 2003).  
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Contrary to the fundamental importance of empirical research in understanding the 
role of the brain in the phenomenon of conscious experience, the relevance of these 
theoretical formulations for what is intended as a science of consciousness is questionable. 
These so-called “theories of consciousness” frequently start from the mistaken idea that in 
order to make science of consciousness and fight against the old dualistic perspective it is 
necessary, first of all, to define consciousness in terms of brain structural or functional 
characteristics. Thus, in the hurry to find a definition of consciousness, these formalisms often 
incur into argumentative fallacies, such as the confusion between ontological and causal 
reductions (Searle, 1987; 2004; Velmans, 2000). Moreover, even those propositions that start 
correctly by approaching the problem from some phenomenological considerations - as the 
“Information Integration Theory of Consciousness” (Tononi, 2008) - end ultimately restricted 
to partial results of such phenomenology, ignoring some well established aspects of 
intentionality and admitting highly controversial ones.  
The skepticism that history and philosophy of science from the recent past have taught 
us about the possibility of finding a priori principles of nature, demands the careful search, 
wherever possible, for concrete empirical results before establishing the foundation for a 
science still in its infancy in its field of study. With respect to theoretical considerations of 
consciousness, it has long been known that reductionism, whether in terms of type-type 
materialism or of functionalism, carries the old burden of explaining what characterizes 
consciousness at the phenomenological level, i.e., the qualitative aspects of experience and 
the so called intentionality of consciousness: the capacity of the conscious mind to represent, 
to stand for things and states of affairs, to be directed towards things outside of it (Brentano, 
1874). In particular, a scientific theory of consciousness must face the important distinction 
between syntax and semantics (Searle, 2004): there are two things going on in the conscious 
subject, one is the neural states of the brain when the subject thinks, the other is the meaning 
that is attached to these conscious states. And when we attend to the problem of meaning, 
aiming at a “Theory of Reference”, we are faced with an “open texture” underlying notions 
such as “synonymy”, “proof”, “confirmation”, where all attempts to formalize meaning seem 
to presuppose the notion of reference that should be explained by them (Putnam, 1988; 1999).  
Knowing the meaning of words depends on grasping the manner in which they are used, and 
this in turn can not be founded in definitions and logical axioms (Wittgenstein, 1953): the 
mind is not a computer (Edelman, 2006; Searle, 2004; Putnam, 1999). The nature of such 
peculiar relation to the objects of consciousness and the distinction of this “open” type of 
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representation from other formal, computer-like, representations are some of the central 
questions to be addressed by any theory that intends to be a theory of consciousness. It is not 
by just redefining consciousness in terms of information processing in the brain that one will 
be able to scientifically explain something else than information processing in the brain itself1 
(Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). 
The call for a hasty reductionism, even if misleading, is often seen as positive from a 
pragmatic point of view: one tends to accept a poor argument just because “it works”. 
However, such theories of consciousness are characterized by the fact that the choice of a 
reductionist paradigm, with all its intrinsic charge, has not resulted in any real advance in the 
implementation of empirical measures correlated with consciousness. Indices of neural 
activation, proposed by such theoretical frameworks, where testable, have not had until now 
unambiguous experimental corroboration, or, in the majority of cases, are still far from being 
applicable to the human brain, despite all the advances in neuroimaging and signal processing 
techniques (Seth et al., 2006). 
 
1.1.3 – The Project of an Empirical Science of Consciousness 
We can then say that much of the research currently being developed in the context of 
a science of consciousness is divided into two approaches to the problem that share a common 
characteristic. On the one hand, the empirical scientist searches for NCCs but with no 
phenomenological guide for the investigation. Under the supposition that everything that is 
fundamentally relevant to consciousness is part of the subjective realm, accessible only to 
introspection and outside the scope of objective science, the scientist must be satisfied with a 
“groping blindly”, with no regard for anything that relates to the phenomenology of conscious 
experience, which is left to philosophy or psychology. This restriction seems to leave no 
possibility of a proper science of consciousness. On the other hand there are those who 
recognize the importance of a theoretical foundation, without which science itself is not 
                                                 
1 Quoting Hilary Putnam, “the very idea of a theoretical identification presupposes that the concepts to be 
reduced are already under some kind of scientific control (recall the case of optics, or of thermodynamics). To 
introduce a set of concepts that at present figure in no laws [i.e., the contents of consciousness], and then 
immediately to begin talking of searching for theoretical identifications of these "narrow contents" with 
computational states of the brain (which, as we noted earlier, also have not been defined, since we have the 
problem of what formalism is being envisaged when one talks of "computational states" here) is to engage in a 
fantasy of theoretical identification. It is to mistake a piece of science fiction for an outline of a scientific theory 
that it only remains for future research to fill in.” (Putnam, 1997, p. 37). 
Introduction: Consciousness and the Brain  
 
 
10
possible, but agree that this theoretical possibility must be based on the definition of 
consciousness in terms reducible to some property or structure of the brain. The intention is to 
establish a theory of consciousness without having to consider the compatibility of its 
premises with the phenomenological properties of conscious experience. The objective 
measures proposed are, therefore, theoretically based not on what is usually meant by 
“consciousness”, but in what theories themselves assume a priori that consciousness is. 
In both cases, when consciousness is the object of study, it is often ignored that the 
most fundamental objective of science is precisely that of, from phenomenological 
considerations which set a reference to the object in question, search for the essential 
characteristics behind what is apparent. When Isaac Newton, in his “Treatise of the 
reflections, refractions, inflections and colours of light”, searched for what is essentially part 
of the luminous phenomenon, he did not intend in any moment to ignore the features that 
were observed in the phenomenal experience of light and color. Newton did not describe the 
spectral decomposition of the light with eyes closed, fearing that a subjective character 
intrinsic to the experience of color could distort scientific objectivity. Similarly, Newton did 
not open the field for scientific developments in optics that followed by starting from a 
definition that would a priori reduce light to some other natural entity, without first carefully 
analyzing the possibility that this definition would explain the properties of the luminous 
phenomenon. Science could never ignore the appearances: it is exactly by trying to explain 
what appearances are that one can find what is essential in nature. Now, if conscious 
experience is a particularly difficult subject because it seems to be, at least at first sight, 
primarily related to phenomenological aspects (Zeeman, 2005), this is another reason for the 
need of including considerations of its phenomenal features in the scientific investigation of 
its basis. 
But then, should we not have to base our investigation on pure introspection? And 
wouldn’t attention to considerations of what it is like to be conscious represent an inescapable 
obstacle to the progress of science towards understanding what really matters for 
consciousness? The present thesis is the result of our efforts to respond negatively to both 
questions. Following a path that we believe has not yet been explored, we try here to advance 
toward an empirical science of consciousness, focusing on the full meaning of these words. A 
science because the object studied here will be treated according to the scientific method and 
tools, avoiding speculative arguments without theoretical or empirical foundation but based, 
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ultimately, only on the results of scientific experiments dealing with quantifiable objective 
properties. The investigation is said empirical because we will not propose here the 
development of a theoretical framework, based on a priori principles or on considerations still 
without experimental evidence, but an objective measure, based on empirical data, with the 
potential to be related to consciousness and that can be tested in various conditions of 
relevance. Finally, we can say that the ultimate object of this investigation is the 
consciousness, because our efforts toward an objective measure with the potential to assist in 
clinical diagnosis of DOC will not ignore what is widely described as that which characterizes 
the conscious experience. We will set a reference to our object of study exactly by focusing 
on the intentionality of consciousness, the fundamental directedness towards what is 
experienced: what it is like to be able to perceive something, to refer to something, to think 
about what we think. 
For this purpose, it is imperative to establish a dialogue with other areas of knowledge. 
Throughout the twentieth century, philosophers have struggled to clarify several relevant 
aspects in the characterization of the concept of consciousness, developing a phenomenology 
that points to objective conditions dissociated from introspection that not only assume but 
require scientific research. Techniques of signal acquisition and processing were developed at 
the interface between neuroscience, engineering, physics and applied mathematics, and, with 
the emergence of new computational methods, new possibilities for acquisition and analysis 
of biological data have been opened. Finally, neurophysiology has advanced in the 
understanding of structures and mechanisms responsible for information processing in the 
brain. Our work emerges from this complex interface which is the natural environment for a 
scientific investigation of consciousness. By paying attention to simple and well established 
phenomenological considerations of what is involved in conscious experience, we will show 
that the natural assumption that the brain, especially the human thalamocortical system, must 
have at least a role of serving as a necessary means to access the content of consciousness, 
will lead us to the implementation of a noninvasive measure of neural activation with the 
potential to be correlated to the brain's capacity for consciousness and to assist the diagnosis 
and prognosis in brain-injured patients. 
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1.2 – Consciousness: Brain, World and Causality 
It is thus not possible to start our work by stating the ultimate nature of conscious 
experience. We do not know if consciousness is made of some strange substance, a res 
cogitans, as would Descartes (1641), or a “nonmaterial entity”, as suggested by Eccles 
(1980), maybe an exotic holistic property, as imagined by Sperry (1985), possibly emerging 
from the brain, as would Libet (1996); or if it really has nothing of strange in it, being only a 
“motion in the brain” as stated by Hobbes (1651), a type of localized memory as proposed by 
Dennett (1991); or just another brain function, a “focal attention” as suggested by James 
(1890), being perhaps nothing more than a specific way of processing information that can be 
transferred to a silicon brain. We can not even say whether everything that is relevant to 
consciousness is located within the human mind, as already suggested by Aristotle, or 
whether conscious experience is fundamentally a type of interaction with the world that points 
away from us, as advocated by Heidegger (1927).  
Nevertheless, even without a complete definition, we all know what is referred to 
when the word “consciousness” is used. We say that a person is conscious when, for example, 
she/he is awake, in a special state of attention, able to perceive and react properly to objects in 
the world, capable of formulating thoughts and using words correctly to report such objects, 
sensations and thoughts to other conscious subjects. On the other hand, we say that a person is 
unconscious when, for example, she/he is in a deep sleep, a state in which one is not able to 
react properly to objects that are presented, nor shows signs of formulating thoughts. 
Consciousness is a state of “awareness” in which things are experimented, in which we are 
directed toward things: we think of something, wish something, imagine something, believe 
in something. Without a thought content, there is no thought, without a experienced content 
there is no experience: all consciousness is consciousness of something. Therefore, when we 
say that a subject has conscious experiences, as opposed to automatic unconscious affections, 
we are affirming that there is something that it is like for the subject, her/his peculiar point of 
view, full of intentional content: the things thought, perceived, the facts remembered, the 
images dreamt, others just imagined or believed; they are all objects for, “represented by” or 
“revealed to”, the conscious subject.  
It is natural to assume, from the perspective of contemporary neuroscience, that if 
something allows us the access to such contents thought, desired, imagined, pursued, if 
something is responsible for the type of interaction that occurs between the subject and the 
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object of consciousness, this vehicle to the content of experience must depend on the brain. 
Whatever the ultimate nature of conscious experience may be, to the extent that consciousness 
is related to a content, the brain, the human organ that gives access to the objects of the world 
outside us and is the actual residence of our memories and feelings, must have a key role in 
supporting our experience.  
If we want to characterize the brain’s role in supporting conscious experience we 
should then ask for the properties of the intentional objects present to consciousness. What is 
the content of our experiences? The precise nature of the intentional objects, whether 
constituted exclusively by internal representations or fundamentally by external real objects, 
is a matter of intense contemporary debate (Menary, 2010; Rowlands, 2010; Searle, 2004; 
Putnam, 1999). Nevertheless, it will be enough for our purposes to consider two well-
accepted and long described phenomenological aspects of the contents of consciousness. 
When we think of something, when we perceive something, the object of our awareness is at 
once a unity and a multiplicity (Kant, 1787; Husserl, 1913; Merleau-Ponty, 1945): in thought, 
imagination, perception things and facts are unveiled to us, in each moment, as units 
composed of a multiplicity of features. Being aware is to be directed towards a world of 
colors, sounds, tastes, smells, memories, emotions, all united under one scheme. Our 
experiences take place as in the fragment of Virginia Woolf's novel, in which the sense of that 
“wonderful night, starlit” is inseparable from Lily Briscoe’s memories, from the “enormous, 
pale” moon she sees in the sky, the sound of the waves she hears, her steps going upstairs, 
and all the emotional content of her mind that rises and falls with the sea.  
 
1.2.1 – A Manifold of Features and the Brain’s Functional Specialization 
If experience and cognition take place through a manifold of simple features - texture, 
position in time and space, images, sounds, smells, tastes, sensations such as heat, cold, pain 
and pleasure - if we are able to access the objects of intentionality through their multiple 
features, then this multiplicity is to be given to us as such by independent sensitive 
modalities2. Now, if we can access these different modalities through the brain, then the brain 
                                                 
2 This is true even if one assumes a “natural realistic” scenario (Putnam, 1999), where “sensations” (or the so 
called “secondary qualities”, such as color) are considered as a set of idealized abstractions from the perceived 
real objects (see also James, 1912; Austin, 1962), instead of a set of “properties” of the mental representations 
which are causally (but not cognitively) related to the perceived objects (Russell, 1914). Whether considered as a 
passive affection or an active ability of the mind, conscious perception unveil to us objects (inside the mind, or 
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must somehow receive them, or process them, independently. Actually, since the 50s it is 
known, mainly from anatomical considerations and studies of cortical lesions that cause 
specific problems of perception, that each sensory modality in the brain is mediated by a 
distinct sensory system with a largely independent processing: a well established principle of 
the organization of the brain is that it is structured in different specialized functional modules 
(Kolb and Whishaw, 1990). For example, while the area responsible for processing 
somatosensory information is located in the postcentral gyrus, the visual cortex is located in 
the occipital lobe near the calcarine fissure, the auditory cortex near the Heschl’s gyrus, the 
emotion content of perception is processed by the Amygdala, and the Hippocampus, in the 
temporal horn of the lateral ventricle, is responsible for the storing of information in long-
term memory.  
When we focus on the processing within a single specific sense modalility, we observe 
a further specialization: sensory and motor areas are functionally divided into primary, 
secondary and tertiary regions, depending on the distance, in terms of information processing, 
to the peripheral sensory and motor pathways. A complete retinotopic mapping, for example, 
is present in the primary area (V1) of the visual cortex, with individual cells firing selectively 
to color, contours and contrasts; in area V2, there are cells sensitive to illusory contours, and 
others capable of coding for differences such as those that determine if the image belongs to 
the main figure or to the background (Qiu and von der Heydt, 2005); information such as 
color and orientation of objects are decisive in the firing of some V4 cells, while specific 
neurons in area V5 are sensitive to movement in specific directions. Such functional 
specialization may be seen even within a single primary sensory region. The primary 
somatosensory cortex, for example, has topographic maps of the skin in four Brodmann’s 
areas (BAs): 3a, 3b, 1 and 2. Basic processing of tactile information takes place in area 3, 
while in areas 1 and 2 more complex processing is associated with neurons with larger and 
more stable receptive fields. In area 2, for example, there are neurons that respond by 
integrating information from tactile sensors and sensors sensitive to the position of the 
members.  
Recent studies using fMRI in natural conditions, while subjects watched a movie, have 
confirmed this functional specialization of the brain (Bartels and Zeki, 2004; 2005). It was 
observed that different areas, even within the visual cortex, responded to stimuli with 
                                                                                                                                                        
outside in the world) that are composed of a multiplicity of independent aspects, such that a conscious brain 
must be capable to individualize them in cognition.  
Introduction: Consciousness and the Brain  
 
 
15
different time courses. The activity time-course in each area could serve as a temporal 
fingerprint to be used to identify specialized cortical subdivisions, which corresponded 
anatomically across subjects with highly area-specific inter-subject correlations. In this 
scenario, our access to the multiplicity of experience is made possible by the brain through a 
series of parallel relays in which the information related to each feature such as color, motion, 
sound or smell is processed independently and simultaneously by functional modules.  
 
1.2.2 – The Unity of Experience and Integration in the Brain 
But if it is through such parallel processing that the brain begins to process what is 
received through the senses, it is also clear that our conscious experience is not formed only 
by a pure fragmented multiplicity of sensations without any unity. Instead, in any experience, 
however simple it may be, all the features that initially appear to be processed in parallel are 
integrated into a whole that we associate with the content of consciousness. If, by hypothesis, 
the brain is our means of access to such content, it is required therefore that somehow the 
information contained in primary sensory areas is combined and processed to be integrated to 
form a multi-modal unit. Indeed, a second organizational principle of the brain, responsible in 
part for such synthesis of modalities, is the hierarchical structure of its functional systems in 
stages of information processing (Kandel et al., 2000). It is well known, for instance, that 
neurons in the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus responds to light in specific regions 
of the visual field. These cells converge on cells in the primary visual cortex which in turn fire 
more selectively, only when a specific combination of thalamic inputs is active. Information 
about color, shape, and depth are added to processing in subsequent steps until, in areas of 
higher-level processing, neurons are able to respond to highly complex information, such as 
faces of familiar persons (Quiroga et al., 2005). A similar process is observed in the other 
sensory areas, so that each primary area serves as the input for higher-order adjacent areas, 
where information is processed and refined. The higher the processing level, the more abstract 
is the encoded information. 
This abstraction follows from unimodal association areas, up to a multi-modal 
integration. Several studies of lesions in the frontal, parietal and temporal lobes indicate that 
specific regions of the cortex are related to specific cognitive functions that depend on 
information from different sensory and motor modalities, including memory and emotional 
Introduction: Consciousness and the Brain  
 
 
16
centers (Etcoff et al., 1991; Damasio, 1994; Khan et al., 2011; Vallar, 2007). The limbic 
association area, in the medial edge of the cerebral hemisphere, integrates emotion and 
memory; regions of the angular gyrus are related to language and integrate both visual and 
somatosensory inputs; the posterior association area, between parietal, temporal and occipital 
lobes, integrates information from several sensory modalities enabling the perception of 
complex objects. Finally, association areas in the frontal lobe integrate information from both 
sensory and motor areas as well as from the remaining association cortex and are responsible 
for complex tasks such as contextual assessment and planning of the most appropriate 
behavior for a specific circumstance. 
We can then form a first image of how the content of experience is made available to 
us by the brain. A particular object gives us a series of sensations, each one related to a 
specific feature. Information about these features is processed in the primary sensory areas, 
and then follow in “bottom-up” circuits to areas that refine it and integrate it: the farther this 
information is from the pure multiplicity present in the initial sense-data, the closer it is to 
what we experience as the content of our thinking, an object or integrated scene composed of 
a multitude of features. 
This bottom-up hierarchy, however, could hardly be enough to provide us with the 
entire contents of our experiences. To be conscious is to be immersed in a world of content, 
where things perceived, thought, remembered are revealed as unified objects. This immersion, 
however, is not just a passive reception, but always takes place as a type of engagement. 
Phenomenology has long discussed the intentional character of experiences and cognition: 
when we are conscious we are directed towards something or some state of affairs. The 
world - sensuous, remembered, imagined, thought - does not just affect us, it is represented 
by us or disclosed to us: it has meaning. In particular, when we are aware of an object, we 
may have access not only to the object itself, but also to what it is like to be aware of it 
(Nagel, 1974). We are therefore “engaged” in our thoughts and perceptions, and this 
intentional engagement is, arguably, what characterizes conscious perception at the 
phenomenological level, distinguishing it from unconscious affection. Through this 
intentional character of consciousness, the world revealed to us is a dynamic world in which 
thoughts and perceptions follow each other, influencing each other reciprocally in a temporal 
unit (James, 1912). Something we see makes us think or imagine something else, which in 
turn brings us memories and emotions, in a way that these lead us to make plans and guide 
our actions, and can even change the way we perceive the world: we guide perception with 
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action and attention, we color the world with our emotions. And so the experience seems to 
take place through an intricate network of connections between the conscious subject and the 
objects of consciousness. In this scenario, it is difficult to imagine how the entanglement 
required by intentionality, this directedness towards its contents, can be made possible only 
through bottom-up thalamocortical circuits. The complete unit that we experience in 
consciousness seems to require that what is at the top of hierarchy of processing, which are 
supposed to refer to the things we think or perceive, can affect the perception and thinking in 
successive moments, allowing our access to the “what-it-is-like-ness” of its awareness. 
Moreover, even if it was possible to sustain this intricate relationship with a processing 
structure exclusively of the bottom-up type, certainly a restriction to such feedforward circuits 
would be a much more expensive way to program the interaction with the world. It is natural 
to assume, instead, that those cells of the primary areas of the cortex are not used only as 
relays of sensory maps, sending information to higher stages, but that they can also be called 
again by these same higher stages, so that the information processing required for experience 
can be more effective with a smaller number of basic units. These feedback loops would then 
be required to form the object of consciousness precisely for making available the means by 
which the above can influence what is below in the level of the hierarchy of information 
processing, and this would be related to the intentional unit that we observe in the object of 
consciousness.  
Anatomically, it is well known that sensory areas such as the visual cortex have a 
massive network of feedback loops (Salin and Bullier, 1995). Only recently, however, the key 
role of such circuits in visual perception has been shown. Studies of reversible inactivation of 
area V5 in monkeys demonstrated that cells from lower areas in the hierarchy of processing of 
visual information (V1, V2 and V3) are substantially reduced in response to visual stimuli 
when upper areas are temporarily inactive (Hupé et al., 1998). The feedback from upper areas 
of the visual cortex to primary areas would facilitate the identification and response to moving 
objects in the receptive field, increasing the removal of what belongs to the background 
stimulus. Further evidence of the role of such circuits in perception comes from studies of 
visual tasks in which longer delays between stimulus and response of primary cells are 
obtained. For example, during tasks of visual search, neurons in the primary cortex of 
monkeys fire with greater intensity if the object they search for is in their receptive fields. 
These more intense responses are however delayed approximately 200 ms with respect to 
initial activations to the onset of the search display, suggesting a feedback action (Gottlieb et 
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al., 1998; Motter, 1994) and indicating that backward connections are necessary for recurrent 
interactions among levels of cortical hierarchies (Garrido et al., 2007). Thus, cells from 
primary areas function as simple detectors of specific sensory aspects when they are in the 
early stages of perception (<80 ms), but in longer latencies they participate, through feedback 
connections from higher areas, of more complex processing systems involved in experience 
(Harrison et al., 2007; Huang et al. 2007; Lamme e Roelfsema, 2000).  
Some studies suggest that the mechanism of such feedback loops can extend beyond 
the corticocortical circuits, involving the thalamus in re-entry processes (Guillery and 
Sherman, 2002). So, higher-level sensory mechanisms are seen modulating the thalamic 
circuitry in ways that optimize abstraction of a meaningful representation of the external 
world, in a scenario in which conscious perception involve a dynamic interplay between the 
thalamus, lower and higher-order cortical areas (Cudeiro and Silito, 2006; Silito et al. 2006). 
Several other studies show the importance of feedback circuits for conscious perception, 
influencing attention in visual (Moran and Desimone, 1985) and auditory (Winkowski and 
Knudsen, 2006) processing, as well as memory retrieval (Tomita et al., 1999) and the ability 
of the brain to provide objects of the imagination (Kreiman et al., 2000) for both visual 
(Guariglia et al., 1993; Kosslyn et al., 1999; Miyashita, 1995) and musical imagery (Kraemer 
et al., 2005). 
 
1.2.3 – The Content of Consciousness and Causal Interactions in the Brain 
The above results indicate that the brain has a complex hierarchical structure of 
information processing in which specialized modules are causally connected by feedforward 
and feedback circuits, including via corticothalamocortical re-entries. Such brain organization 
also appears to be required by the phenomenological observations on the characteristics of the 
intentional content: a multitude of features integrated into composite units, influencing our 
perception, guiding our action, and towards which we are directed. From these considerations, 
then, emerges a scenario of how the brain may sustain our access to the objects of 
consciousness. When consciously perceived, objects in the world should be able to cause a 
cascade of interactions involving the thalamus and the cortex, allowing neural activity to 
travel causally between several specific cortical areas: from the thalamus to primary sensory 
regions and from these to unimodal associative areas, moving in feedforward into the 
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multimodal associative cortex and from both associative areas, by feedback circuits, to 
sensory areas, also re-entering the system via complex corticothalamocortical projections. In 
this scenario, the set of causal interactions between the various specialized areas of the 
thalamocortical system appears as a mechanism that would allow us to access the contents of 
intentionality. We are then naturally led to the idea that, whether our consciousness is 
something that depends only on internal brain functions, whether it is an intricate way of 
interacting with the external world, the way to access to the contents of consciousness, 
without which the experience itself is empty - without which, therefore, there is no experience 
- depends on a certain capacity of the brain: the capacity of the thalamocortical system to 
sustain this complex network of causal interactions. 
Such interactions clearly coordinate opposing forces: specialized functional modules 
with independent activities coexist with a mutual integration that tends to inhibit such 
independence. If the contents of consciousness are disclosed to us from this balance of 
opposing forces, it is natural to assume that this takes place in a situation of dynamic 
equilibrium. Integration can not be so strong that it could inhibit the independent processing 
of multiple features, since in this case the object of consciousness as an integrated multiple 
would become unavailable; on the other hand, this integration can not be so weak that the 
unity of the object is lost, leaving only a fragmented multiple. Thus, since this dynamic 
balance required by the content of that we experience certainly depends on 
neurophysiological properties of the thalamocortical system, the investigation of the ability of 
such a system to sustain this dynamic equilibrium of causal activations emerges, in this 
scenario, as a possible way to probe what could be called the brain’s capacity for 
consciousness. 
 
1.3 – TMS/hd-EEG: a Window to Causality in the Brain 
An immediate limitation imposed on techniques that aim to reveal the nature of such 
causal interactions, hypothesized to be involved in the conscious processing of information, is 
the temporal resolution of the corresponding neural activation record. The feedforward sweep 
of visual perception, for example, is estimated to be completed in about 80-100 ms (Nowak 
and Bullier, 1998; Schmolesky et al., 1998), while recurrent connections operate up to a 
latency of around 300 ms (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Roelfsema et al., 1998). Therefore, 
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under the demand of a time scale of a few milliseconds, electroencephalography (EEG) and 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) appear as the best methods available to explore, in a non-
invasive way, the causal processes involved in consciousness. 
Some conceivable electrophysiological measures of causality have been proposed in 
connection with theoretical perspectives of consciousness (Seth et al., 2006). Tononi and 
Edelman (1998), for example, focused on the relevance of causal processes to consciousness, 
such as those involved in thalamocortical re-entry, and introduced a measurement of 
complexity which is sensitive to the balance between the degrees of segregation and 
integration of a physical system. Neural Complexity, as it is called, is based on the amount of 
information shared by the parts of the system. It is calculated by observing the spontaneous 
activity of parts of the system and estimating the sum of the average mutual information 
across all bipartitions of the system. In addition to depend on the calculation of all bipartitions 
of the system, a task computationally prohibitive for large networks, this measure is 
symmetric between the parts and therefore unable to capture the causal link between brain 
areas, but only their statistical correlations. Seth's suggestion to introduce the required 
asymmetry for estimating causality is to apply Granger’s statistical measure to the set of 
temporal series of the system (Seth, 2005). Granger Causality infers causality between signals 
from the ability to predict a signal from another one: if a signal causes a second signal, then 
past values of the first should contain information that helps predict the second, above and 
beyond the information contained in past values of the second signal alone. This measure, 
however, is also difficult to apply directly to the brain, since Granger causality depends on the 
correct estimation of a multivariate regression model of the thalamocortical system and the 
number of parameters that should be estimated in these models grows in proportion to the 
square of the number of elements in the network. In addition to this difficulty of 
implementation, the application of Granger Causality is not able to overcome the general 
problem of inferring causality from the spontaneous activity of a system. What we actually 
observe with the measure of Granger is the ability to statistically predict a signal in a future 
time from another signal in a previous time. However, if the fact that one signal causes 
another implies the ability to better predict the second signal by using the information 
contained in the first one, the reverse is not true: we can not always infer causality from 
statistical prediction. For example, applying Granger Causality to the time-varying, complex 
correlations among retinal neurons that are responding to a rich visual scene may lead one to 
the conclusion that activity of some retina neurons is causally determined by the activity of 
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other retina neurons. However, it is enough to perturb a few retinal elements and to record 
from the rest of the cells to realize that, to a large extent, the retina is actually composed of 
segregated modules that do not interact with each other and the activity that seems to be due 
to a causal influence of a part of the system over another one may actually be caused by a 
single common input external to the system. 
How should we then proceed to measure causal interactions in thalamocortical 
system? In general, inferring the causal influence of one system on another depends on more 
than just a passive observation of the activity of the parties involved, requiring also an 
adequate control of other environmental variables, presumably relevant to the dynamics of the 
systems studied. This control is usually obtained by a perturbational approach. Let A and B be 
two systems immersed in an environment E. If one induces a controlled activity in B, keeping 
E invariant, and observes a subsequent significant response in A which is not seen when B is 
not stimulated, one have only then justified reasons to infer that B was able to causally 
influence A. Thus, the best way to access causal activation inside the thalamocortical system 
depends on the possibility of stimulating in a controlled way a specific area of the brain and to 
register the subsequent response of the rest of the system. Averaging out environmental 
variations by applying statistical measures to the response of the system, one could then 
safely infer causal influences of the perturbed area in the responding cortical regions. In order 
to accomplish this, one should employ a technique that directly stimulates the cerebral cortex, 
avoiding possible subcortical filtering or gating, and record the neural effects of the 
perturbation with the appropriate temporal resolution. Today, such a perturbational approach 
to explore causality in the thalamocortical system can be implemented non-invasively in 
humans (Paus, 2005), thanks to the development of a novel electrophysiological technique 
based on the combination of navigated transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and high-
density electroencephalography (hd-EEG). 
 
1.3.1 – Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
TMS is the application of a short magnetic pulse to the cortex, resulting in the 
induction of an electric field on the surface of the cortex and subsequent neural activity or 
changes in resting potentials (Walsh and Pascual-Leone, 2003). In TMS, intense current (8 
kA) resulting from the discharge of a capacitor passes through a coil, producing a strong 
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magnetic pulse (2-3 T) with a short duration (about 1 ms and a rise time of approximately 
100-200 μs). A figure-eight coil-shape is normally used for its ability to produce a more 
focused magnetic pulse due to the sum of the magnetic fields produced by the reverse coils 
inside the target area and their cancellation outside it. The volume stimulated under a standard 
figure-eight-shape coil is estimated to comprise an area of up to 12 cm2 on the cortical surface 
(20 mm below the coil), and to be reduced to zero within 2 to 3 cm of cortical depth (Barker, 
1999). When the orientation of the electric field lines in relation to the axons forms a field 
gradient across the surface of the neuron, the induced current is able to activate the neuron 
(Ruohonen and Ilmoniemi, 1999). Through this type of mechanism, TMS induces neural 
activation mainly in interneurons parallel to the cortical surface or pyramidal neurons bended 
with respect to the coil's orthogonal direction, without being able to distinguish between 
inhibitory or excitatory neurons, nor between orthodromic and antidromic direction of 
stimulation. 
TMS is used in studies that range from the cortical physiology and brain plasticity to 
therapeutic applications (Hallett, 2000). For our purposes, the importance of TMS is to allow 
for the direct stimulation, in a controlled and non-invasive way, of specific functional 
modules of the cortical surface. Several studies indicate the functional specificity of the 
primary effects of TMS. For example, TMS can produce muscle twitches when applied to the 
motor cortex (Barker et al., 1985), phosphenes when applied to the visual cortex (Kastner et 
al., 1998; Meyer et al., 1991) and speech arrest when applied to the frontal cortex (Pascual-
Leone et al., 1991). Furthermore, studies combining TMS with positron emission tomography 
(PET) and fMRI reinforce the TMS focality by reporting that the neural activation induced by 
TMS is initially restricted only to areas located immediately below the coil, and secondarily 
spreads to those brain regions that are connected with the stimulation site (Paus et al., 1997; 
2001, Siebner et al., 1998). 
Also, as TMS stimulates the cerebral cortex directly, it can activate cortical neurons 
with a wide range of stimulation intensities, without being constrained by the physiology of 
peripheral receptors and nerves, providing full excitability profiles from threshold to 
saturation (Kähkönen et al., 2005b; 2005c; Komssi et al., 2004). Moreover, TMS does not 
depend on the integrity/status of sensory and motor systems and can be applied to any patient 
(de-afferentated, paralyzed, unconscious) and to any cortical area (primary and associative). 
Finally, by integrating TMS with MRI-guided infra-red navigation systems, which employs a 
3D infrared Tracking Position Sensor Unit to map the positions of TMS coil and subject's 
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head within the reference space of individual structural MRI, it is also possible to render the 
perturbation controllable and reproducible, in most cortical regions. 
 
1.3.2 – The Combination of TMS with High-density Electroencephalography (TMS/hd-EEG) 
Above the direct stimulation of specific regions of the cortex in a non-invasive, 
reproducible and controlled way, the investigation of the patterns of causal activation in the 
thalamocortical system also depends on the possibility to record the response of this system to 
the stimulus in adequate time resolution. The development of multichannel TMS-compatible 
EEG amplifiers (Virtanen et al., 1999) has recently opened the possibility of combining TMS 
with hd-EEG, thus recording the electrical response of the human brain to the direct cortical 
stimulation with excellent temporal resolution (Iramina et al., 2003; Komssi and Kähkönen, 
2006; Thut et al., 2005). The TMS-compatible EEG amplifier gates the TMS artefact and 
prevents saturation by means of a proprietary sample-and-hold circuit that keeps the analog 
output of the amplifier constant between 100 μs before and 2 ms after the stimulus (Virtanen 
et al., 1999). This device guarantees total absence of TMS-induced magnetic artefacts in most 
EEG recordings and artefact-free EEG recordings from 8 ms after stimulus, in all cases.  
It is worth highlighting some of the specific advantages that TMS/hd-EEG may offer 
as a tool to probe the brain (Massimini et al., 2009): 
1. TMS-evoked activations are intrinsically causal. Thus, unlike methods based on 
temporal correlations, TMS/hd-EEG immediately captures the ability of different elements of 
a system to affect each other. 
2. TMS/hd-EEG bypasses sensory pathways and subcortical structures to probe 
directly the thalamocortical system. Therefore, unlike peripherally evoked potentials and 
evoked motor activations, TMS/hd-EEG does not depend on the integrity of sensory and 
motor systems and can access any patient (deafferentated or paralysed). Moreover, with TMS 
one can stimulate most cortical areas (including associative cortices) employing several 
different parameters (intensity, angle, current direction), thus probing a vast repertoire of 
possible responses, above and beyond observable ongoing brain states. 
3. TMS-evoked potentials can be recorded with millisecond resolution, a time scale 
that is adequate to capture effective synaptic interactions among neurons. 
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4. TMS/hd-EEG does not require the subject to be involved in a task and the observed 
activations are not affected either by the willingness of the patient to participate or by his 
effort and performance. Hence, this approach is well suited to assess the objective capacity of 
thalamocortical circuits independently on behaviour. 
5. TMS/hd-EEG can be made portable in order to overcome the logistical and 
economic hurdles that may separate severely brain-injured patients from advanced imaging 
facilities. 
 
1. 4 - Plan of the Thesis 
Phenomenological considerations on the nature of the intentional content of 
consciousness and the neurophysiological findings that suggest how this content is processed 
by the brain indicate that the support of conscious experience depends on the ability of the 
thalamocortical system to process information causally, integrating various specialized areas 
of the cortex at different moments. This study aims to apply a perturb-and-measure approach 
to the human thalamocortical system, through the combination of TMS and hd-EEG, to 
investigate the characteristics of these causal activations allegedly involved in conscious 
experience, for the introduction of a feasible empirical measure which allows for the 
discrimination between conscious and unconscious subjects. 
A first step in this direction involves the development of standardized and data-driven 
procedures which are capable of describing the causal responses to TMS in the brain. In 
Chapter 2 we expose such methods to extract, from the raw EEG data, and passing through 
source activity reconstruction and non-parametric statistical analysis, a limited set of 
informative indices which are capable to quantitatively characterize different properties of the 
stimulated neuronal circuits, such as threshold for activation, cortico–cortical delays and 
patterns of neural connectivity.  
Chapter 3 reports our results obtained from applying these methods in the study of the 
cortical activation evoked by TMS across subjects under different conditions:  healthy 
subjects during alert wakefulness, slow-wave sleep, REM sleep and anesthesia; conscious 
locked-in patients and brain-injured, non-communicating patients who recovered from coma 
into different clinical states. In all cases, what fundamentally distinguished TMS-evoked 
responses when consciousness was unambiguously present from responses in conditions in 
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which consciousness was unambiguously reduced was an overall reduction of the complexity 
of the spatiotemporal cortical activation induced by the perturbation during loss of 
consciousness. Moreover, this spatiotemporal complexity consistently increased during the 
recovery of cognitive function underlying the evolution from vegetative state to minimally 
conscious state in brain-injured patients. 
Motivated by these results, we introduce in Chapter 4 a feasible measure of the 
spatiotemporal complexity of the cortical activity evoked by TMS, called Perturbational 
Complexity Index (PCI). PCI is high only if many regions of the cerebral cortex react to the 
initial perturbation quickly and in a differentiated way. Remarkably, in a total of 116 TMS 
sessions collected from 19 healthy subjects and 17 brain injured patients, we invariably found 
high PCI values in conditions in which consciousness was unambiguously present (alert 
wakefulness in healthy subjects and locked-in patients) and low PCI values in conditions in 
which consciousness was clearly reduced (sleep, anaesthesia and vegetative state). This 
difference allowed for the reliable and robust discrimination between conscious and 
unconscious healthy subjects, producing disjoint distributions that were independent of the 
stimulation parameters, the strength and the extent of the cortical activation. Moreover, when 
PCI was measured in brain-injured patients who recovered consciousness from the vegetative 
state, it increased progressively in parallel with the level of consciousness. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to a discussion of possible mechanisms underlying the loss of the 
thalamocortical capacity to sustain spatiotemporal complex patterns of causal activations 
during LOC. We will also discuss the limitations and advantages of PCI as well as its 
potential application toward developing a science of consciousness.  
 
 
 Chapter 2. 
Methods on TMS/hd-EEG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The combination of transcranial magnetic stimulation with high-density 
electroencephalography is potentially capable of providing direct access to causal processes in 
the brain which are supposedly relevant to an empirical investigation of the nature of 
consciousness. In such a project, the application of TMS/hd-EEG to the thalamocortical 
system aims mainly at the study of neural activity that is not produced randomly, nor results 
from a common input ruling segregated functional modules, which is not a stereotyped 
response to stimulation and neither express mere temporal correlation, but that originates 
exclusively from the causal interaction between the parts of the neural circuitry involved. 
Therefore, the exploitation of this potential of TMS/hd-EEG depends on developing methods 
of analysis that, using the EEG signal produced in response to TMS, result in a quantitative 
description of neural activation arising exclusively from causal interactions between the parts 
of the thalamocortical system. 
In this chapter, after describing the procedures involved in TMS/hd-EEG recording, 
we answer four questions that lead us to a standardized and data-driven signal processing 
method to qualify and quantify neural activation of causal origin within the thalamocortical 
system: 1) Does the EEG response to TMS reflect particular properties of stimulated circuits 
rather than stereotypical and/or random reactions? 2) How to extract a signal of neural 
activation from the EEG? 3) How to access the components of such a response that are 
produced exclusively by causal interactions in the stimulated circuits? 4) Can we quantify 
relevant characteristics of such circuits to describe the cortical activation evoked by TMS? 
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2.1 – TMS/hd-EEG Recording 
We begin by describing the general procedure employed in the recording of the EEG 
potentials evoked by TMS, which will then be the object of our attention in this and in the 
following chapters. 
  
2.1.1 – TMS Targeting  
A Focal Bipulse 8-Coil (mean/outer winding diameter ca. 50/70 mm, biphasic pulse 
shape, pulse length ca. 280 s, focal area of the stimulation hot spot 0.68 cm2) driven by a 
Mobile Stimulator Unit (Eximia TMS Stimulator, Nexstim Ltd., Helsinki, Finland) was 
targeted to specific cortical locations using a Navigated Brain Stimulation (NBS) system 
(Nexstim Ltd., Helsinki, Finland).  Structural MRI images at 1 mm3 spatial resolution were 
acquired with a 1T Philips scanner from all subjects enrolled in the studies. The NBS system 
employs a 3D infrared Tracking Position Sensor Unit to map the positions of TMS coil and 
subject’s head within the reference space of individual structural MRI in order to precisely 
identify the TMS stimulation target. Optimal alignment between MRI fiducials and digitized 
scalp landmarks (nasion, left and right tragus) was verified prior to all experiments. NBS also 
calculates on-line the distribution and intensity of the intracranial electric field induced by 
TMS, using a best-fitting spherical model of subjects’ head and brain and taking into account 
the exact shape, 3D position and orientation of the coil. TMS hot spot (i.e. 98% of the 
maximum stimulating electric field calculated at individually-determined depth) was kept 
fixed to the stimulation target with the current perpendicular to its main axis. The 
reproducibility of the stimulation coordinates across sessions was guaranteed by an aiming 
device that indicated in real-time any deviation from the desired target greater than 3 mm. 
 
2.1.2 – hd-EEG Recording 
TMS-evoked potentials were recorded by a TMS-compatible 60-channel EEG 
amplifier (Nexstim Ltd., Helsinki, Finland). Impedance at all electrodes was kept below 5 kΩ. 
The EEG signals, referenced to an additional electrode on the forehead, were filtered (0.1-500 
Hz) and sampled at 1,450 Hz with 16 bit resolution. At the end of each experiment, a pen 
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visible to the infrared camera was used to digitise the EEG electrode positions on the 
subject’s head. Two extra electrodes were used to record the vertical electrooculogram 
(EOG).  
During EEG recording, subject’s perception of the clicks produced by TMS coil’s 
discharge was eliminated by means of inserted earplugs continuously playing a masking noise 
(always below 90 dB). A thin layer of foam was placed between coil and scalp (resulting in 
less than 1 mm thickness when coil was pressed against the head) in order to attenuate bone 
conduction. As previously demonstrated, this procedure effectively prevented any 
contamination of EEG signals by auditory potentials elicited by TMS-associated clicks 
(Massimini et al., 2005; 2007). 
 
2.1.3 – EEG Pre-processing 
Trials containing activity from other sources than neural were automatically rejected if 
EOG exceeded 70 μV (ocular activity) and/ or absolute power of EEG channel F8 in the fast 
beta range (N25 Hz) exceeded 0.9 μV2/Hz (van de Velde et al., 1998) (indicating activity of 
fronto-temporal muscles). After averaging, channels with bad signal quality or large residual 
artifacts were excluded from further analysis. In all TMS sessions we retained at least 50 good 
channels, with an inter-session variation of at most 4 channels in each subject, thus ensuring 
an estimation of cortical generators that was reliable and comparable across sessions (Laarne 
et al., 2000). Before source modeling, signals were low pass filtered (80 Hz), down-sampled 
to 362.5 Hz and re-referenced to the common average reference. Figure 2.1A exhibits an 
example of pre-processed single-subject TMS-evoked potentials after stimulation of BA19. 
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Figure 2.1: Single-subject TMS-evoked potentials. A) Top Left: Location of the TMS 
stimulation target (left superior occipital lobule, BA 19) is shown on individual MRI, 
together with the approximate distribution of the electric field induced by TMS pulses 
in the cortex. The orange spots represent the digitized positions of EEG electrodes on 
the scalp. Right: Averaged TMS-evoked potentials recorded from 60 electrodes on the 
scalp at three different intensities of stimulation (red 118V/m, blue 84V/m, black 
49V/m). Approximate location of the TMS target is reported with a red circle. Bottom 
left: zoom on averaged EOG activity, TMS-evoked potentials recorded on PO3 lead, 
and also during a sham TMS session, when the TMS coil was discharged while 
separated from the scalp by a 4 cm Plexiglas cube.  B) Superimposition of the 
averaged TMS-evoked potentials recorded from all channels (Butterfly plot) at a 
stimulation intensity of 118V/m. Color-coded instantaneous topographic distribution of 
the potential on the scalp is displayed for 7 relevant time samples after TMS pulse 
delivery. 
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2.2 – Does the response to TMS reflect particular properties of stimulated 
circuits rather than stereotypical and/or random reactions? 
A first step to correctly interpret the nature of TMS-evoked potentials is to establish to 
what extent responses to TMS are non-random or specific when stimulation parameters and 
other environmental factors are kept constant, and to what extent they are non-stereotypical or 
sensitive to variations of stimulation parameters. Unlike sensory stimulation, TMS activates 
simultaneously a rather large cortical volume containing both inhibitory and excitatory fibers, 
possibly belonging to different functional subsystems. Thus, it is possible that different TMS 
perturbations may result in EEG responses that engage many different circuits and that are 
largely overlapping. In addition, TMS not only perturbs cortical neurons directly but may also 
activate the brain indirectly, due to the stimulation of scalp nerves and to the click sound 
associated with the coil’s discharge, when unmasked, over the subject’s head. For this reason, 
it is also conceivable that differences in the brain’s reaction to different cortical perturbation 
may be partially obliterated by an invariant event-related potential triggered by an unwanted 
somatosensory or/and acoustic stimulation. Altogether, these factors may significantly 
hamper the sensitivity of TMS-evoked potentials. On the other hand, due to the complexity of 
the technique, TMS-evoked potentials may also lack specificity, by showing accidental 
changes related to stimulation/recordings errors. In fact, stimulating directly the cortical 
surface involves the control of several factors, since  a large number of cortical locations can 
be arbitrarily selected and perturbed, each one with several stimulation parameters (e.g. 
intensity, time-course, and orientation of the magnetic field). Thus, a lack of precise control of 
these parameters across subsequent TMS/hd-EEG sessions may result in large measurement 
errors and in an apparent modulation of cortical responsiveness. Similarly, other factors, such 
as EEG sensors positioning, coil temperature, calibration of amplifiers, etc., may, if not 
adequately controlled, affect the specificity of TMS-evoked potentials. 
Separate experimental evidences have suggested that TMS-evoked potentials have a 
certain degree of sensitivity to changes in stimulation parameters, such as location (Komssi et 
al., 2002;  Kähkönen et al., 2004), intensity (Komssi et al., 2004; Kähkönen et al., 2005b) and 
direction of the induced current with respect to the cortical surface (Bonato et al., 2006). 
Moreover, a few works have demonstrated that TMS-evoked potentials can also detect 
changes in the state of cortical circuits, such as the ones induced by alcohol intake 
(Kähkönen, 2005), by falling asleep (Massimini et al., 2005; 2007) and by induction of 
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cortical potentiation with repetitive TMS (Esser at al., 2006). Specificity has been evaluated at 
the group level and the amplitude and latency of selected components of TMS-evoked 
potentials tend to be stable over time when stimulation parameters are constant (Lioumis et 
al., 2009). 
But in actual fact, deciding whether a change in the EEG response to TMS is 
biologically relevant, or not, requires a systematic quantification of the trade-off between 
sensitivity and specificity. In Casarotto et al (2010) we addressed this question by performing 
a statistical joint evaluation of the sensitivity and specificity of TMS/hd-EEG measures. In 
order to test for sensitivity, subjects were submitted to different, randomly ordered, TMS 
sessions in the same day (day1), varying only one stimulation parameter at a time (either 
stimulation site, or stimulation intensity, or angle of the TMS-induced current). TMS-evoked 
potentials were considered sensitive to the extent that they changed when stimulation 
parameters were changed. In order to evaluate specificity, a subset of TMS sessions was 
repeated later in the same day (day1) as well as one week later (day8), without changing any 
stimulation parameter. TMS-evoked potentials were considered specific to the extent that they 
did not change over time when stimulation parameters were kept constant (thus, in the present 
context specificity is related to test-retest reproducibility).  
 
2.2.1 – Quantifying sensitivity and specificity: the Divergence Index (DI) 
By performing single-subject pairwise comparisons of the TMS-evoked potentials we 
could evaluate sensitivity when the sessions compared have different simulation parameters - 
“change comparisons” (C) - and specificity when they have identical stimulation parameters - 
“no change comparisons” (NC). In order to quantify the diversity of TMS-evoked responses 
in C and NC comparisons, we applied non-parametric statistics and computed the percentage 
of spatial-temporal samples that differed significantly between two sessions of TMS-evoked 
potentials (Divergence Index – DI).  At first, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test was applied to check 
that the baselines (250 ms pre-stimulus) of the single trials, contributing to the two TMS-
evoked potentials to be compared, had the same distribution. In case of a negative result, the 
most deviated trials were removed and the test was repeated until the baseline distributions of 
the two groups of trials were statistically equivalent (p>0.05). At this point, we could test the 
null hypothesis that two sets of TMS-evoked potentials are equivalent. If this is the case, 
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“mixing” together, in any random combination, the single trials collected during the two 
TMS/hd-EEG sessions should always result in the same TMS-evoked potential. Otherwise, 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. Thus, for each comparison, 1000 “mixed” TMS-evoked 
potentials were obtained by randomly mixing and averaging 1000 times the single trials 
collected in two different sessions (Figure 2.2 A, B).  The set of 1000 values at each post-
stimulus time sample represented the instantaneous empirical null probabilistic distribution of 
the voltage of the TMS-evoked potentials. In order to correct for multiple comparisons in 
time, we computed a single  distribution for the whole time interval as follows: i) all 
instantaneous distributions were centralized around zero, by shifting them by an amount  δ(t) 
(Figure 2.2C); ii) for each centralized distribution, we computed the maximum absolute value 
(Figure 2.2D); iii) the one-tail (1-α)100th percentile of the distribution of the maximum 
absolute values was used to estimate a significance threshold G for the whole time window of 
interest (Figure 2.2D); iv) two boundaries were computed as (+G+δ(t)) and (–G+δ(t)). The 
temporal profile of these boundaries is modulated by δ(t), since G is a fixed threshold. The 
null hypothesis of equivalence between two TMS-evoked responses at each time sample t was 
rejected with probability of false positives α corrected for multiple comparisons when at least 
one of the two original potentials at that time sample lay beyond the significance threshold 
(Figure 2.2E). Finally, for each comparison the DI was defined as the percentage of 
significantly different time samples in the first 250 ms post-stimulus in all 60 EEG channels 
out of the total number of spatial-temporal samples. In this way, the DI was systematically 
calculated at the sensor level for all pair-wise comparisons (n= 92).  
 
2.2.2 – TMS-evoked potentials are sensitive and specific for changes in perturbation 
parameters 
We performed a total of 62 C comparisons with data obtained from ten right handed 
healthy volunteers enrolled into the study: 22 comparisons for stimulation site varying 
between BA6, BA7, and BA19; 20 comparison changing stimulation intensity from I% and 
I%+10% (I%, expressed as a percentage of maximum stimulator’s output of the stimulator, 
was kept between 40-75% for all subjects, corresponding to an electric field between 110-120 
V/m on the cortical surface); and 20 comparisons varying stimulation angle (10 comparisons 
0° vs. 45° and 10 comparisons 0° vs. 90°). We also performed 3 NC comparisons for each 
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subject with identical sessions repeated in the same day (10 comparisons) and one week apart 
(20 comparisons). 
 
Figure 2.2: Non-parametric statistical procedure to perform single-subject pairwise 
comparisons between TMS-evoked potentials. Single-trial recordings from two different 
conditions (blue and red lines) were randomly mixed 1000 times (A) and averaged (B). 
Instantaneous distributions of averaged voltages were computed and centralized around zero 
by keeping record of the displacement δ(t) (C). The distribution of maximum absolute 
values of each centralized distribution was computed and used to define a significance 
threshold G as the (1-α)100th percentile (D). Significance boundaries (gray dotted lines) 
were computed as (±G + δ(t)) and used to define the significantly different time samples 
(red stars) between conditions at a specific channel (E) (adapted from Casarotto et al., 
2010). 
 
Results of a representative subject are reported in Figure 2.3. While TMS-evoked 
scalp potentials and cortical currents tended to overlap in the NC comparison, they were 
clearly characterized by divergent spatiotemporal patterns in all the C comparisons, 
suggesting that the spatiotemporal characteristics of the brain response to a direct perturbation 
markedly depended on each and every stimulation parameter, e.g. site, intensity and angle.   
 
Methods on TMS/hd-EEG  
 
 
34
 
 
Figure 2.3: Results of pairwise comparisons between TMS-evoked potentials of a 
representative subject. Here, one particular TMS/hd-EEG session (stimulation of 
BA19 at I% intensity and 0°  angle on day1) is taken as a reference (blue) and compared 
with four other sessions (red), where  stimulation parameters are varied one at a time. 
Specifically, the site (BA19 vs. BA6), the intensity (I% vs. I%+10%), the angle (0 vs. 
45°) and the day (day1 vs. day8) of stimulation were varied, resulting in three C 
comparisons and one NC comparison. For each comparison, superimposition of pairs of 
TMS-evoked potentials in all sensors is displayed in the panel A, while enlarged view 
of P1 channel is shown in the panel B, together with significance boundaries (dotted 
gray traces) and significantly different samples (red stars) (adapted from Casarotto et 
al., 2010). 
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Figure 2.4A summarizes the general results obtained from all subjects: each coloured 
dot represents the DI computed for a specific pairwise comparison.  
Generally, comparing the brain responses evoked by TMS pulses delivered over 
different cortical sites revealed obvious differences in the space distribution and time course 
of voltages and currents, and the average DI of all 22 C comparisons between different 
stimulation sites was 11.45 ± 5.7% (range 3-19.7%).  
Varying stimulation intensity resulted in amplitude and latency changes of the main 
TMS-evoked components, while the general topographical distribution of voltages and 
currents tended to be preserved. The average DI across the 20 C comparisons between 
different intensities of stimulation (Figure 2.4A, black dots) was 10.88 ± 6% (range: 2.31-
22.2%).  
When changing the angle of the TMS-induced current, the morphology of cortical 
responses varied in a rather unpredictable way. The average DI value was 3.92 ± 3% (range: 
0.7-13.8%), with no systematic difference between 0° vs. 45° and 0° vs. 90° pairwise 
comparisons.  
Finally, when TMS was applied with identical stimulation parameters at different 
times, the morphology and the spatial-temporal dynamics of TMS-evoked potentials were 
largely preserved. The average DI was 0.28±0.4% (range 0-1.2%) when comparing same-day 
recordings and 0.43±0.4% (range: 0-1.67%) for pairwise comparisons between one-week-
apart sessions. 
Fig 2.4B shows that the relative difference in DI values is preserved across latencies. 
For each type of pairwise comparison, the average DI computed at early latencies (0-60 ms) 
was significantly higher (p < 0.05) as compared to the one computed for late latencies (120-
250 ms), although the relative differences among types of comparison were preserved across 
all time intervals (p < 0.01). 
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Figure 2.4: Divergence Index of all pairwise comparisons between TMS-evoked 
potentials. Single DI values computed over the entire post-stimulus period (250 ms) are 
shown (A) with the following color-coding: DIs of the C comparisons for changes in the 
stimulation site, intensity and angle are represented by cyan, black and green dots, 
respectively, while DIs of NC comparisons are depicted in yellow for same-day sessions 
and in red for one-week-apart sessions. DI values computed over different temporal 
windows of interest (0–60 ms, 60–120 ms, 120–250 ms) are reported in the panel B with 
the same color-coding, except for NC comparisons that are summed together and plotted 
in orange (adapted from Casarotto et al., 2010). 
 
At this point, considering each DI as a threshold, we performed receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) analysis and we computed the true positive rate or sensitivity rate (the 
number of C comparisons with DI > threshold) and the true negative rate or specificity rate 
(the number of NC comparisons with a DI < threshold). Plotting the ROC curve as sensitivity 
vs specificity, the optimal DI threshold was set in correspondence to the maximum of the 
Younden index (Younden, 1950), computed as [sensitivity + specificity - 1].  The optimal DI  
threshold according to Younden index was 1.67% and yielded a 95.1% sensitivity and 100% 
specificity, corresponding to an overall accuracy of 96.7%. The efficacy of DI in reliably 
quantifying the pairwise differences between TMS-evoked potentials was 99.1%. 
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These results confirm that TMS-evoked potentials, rather than being stereotypical or 
noisy responses, reflect, to a large extent, deterministic properties of the stimulated cortical 
circuits. Changing stimulation parameters almost invariably resulted in higher DIs compared 
to the no-change conditions. Importantly, this finding was not limited to the early latencies, 
and indeed DI values for the C conditions were significantly larger until 250 ms post-
stimulus. This evidence demonstrates that the EEG response to TMS is primarily due to direct 
cortical stimulation and to the ensuing reverberation of activity in a specific network of 
connected elements. Indeed, changing the site of stimulation resulted in very different 
responses and in high DI values that were even higher when the responses triggered in areas 
located far away (area 19 vs. area 6) where compared. This variability in the cortical response 
reflects specific properties of the stimulated circuits and may be ascribed to local differences 
in cortical excitability (Kähkönen et al., 2005), to differences in the frequency tuning of 
corticothalamic modules (Kähkönen et al., 2005b) and to differences in the pattern of cortico-
cortical connectivity (Ilmoniemi et al., 1997; Komssi et al., 2002). 
Moreover, TMS-evoked potentials, besides being sensitive to changes, are also very 
stable over time. Repeating after one week a given perturbation and observing a DI >1.67% 
would strongly indicate that, in the mean time, some change occurred in the brain circuits. In 
principle, identifying a cut-off level above which one can decide whether a change in brain 
responsiveness occurred, or not, is crucial if one wants to use TMS/hd-EEG to track over time 
pathological alterations, plastic changes and therapy-induced modifications in cortical circuits 
 
2.3 – How to extract a signal of neural activation from the EEG? 
Postsynaptic potentials generated among the dendrites of pyramidal cortical neurons 
are believed to be the main contributors to EEG signal (Nunez and Silberstein, 2000). They 
typically last longer than the rapidly firing action potentials traveling along the axons of 
excited neurons and therefore are more likely to be synchronized.  Also, the pyramidal 
cortical neurons are best fitted to contribute to the electric potential differences measured in 
the scalp because they have large dendritic trunks normally pointing perpendicularly to the 
cortical surface with similar spatial orientation.  
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The potential differences associated to these postsynaptic potentials generate 
intracellular post synaptic currents (called primary, or generator currents) as well as a loop of 
extracellular currents that flow through the volume conductor (called secondary, return, or 
volume currents). Both primary and secondary currents contribute to electric scalp potentials 
and localizing the primary electromagnetic sources of EEG activity is a major problem in any 
attempt to access neural activity generated exclusively by the causal effect of a neuronal 
group on another set of neurons. The solution of this so called inverse problem evolves a 
two-step procedure that eliminates the impact of the secondary currents flowing in the tissue. 
The first step takes into account geometrical and physical properties of the head in order to 
construct a model of the transmission of currents within the volume conductor called the 
forward model. The second step involves estimating the location of the primary currents in 
the cerebral cortex associated to the EEG signal. 
 
2.3.1 – The Forward Model 
Modeling the propagation of electromagnetic field through the different tissues of the 
head depends on the parametric representation of the sources and the model of the physical 
and geometrical properties of the head. Given that a vast class of complex currents can be 
expressed as sums of dipolar sources, the first task is normally achieved by modeling the 
primary currents as a set of equivalent dipoles representing the total activation of pyramidal 
cells in a given cortical region. As the electrophysiological signals typically have frequencies 
bellow 1kHz, the Maxwell’s Equations that govern the dipolar approximation may be further 
simplified in the quasi-static limit. With these assumptions, the divergence free current 
density acting as source determine the voltage at scalp sensors by the following linear 
algebraic model (Baillet, 2001; Mosher et al. 1999): 
                                                                                                                        (2.1) 
where v = v(xe,t,k) is the data vector containing the scalp potentials of a generic trial k  {1, 
2,…, Nk},  recorded at time t from Ne electrodes located at spatial coordinates xe; j = j(xj,t,k) 
is the corresponding source vector containing the instantaneous electrical activity of Nj 
dipole-like primary sources located at spatial coordinates xj on a fixed grid, covering brain 
cortex;  = (xe,t,k) is an instantaneous additive measurement noise; and G=G(xe,,xj) is the 
εjGv 
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forward operator defining the electric potential propagation in head tissues and depends only 
on the geometrical and physical properties of the head and on the relative positions between 
sensors and sources. 
The head model routinely used in most clinical and research applications assumes 
three concentric spheres with different homogeneous conductivity, representing the best-
fitting spheres of inner skull, outer skull and scalp compartments extracted from individual 
MRIs (Zang, 1995). The solution to the field’s equations determining the forward operator of 
the 3-spheres model is obtained by the truncation of an infinite series. A particular form to 
approximate the series which achieved popularity as a forward model in EEG analysis due to 
an equilibrated trade-off between computational resources, computational velocity and 
accuracy of the results is know as the BERG method (Berg and Scherg, 1994; Zang, 1995).  
We implemented the 3-spheres BERG method with the Brainstorm software package (freely 
available at: http://neuroimage.usc.edu/brainstorm), modeling the dipolar sources as a three-
dimensional grid of 3004 fixed dipoles oriented normally to the cortical surface of a Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) canonical mesh. This head model was adapted to the anatomy of 
each subject using the Statistical Parametric Mapping software package (SPM5, freely 
available at: http://www.fil.ion.bpmf.ac.uk/spm) as follows. Binary masks of skull and scalp 
obtained from individual MRIs were warped to the corresponding canonical meshes of the 
MNI atlas. Then, the inverse transformation was applied to the MNI canonical mesh of the 
cortex for approximating to real anatomy. Solutions to the forward operator were then 
obtained after EEG sensors and individual meshes were co-registered by rigid rotations and 
translations of digitized landmarks (nasion, left and right tragus). 
 
2.3.2 – Estimating Primary Currents 
Given a solution for the G operator, primary sources of EEG potentials can be 
obtained by the inverse solution of Eq. (2.1). However, this inverse problem is highly 
underdetermined (Nj » Ne) and mathematically ill-posed, since a virtually infinite number of 
source configurations can explain the same potential distribution on the scalp, unless specific 
anatomical and/or functional constraints (priors) are imposed to measurement noise and 
source configuration.  
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A straightforward constraint to the set of equations is to search, between all possible 
solutions, for the one that minimizes the deviations from the model, that is, 
                               
,                                                                                      (2.2) 
where the measurement noise is assumed Gaussian with covariance Ce,  ~ N(0,Ce). 
However, this Minimal Norm approach can be too unrealistic and the classical method 
used in the inverse solution for MEG and EEG generalizes such a straightforward approach 
using the Tikhonov regularization (Tikhonov and Arsenin, 1977), minimizing a linear mixture 
of the residuals of data fit to the forward model and of a weighted norm of the current 
sources: 



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j
jHjGvCj )(ˆ /eargmin ,                                                              (2.3) 
where  is an hyperparameter expressing the relative importance of the two terms to be 
minimized and H is a regularizing operator defining some anatomical and/or functional 
constraints (priors) on the solution. The so called Weighted Minimum Norm (WMN) solution 
is given by: 
                (2.4) 
The main drawback of WMN is its strictness. The solution is highly dependent on  and, 
although it is possible to obtain an optimal  through the inspection of a 2D plot from the first 
and second norms in Eq. (2.3) for all values of the hyperparameter, this can only be done for a 
single prior term (Brooks et al., 1999).  
Alternatively, the inverse solution can be seen as an inference problem: the inference 
of the causes (current sources j) from the consequences (scalp potentials v). In the presence of 
noise, v can be considered as resulting from a stochastic process where the probability of 
finding a voltage distribution p(v) is determined by the probability of a given source 
distribution p(j) and the conditional probability of v given j, p(v|j): 

j
jjvv )()|()( ppp .                                                                                                          (2.5) 
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The inverse solution, which requires determining the inverse conditional probability 
p(v|j), is then equivalent to the inference problem that can be treated using the Bayes theorem 
where 
)(
)()|()|(
v
jjvvj
p
ppp  .                            (2.6)                         
That is, the probability of j given v is a normalized product of the “likelihood”, p(v|j), 
with a priori information about the currents, p(j). When the currents are assumed as Gaussian 
distributed, j ~ N(0,Cj), the value j* that maximizes the likelihood with Gaussian noise  ~ 
N(0,Ce) is given by (Mattout et al., 2006) 
                   (2.7) 
 
Comparing the expressions (2.4) and (2.7) we see that the solution that minimizes the 
weighted minimum norm for a given Ce and  is equivalent to the source distribution that 
maximizes the likelihood assuming, a priori, Gaussian currents with covariance Cj=(HTH)-1. 
Therefore, the problem (2.1) can be re-written according to a two-level hierarchical 
Parametric Empirical Bayesian model, 
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and the covariance matrices for the first level, Ce, and for the second, Cj, can be modeled as 
linear functions of covariance components of first level Qe and second level Qj: 
 
 






i
i
jij
i
i
eie
QC
QC


.                      (2.9) 
This formulation allows the representation of an arbitrary number of priors in terms of 
Qe(i) and Qj(i). The prior Qj = (HTH)-1 represents the WMN framework and H = I - 
corresponding to a source covariance Cj = I, where I is the identity matrix in the source 
space - is known as the maximal likelihood WMN constraint. Other priors are commonly 
used, as the smoothness constraint Qj = exp(-D/22) in order to enforce correlation among 
  vCGCGCGj 1T111T   eje*
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neighboring sources, where D is the Euclidian distance between dipoles and ζ a smoothness 
parameter (Mattout et al., 2006). Once priors are modeled, the unknown hyperparameters i 
and i can be jointly estimate directly from the data by applying the restricted maximum 
likelihood method (Friston et al., 2002, 2006; Mattout et al., 2006; Phillips et al., 2005). After 
Ce and Cj have been estimated, the inverse solution j is given by Eq. (2.7).  
We applied this empirical Bayesian approach as implemented in SPM5 to estimate the 
distribution of electrical sources in the brain. The covariance matrix of the first level was 
assumed independent across EEG electrodes, with fixed variance computed from pre-stimulus 
recordings. The second level of the parametric empirical Bayesian approach was modeled by 
two priors: the maximal likelihood WMN constraint and the smoothness constraint, with a 
smoothness parameter set to 8 mm (Mattout et al., 2006).  
The two-step method involving forward modeling and sources reconstruction has been 
thoroughly validated over the years, using simulated datasets (Hauk, 2004) peripheral evoked 
potentials (Komssi et al., 2004b) and intracranial recordings in epileptic patients (Tanaka et 
al., 2010). It provides the backbone of all major commercial (Curry and BESA) and freely 
available (SPM) softwares for source reconstruction and represents the gold-standard to 
compare other algorithms (Babiloni et al., 2000). In particular, the WMN constraint requires 
minimal a priori information about the nature of source distribution and results in a low-
resolution (few centimeters) but reliable localization of primary neuronal currents, 
representing the tool of choice when robustness is more important than spatial resolution. Our 
own tests of the reliability of the inverse solution are reported with the results of the statistical 
analysis described in the section 2.4. 
 
2.3.3 – Automatic Anatomical Classification 
The inverse solution provides the instantaneous electrical activity of dipole-like 
primary sources j(xj,t,k), located at spatial coordinates xj of the cortical surface as modeled by 
a set of vertexes  {j = 1 … Nj}. By applying the inverse of the transformation matrix 
estimated by SPM5, which maps the individual cortical surface into the MNI atlas (see 
section 2.3.1), to region of-interest masks provided by WFUPickAltas tool (freely available 
at: http://www.ansir.wfubmc.edu; Maldjian et al., 2003, 2004), it is possible to automatically 
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identify, for each subject, the vertexes belonging to a given cortical area according to both the 
Automated Anatomical Lobules and Brodmann areas classifications. Therefore, by summing 
the current vector j(xj,t,k) over these anatomically- and/or functionally-identifiable brain 
regions we could estimate significant anatomical and functional measures of source activity. 
 
2.4 – How to access cortical activation produced exclusively by causal 
interactions in the stimulated circuits? 
We saw in section 2.2 that the combination of TMS with hd-EEG allows stimulating 
directly the cortical surface in a controlled way and recording evoked potentials which reflect 
deterministic properties of the stimulated neural circuits. After source reconstruction (section 
2.3), secondary currents are eliminated and single trial cortical distributions of primary 
dipolar currents, locket to the stimulation, are obtained. By averaging these TMS-related 
currents, the source activity due to uncontrolled internal and external factors is minimized 
revealing the spatiotemporal components of the EEG signal related to the stimulus. These 
averaged currents are then: 1) associated to neural sources; 2) reflecting deterministic 
properties of the neuronal circuits; and 3) locked to the stimulation of a given cortical area. 
The assumption that these currents are produced, in the region under the stimulator, directly 
by the magnetic stimulation, or, in distant cortical areas, by the causal effect of the activation 
of the stimulated cortical neurons on other neuronal groups, depends on a forth and last 
requirement: 4) the averaged activity in question must be absent when the stimulus is not 
applied.  
Thus, in order to estimate the activity related to the stimulation by causal interactions 
between neuronal groups, after source modeling we need to assess where (xj) and when (t) the 
average cortical response  
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is significantly different from pre-stimulus source activity. Due to the large number (3004) of 
cortical sources, assessing significance involved controlling for the risk of false positives. We 
controlled false-positives through the familywise error rate based on global maximum 
Methods on TMS/hd-EEG  
 
 
44
distributions, by applying a non-parametric permutation-based statistical procedure (Pantazis 
et al., 2003). Under the null hypothesis of no TMS-evoked response in the average and 
assuming that noise is equally distributed before and after TMS pulses, a random permutation 
of pre- and post-stimulus periods in a subset of trials should result in approximately the same 
mean activity as in the original dataset. Provided that an equal number of samples T is 
collected before and after TMS pulses (2T+1 time samples in each trial), it is then possible to 
generate Np < 2Nk sets, each set resulting from Nk binary decisions, one for each trial, about 
swapping the pre- and post-stimulus periods. For each permuted set p, the corresponding 
average cortical response jp(xj,t) was then computed for comparison with the original average 
j0(xj,t). Before comparison, average responses at each source location were normalized by 
subtracting the mean pre-stimulus value and dividing by pre-stimulus variance (normalized 
averages j0n(xj,t) and jpn(xj,t)), in order to allow for an equal weighting of sources in the 
statistical analysis. Instantaneous control over multiple comparisons was obtained by 
computing the cumulative distribution function F of the maximum absolute value in space of 
the source activity at each time t: 
    pjnpp ,...,ptt
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The null hypothesis at time t for the source located at coordinates xj was rejected with 
probability of false positives α when  
    1xj0 tjn , 100th percentile of F .                 (2.12) 
This method allowed identifying the binary spatiotemporal distribution of statistically 
significant sources (SS(xj,t)): SS(xj,t) = 0 for all sources (xj) and time samples (t) in which 
the null hypothesis could not be rejected, SS(xj,t) = 1 otherwise. Results were constructed 
with a significance level α = 0.01, estimated from Np = 1000. 
The reliability of the inverse solution and of the statistical analysis was tested by 
applying the analysis to somatosensory (SEP) (right median nerve) and auditory (AEP) 
(binaural tones) evoked potentials. Significant vertexes were detected in the contralateral hand 
area of the somatomotor cortex in the case of SEP and, bilaterally, in the supra-temporal plane 
in the case of AEP. The results of this analysis are reported in Figure (2.5). 
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Figure 2.5: Accuracy of source reconstruction after non-parametric statistics. The 
butterfly plot (black traces) of (A) somatosensory-evoked potentials (SEPs) and (B) 
auditory-evoked potentials (AEPs) are displayed. The spatial distributions (cortical maps) of 
the current sources are shown for some relevant components. 
 
2.5 – Can we quantitatively describe the pattern of cortical activation 
evoked by TMS?  
In the previous two sections, we described how it is possible to access the cortical 
activity produced, in the region under the stimulator, directly by the magnetic stimulation, 
and, in distant cortical areas, by the causal effect of the activation of the stimulated cortical 
neurons on other neuronal groups. In neurophysiology, the term “excitability” usually 
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refers to the amplitude of the immediate neural response to a perturbation, while the effect of 
the activation of a neuronal group on another set of neurons is termed “effective 
connectivity” (Friston, 2002). Therefore, TMS/hd-EEG opens up the possibility to measure 
directly the cortical excitability of virtually any cortical area and to detect specific patterns of 
effective connectivity in the thalamocortical system.  
In Casali et al. (2010) we implemented a data-driven procedure to characterize TMS-
evoked cortical potentials based on a limited set of indices of cortical excitability and 
connectivity. These general indices can be used to describe synthetically the large-scale 
effects of TMS on cortical circuits, even when very little a priori knowledge is available. 
 
2.5.1 – Indices of Cortical Responsiveness 
Starting from the spatiotemporal distribution of statistically significant sources 
(SS(xj,t)), we derived three general indices of global cortical responsiveness. These indices 
are designed to capture different aspects of the electrical reaction of the cerebral cortex to 
TMS. 
Significant current density (SCD). SCD is designed to capture the overall strength of 
the currents evoked by TMS in the cerebral cortex. It is calculated by cumulating the absolute 
amplitude of all significant TMS-evoked currents over a time interval σ and/or a cortical 
region s: 
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SCDsσ  is a single number representing the absolute total current of the sources significantly 
activated by TMS pulses in a cortical volume s and time interval σ. Similarly, SCDs and SCDσ 
describe, respectively, the temporal modulation of all TMS-evoked currents in a volume s and 
the spatial distribution of TMS-evoked currents during a finite time interval σ. 
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Phase-locking (bPL). This index reflects the broad-band ability of TMS to affect the 
phase of ongoing oscillations at the cortical source level.  
Given a set of complex numbers on the unit circle, broad-band phase-locking (bPL) 
can be defined as the absolute value of their average. Single-trial time series of TMS-evoked 
currents from each cortical source j(xj,t,k) can be transformed into complex analytic signals 
by means of the Hilbert transform (H()), 
      ktiktkt jjj ,,H,,,, xjxjxz  ,                 (2.14) 
and then normalized to obtain unitary absolute values zn(xj,t,k). Therefore, instantaneous bPL 
of a single source can be obtained as (Fründ et al., 2007; Palva et al., 2005; Sinkkonen et al., 
1995; Tallon-Baundry, et al., 1996)  
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bPL ranges from 0 (random phases) to 1 (perfect phase locking). Under the null hypothesis 
that the complex numbers {zn(xj,t,k)} at each time sample t are randomly uncorrelated and 
uniformly distributed, bPL values follow a Rayleigh distribution  
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with m being the mean distribution value, that can be estimated from baseline by 
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The null hypothesis of random phase distribution of TMS-evoked potentials can be 
rejected with a level of significance α when P(bPL(xj,t)) > 1-α. Correction for multiple 
comparisons was performed by applying to the bPL obtained from each source the Rayleigh 
distribution with m = m*, where  
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bPL is amplitude independent, robust to large artefacts, is not based on the spectral 
content of the data and has excellent temporal resolution. Similarly to SCD, bPL can also be 
cumulated over a cortical volume s and/or a time interval  to obtain synthetic indices of 
broad-band phase-locking (bPLs, bPLσ, and bPLsσ,).    
Significant current scattering (SCS). This index captures the spatial spreading of the 
significant activations evoked by TMS. SCS was calculated by cumulating the geodesic 
distances (d(xj)) between any significant current source and the TMS target over a time 
interval  and/or a cortical volume s: 
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This index is maximally sensitive to the spatial extent of the significant activations evoked by 
TMS and depends minimally on the amplitude of the TMS-evoked responses. Thus, SCS 
increases proportionally to the spreading of TMS-evoked activity from the site of stimulation. 
 
2.5.2 – Interpretation of  Indices of Cortical Responsiveness 
In order to test the sensitivity of the above synthetic measures with respect to specific 
properties of the stimulated circuits, TMS-evoked potentials were recorded from five healthy 
adults (two males and three females, age range 23–37years) at different stimulation 
intensities, during randomly ordered sub-sessions, when the medial third of the left superior 
occipital gyrus in BA19 was stimulated. The intensity of TMS was referred to the nearest-
sensor EEG threshold (NSET), individually defined as the maximal TMS intensity (expressed 
as a percentage of the stimulator's maximal output) that failed to evoke visible potentials in 
the electrode nearest to the coil. NSET was assessed at the beginning of each experiment by 
visually inspecting online the EEG potentials obtained by averaging 20–30 single-trial 
responses to TMS. Full sessions of stimulation were then delivered to each subject at 65%, 
100%, 135%, 145%, 170%, 205%, 240% and 275% of individual NSET, with a tolerance of 
5%. For each intensity, 150–200 stimuli were delivered at a frequency randomly distributed 
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between 0.43 and 0.50 Hz. During the experiment, subjects were lying on an ergonomic chair, 
relaxed and with eyes open looking at a fixation point on a screen.  
Figure 2.6 depicts the time course over the whole brain (panel A) and the spatial 
distribution over the full post-stimulus period (panel B) of SCD, bPL and SCS obtained when 
BA19 was stimulated at increasing intensities in one subject. The time courses and the spatial 
maps of the three indices show that the duration of the overall cortical response progressively 
increased in time and that the set of cortical regions engaged by TMS progressively enlarged 
when stimulation intensity was increased above 100% NSET. Albeit these general 
similarities, SCD, bPL and SCS seemed to capture different features of the brain response to 
TMS. In all subjects SCD peaked early and decayed rapidly, bPL was more sustained in time, 
while SCS was the last one to attain its peak values and the last one to decay (Figure 2.7). 
Also, considering the spatial distribution maps exhibited in Figure 2.8 for all subjects SCD 
had the highest values in the stimulated area (left Superior occipital gyrus), bPL showed a 
rather balanced activation between cortical regions located near and far from the TMS target, 
while SCS values were maximal in distant brain areas (frontal lobe). Based on the individual 
time course of these indices, it was possible to map, in each subject, the instantaneous spatial 
distribution of SCD, bPL and SCS at the peak of their activity (Figure 2.9). This 
representation revealed a consistent pattern across individuals, showing that the strongest 
cortical activation (SCD peak) always occurred in the stimulated area between 28 and 36 ms, 
while the maximum spread of activity (SCS peak) occurred in left frontal regions (ipsilateral 
to the stimulation target) between 77 and 101 ms.  
Thus, SCD, being highly sensitive to the response's amplitude, was higher shortly after 
the TMS, when the target area reacts to the direct stimulation, and was more sensitive to the 
immediate brain's reaction to TMS. SCS was minimally dependent on the response's 
amplitude but maximally sensitive to its spatial extension, being capable of detecting the 
subsequent long-range spreading of activation. bPL being an amplitude-independent measure 
that is not weighted towards distant activations lied in between SCD and SCS and was equally 
sensitive to the local (excitability) and the distant (connectivity) effects of TMS. 
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Figure 2.6: Synthetic indices of cortical responsiveness to TMS in a single subject 
at different stimulation intensities. Time course (A) and spatial distribution (B) of 
significant current density (SCD), broad-band phase-locking (bPL) and significant 
current scattering (SCS), averaged over the whole brain(s) and the full poststimulus 
period(σ) respectively (adapted from Casali et al., 2010). 
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Figure 2.7: Time course of SCD, bPL and SCS averaged over the whole brain (s), for 
all subjects at different stimulation intensities (adapted from Casali et al., 2010). 
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Figure 2.8: Spatial distribution of SCD, bPL and SCS averaged over the entire post-
stimulus period, for all subjects at 275% NSET (adapted from Casali et al., 2010). 
 
 
 
 
Methods on TMS/hd-EEG  
 
 
53
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Instantaneous spatial distribution of SCD, bPL and SCS, in 
correspondence to their respective peak of activity in time, at 275% NSET stimulation 
intensity for all subjects (adapted from Casali et al., 2010).  
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 2.5.3 – Measuring Local Excitability 
SCD, bPL and SCS reflected different properties of the stimulated circuits. In 
particular, SCD suggested that a strong reaction to TMS occurs within the first 50 ms in a 
region located immediately under the coil. Thus, based on this information, we restrict our 
analysis to detect the local excitability (threshold) of the stimulated area (BA19). 
Typically, cortical excitability, or the amplitude of the immediate neural response to a 
perturbation, is defined operationally as the local activation threshold, i.e., the minimum 
stimulation intensity eliciting a reliable motor response of the target muscles (Rossini et al., 
1994). This approach, although practical and reliable, inevitably confines the assessment of 
excitability to cortico-spinal circuits. TMS/hd-EEG may extend the measurement of cortical 
excitability to a larger set of cortical areas. Using this technique, one could, for instance, 
implement a method to detect the minimum stimulation intensity required to trigger 
significant neuronal currents in the stimulated area. Observing and comparing the time 
courses and spatial distributions of SCD and SCS (Figs. 2.7 and 2.8) reveals that TMS always 
evoked, during the first 50 ms, strong currents localized in the target region, possibly 
reflecting the initial trans-synaptic activation of the neuronal population located under the 
coil. Based on this observation, we defined the TMS/hd-EEG threshold as the minimum 
stimulation intensity (TMS-induced electric field on the cortical surface) required for 
significantly activating more than 1% of the cortical sources within the stimulated area during 
the first 50 ms after TMS pulse. The temporal and spatial boundaries of this definition were 
directly derived from the data, while the choice of the minimum percentage of active sources 
was motivated by the fact that a non-parametric statistics with α = 0.01 admits a 1% rate of 
false positives. 
Application of this procedure to real data showed a dramatic drop of significance 
(∼<1% of significantly active sources) in all subjects for stimulation intensities below 50 V/m 
and no significant activations below 40 V/m (Figure 2.10). These values are in good 
agreement with the activation threshold of the cat's phrenic nerve measured in vitro 
(Maccabee et al., 1993) and with the threshold of the human median nerve measured in vivo 
(McRobbie and Foster, 1984). These results are also similar to the ones obtained by Komssi et 
al. (2007) using TMS/hd-EEG on motor cortex. While in Komssi et al. (2007) the threshold 
was defined as the TMS intensity yielding a 50% probability of evoking some pre-selected 
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EEG components in a sample of healthy subjects, the procedure proposed here allows 
detecting the cortical activation threshold automatically at the single-subject level. 
 
Figure 2.10: Caracterizing Cortical Excitability: log-transformed percentage of 
significant current sources cumulated over the TMS target region (s = left superior 
occipital lobule, white area in the cortical map on the right) and the temporal window 0–
50 ms (σ) as a function of the TMS-induced cortical electric field (automatically 
estimated in V/m by the navigation system) for all subjects. Activation threshold (dotted 
line) is set at 1%, based on the α-value of significance of non-parametric statistics 
(adapted from Casali et al., 2010). 
 
2.5.4 – Measuring Cortical Connectivity 
In this work, we are particularly interested in employing the combination of TMS and 
hd-EEG to access the capability of different elements of the thalamocortical system to 
causally interact with each other. Figure 2.11 represents an example of how the above 
standardized analysis of TMS/hd-EEG data can help identifying subsets of cortical regions 
that are specifically linked by causal interactions.  
In this example, TMS was applied to the left Superior occipital lobule at high intensity 
(275% of NSET) during two different days (day 1, red color; day 2, blue color) in order to 
evaluate test-retest reproducibility. In the same subject, the left motor cortex was also targeted 
(green color) at the same TMS intensity, in order to appreciate the specificity of TMS-evoked 
cortical activation. Figure 2.11A depicts the total value (bars), the spatial distribution (maps) 
and the time course (lines) of SCD, bPL and SCD calculated in the three different conditions 
and respectively integrated over the whole brain and post-stimulus period. While repeating 
the same occipital stimulation on two different days evoked a similar spatiotemporal pattern 
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of cortical activation, TMS on motor cortex resulted in clearly different spatial distributions 
and time courses of SCD, bPL and SCD. The same observations can be derived from Figure 
2.11B where the spatial distribution of the indices is shown at their respective peak values; 
following a strong initial response in the target area, activity propagated to the ipsilateral 
frontal cortex within the first 100–110 ms in the case of the two occipital stimulations, while a 
dominant contralateral activation was detected within the first 50 ms after motor cortex 
stimulation. 
Cumulating SCD and SCS values over discrete regions of interest (see section 2.3.3) 
allowed reducing the data space and identifying a set of distant cortical regions specifically 
engaged by stimulation of the left Superior occipital lobule. The histograms depicted in 
Figure 2.11C represent (for the three conditions) the values of SCD and SCS calculated in all 
cortical lobules, sorted according to their geodesic distance from the left Superior occipital 
lobule. Stimulation of the occipital cortex on day 1 and day 2 resulted in histograms 
characterized by the same peaks of regional activation (the regions with higher SCS values 
are color-coded and plotted on the cortical surface below), involving the left superior parietal 
lobule, the left precuneus, the left supplementary motor area, the left precentral region and left 
superior frontal lobule. Conversely, the same analysis applied to motor cortex stimulation 
detected a strong bilateral activation of motor cortex, somatosensory cortex, precuneus and of 
ipsilateral parietal lobule. Extracting the time course of the significant currents from a subset 
of cortical regions (Figure 2.11D) also highlighted the reproducibility and the specificity of 
TMS-evoked cortical activations. 
This pattern of effective connectivity evoked by stimulation of the Superior occipital 
lobule is consistent with cortico–cortical interactions occurring through the dorsal visual 
stream (Colby et al., 1988; Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003; Tanné et al., 1995) or through the 
occipito-frontal fascicle. Intracranial recordings in monkeys (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; 
Schroeder et al., 1998) and humans (Gaillard et al., 2009) have demonstrated that peripheral 
visual stimulation results in a progressive posterior–anterior propagation of neural activity 
that reaches area V3 (BA19) at around 50 ms and the ipsilateral frontal lobe at latencies 
between 120 and 150 ms. Consistent with the results of these invasive recordings, the present 
experiment showed a maximum spread of activation (Max SCS) in ipsilateral frontal cortex 
occurring 77–101 ms after direct stimulation of left Superior occipital—BA19 (Figure 2.9).  
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Figure 2.11: Caracterizing Cortical Connectivity. Synthetic indices of cortical 
responsiveness to TMS computed in a single subject at a stimulation intensity of 275% 
NSET delivered to the left Superior occipital cortex in two different days (red and blue 
colors, respectively) and to the left hand motor area (green color). A) SCD, bPL and 
SCS values cumulated either over the whole brain (time courses) or over the full post-
stimulus period (spatial maps) or over both the whole brain and the post-stimulus period 
(bars). B) Instantaneous spatial distribution of SCD, bPL and SCS indices in 
correspondence to their respective peak of activity in time. C) SCD and SCS cumulated 
over the post-stimulus and over single regions of interest, sorted according to the 
distance from the left Superior occipital cortex. Regions with higher SCS activity and 
the region with highest SCD activity are color-coded and highlighted in the cortical 
outline below. D) Time course of dipolar currents cumulated over three regions of 
interest ipsilateral to the TMS stimulation— superior occipital (Sup. O) lobule, 
precentral area (Precen) and superior frontal (Sup. F) cortex—when TMS is delivered to 
the left Sup. O (red and blue lines) and to the left hand motor (Motor) area (green line) 
(adapted from Casali et al., 2010).  
 Chapter 3. 
Causal Responses of the Thalamocortical System to 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter described how to employ the combination of TMS and hd-EEG 
to perturb directly, in a controlled and reproducible way, specific cortical areas and measure 
the corresponding neural responses that reflect causal patterns of interaction between different 
groups of neurons in the thalamocortical system. What then can be said about such responses 
evoked by TMS in conditions such as alert wakefulness, in which consciousness is 
unambiguously present, or when it is clearly reduced, such as during deep sleep, anesthesia 
and vegetative state? In this chapter we will show that the causal interaction of different 
connected neuronal modules with specific oscillatory frequencies produces qualitatively 
complex patterns of cortical response to TMS during alert wakefulness. We will also show 
that this ability of the thalamocortical system to sustain complexity is consistently impaired 
among unconscious healthy subjects and brain-injured patients. 
 
3.1 – Alert Wakefulness 
3.1.1 – The Natural Frequencies of Corticothalamic Circuits 
A system of causally interacting neurons can be generally thought as a set of coupled 
electrical oscillators. It is well known that the perturbation of coupled oscillators may reveal 
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the tuning frequency, or “natural frequency” of the system which, in turn, indicates structural 
properties of the state of the system under study. In Rosanova et al. (2009) we employed 
TMS/hd-EEG to measure the natural frequencies of different corticothalamic modules in 
awake healthy subjects. We targeted TMS to three different cortical areas (BAs 19, 7 and 6) 
of 6 subjects, stimulating each cortical area at 8 different intensities (range: 20-160 V/m). 
During the experiment, subjects were lying on an ergonomic chair, relaxed and with eyes 
open looking at a fixation point on a screen. For each intensity we delivered between 100 and 
200 stimuli at a frequency jittering between 0.4-0.5 Hz (period: 2000 plus a jitter ≤ 300 ms). 
Figure 3.1 displays the EEG responses recorded in one subject from all sensors after 
stimulation of area 19, area 7 and area 6 at 120V/m on the cortical surface. The butterfly plots 
reveal that the brain electrical response to TMS varied markedly depending on the site of 
stimulation: following an early (0-20 ms) stereotypical sharp component, TMS of area 19 
resulted, during the first 200 ms, in a low frequency, large response; stimulation of area 7 
elicited faster and smaller components; and stimulation of area 6 evoked the fastest EEG 
oscillations.  
In order to detect the frequency of the oscillations induced by TMS at different cortical 
sites, we calculated the Event Related Spectral Perturbation (ERSP) based on Morlet 
wavelets. The procedure was implemented using the public license toolbox EEGLAB 
(Delorme and Makeig, 2004). ERSP decomposes the EEG response recorded from each 
sensor in the time-frequency space and allows tracking the significant spectral modulations 
induced by TMS during the post-stimulus time. We averaged, for each condition, the ERSPs 
matrices across all channels in order to obtain a global-ERSP (gERSP). The bottom panels of 
Figure 3.1 display the resulting plots for the three stimulation sites. In all cases, TMS resulted 
in a significant early (8-20 ms) activation in the β2/γ bands (21-50 Hz). After this short-lasting 
stereotypical event, the frequency content of the global brain response to TMS varied 
markedly depending on the stimulated area: dominant oscillations in the α range (8-12 Hz) 
were detected when area 19 was stimulated, in the β1 range (13-20 Hz) when area 7 was 
stimulated and in the β2/γ range (21-50 Hz) when area 6 was stimulated.  
In order to extract the natural frequency associated to the TMS-evoked potentials in 
each condition, we averaged the gERSP in a time window between 20 and 200 ms post-
stimulus, minimizing the effect of possible artifacts occurring at the time of stimulation. We 
Causal Responses of the Thalamocortical System to  TMS  
 
 
60
detected, on the resulting spectral profiles (black trace on the right of each panel), the 
frequency with maximum power (indicated by a dotted line). Across all subject, at the 
intensity of 120 V/m, the natural frequency of the global scalp response to stimulation of area 
19, area 7 and area 6 was 11 ± 1.5 Hz, 18.3 ± 2.0 Hz and 29 ± 2.0, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: TMS induced global EEG oscillations that are specific for the stimulated 
site. The figurine illustrates the 3 cortical sites targeted by TMS (hot spot on the 
individual MRI). The traces below represent butterfly plots; the black trace highlights the 
electrode directly underlying the stimulator. The bottom panels show the ERSP patterns 
calculated globally on the scalp (average of all electrodes). The rightmost graphs depict 
the power spectrum profile induced during the first 200ms after TMS. The dotted lines 
highlight the frequency with maximum power. TMS elicited early gamma components 
immediately followed by prominent alpha band oscillations after occipital stimulation, 
beta band oscillations after parietal stimulation and fast beta/gamma oscillations after 
perturbation of frontal cortex (adapted from Rosanova et al., 2009). 
 
An important parameter that may potentially bias the frequency of the EEG response 
to TMS is the strength of the applied stimulus. We employed an MRI-guided navigation 
system to ensure that the strength of the electric field induced by TMS in different areas was 
always comparable. The maximum electric field was always kept on the convexity of the 
gyrus with the induced current perpendicular to its main axis. Moreover, in order to exclude 
an effect of local activation thresholds in determining the observed site-specificity of the 
response's frequency, we probed each site at several different intensities, from sub-threshold 
levels to near-saturation levels. As shown in Figure 3.2, TMS intensities below 40 V/m did 
not result in any significant power modulation in any of the four EEG bands. Intensities of 
stimulation between 60 and 120 V/m evoked progressively larger responses in all four 
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frequency bands. At this level the responses of the three corticothalamic modules clearly 
differed, displaying higher α band power after stimulation of area 19, higher β1 band power 
after stimulation of area 7 and higher β2/γ band power after stimulation of area 6. These 
differences further increased at stimulation intensities (140-160 V/m) that produced saturation 
of the TMS-evoked potentials. Thus, the specific frequency of the response did not depend on 
stimulation intensity, or activation threshold, but most likely depended on a number of 
endogenous properties of the activated circuit.  
These results were reproducible in all subjects: provided that TMS intensity was above 
the threshold for triggering a significant EEG response, the average waveform differed 
according to the site of stimulation (Figure 3.3). Occipital stimulation triggered high-
amplitude, lower-frequency components, while stimulating more rostral sites elicited smaller 
waves separated by shorter intervals. Panel B of Figure 3.3 shows the natural frequency 
calculated at the global sensor level in all subjects after stimulation of area 19, area 7 and area 
6 at 160 V/m. In all cases, the natural frequency progressively increases from α, to β and γ 
when the three sites are plotted in the caudal-rostral order. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The specificity of natural frequencies was preserved with different 
stimulation intensities. Time series (ERSP) of standard EEG frequency bands (alpha: 8-
12; beta1: 13-19; beta2: 20-29; gamma: 30-50) for the three sites of stimulation (first row: 
area 6; second row: area 7; third row: area 19) are plotted as a function of stimulation 
intensity, ranging from 20 to 160 V/m (adapted from Rosanova et al., 2009). 
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Figure 3.3: The specificity of the natural frequency was reproducible across subjects. 
A) The traces represent TMS responses for each subject (n=6) evoked by 6-8 intensities of 
stimulation, recorded from one electrode underlying the stimulator. The black trace 
highlights the response obtained at maximal stimulation intensity (160 V/m). The thicker 
black traces at the bottom represent the grand averages calculated from all 6 subjects.  B) 
The frequencies with maximum power, obtained by stimulating each cortical area at the 
maximal intensity, are plotted for each subject. A clear posterior-anterior gradient of 
increasing frequencies is observable (adapted from Rosanova et al., 2009). 
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Did these dominant frequencies, recorded globally over the scalp, reflect the 
frequencies of neural oscillations generated by TMS? Time series of local currents evoked by 
TMS activation were obtained, after source modeling and automatic classification of the 
individual’s cortical surface, by cumulating the dipole activities recorded in each one of the 
47 Brodmann’s areas (see section 2.3.3). At this point, the same time-frequency 
decomposition analysis performed at the global sensors level was carried out at the local 
source level. Figure 3.4 shows the time series of the local current and the ERSP plots 
recorded from all three cortical areas of interest (area 19, area 7 and area 6) when TMS was 
directly applied to each of them. These sources, directly activated by TMS, generated strong 
currents matching the dominant frequency recorded globally at the scalp level. Moreover, 
even when not directly stimulated, each cortical area still tended to oscillate at a rate closer to 
its own natural frequency. Across all subjects, when area 19 was stimulated, area 19 
responded at 10.8 Hz, area 7 at 20 Hz and area 6 at 31.3 Hz; when area 7 was stimulated, area 
19 responded at 13.5 Hz, area 7 at 18.6 Hz and area 6 at 27.3 Hz; when area 6 was stimulated, 
area 19 responded at 10.6 Hz, area 7 at 19 Hz and area 6 at 29 Hz. Hence, each area, whether 
directly activated by TMS or engaged through long-range connections, expressed local 
oscillations at a rate closer to its own natural frequency. 
The electrical rhythms triggered by TMS are more likely to reflect overall circuit 
properties at the level of whole cortical areas and connected thalamic/subcortical nuclei. For 
instance, a recent study has linked α oscillations to the presence of a subpopulation of 
electrically coupled neurons localized in the lateral geniculate nucleus which fire bursts of 
action potentials in the α range when activated by a cortical glutamatergic input (Hughes et 
al., 2004). This mechanism, involving a whole corticothalamic module, may explain why 
TMS of visual cortex readily triggers α oscillations, while TMS of frontal cortex fails to do 
so. Similarly a role of the thalamus can be postulated in the genesis of faster oscillations 
(Llinas et al., 2007). Interestingly, TMS/EEG experiments performed in patients with lesions 
in the ventrolateral thalamus have demonstrated a significant decrease of β band oscillations 
after TMS of the ipsi-lesional motor cortex (Van Der Werf et al., 2006). In this perspective, 
our results suggest that TMS is capable to engage the thalamocortical system of alert healthy 
subjects, setting in motion different connected neuronal oscillators and generating complex 
EEG responses composed of strong fluctuations at the natural frequency of the stimulated 
area and by weaker fluctuations at around the natural frequency of distant regions. 
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Figure 3.4: The natural frequency is a local property of individual thalamocortical 
modules. The coloured patches on the cortical surface mark the areas from which cortical 
currents are recorded after source modeling. Below, time series and ERSP plots of local 
cortical currents are displayed for area 6 (first row, blue traces), area 7 (second row, green 
traces) and area 19 (third row, red traces) when area 19 was stimulated (first column), 
area 7 was stimulated (second column) and area 6 was stimulated (third column). The 
dotted lines highlight the peak frequency for each plot. Comparing the plots on the 
diagonal line marked by TMS icon, reveals that each cortical area responded with a clear-
cut natural frequency when directly stimulated. Comparing the plots on the horizontal and 
on the vertical lines, reveals that the natural frequency is a local property that was 
partially preserved also when its cortical generator was not directly stimulated (adapted 
from Rosanova et al., 2009). 
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3.1.2 – The Spatiotemporal Complexity of Cortical Activation Evoked by TMS during 
Wakefulness 
As we saw in the first chapter, if the brain is the vehicle for the objects of 
consciousness, during alert wakefulness the thalamocortical system is likely to be in a state of 
dynamical equilibrium, being capable of integrating activity across several neuronal modules 
through feedforward and feedback causal connections. Thus, if these widespread and 
specialized cortical areas have distinct intrinsic dynamical properties and are engaged at 
different latencies, such complex reentrant system will generate complex spatiotemporal 
patterns of causal activation. In fact, the results described in the previous section indicates that 
TMS/hd-EEG is capable of probing this capability of integration across neuronal modules, 
each one oscillating with its particular natural frequency, when TMS-evoked neural currents 
activated different areas of the cortex at different latencies. Figure 3.5 displays the significant 
neuronal currents evoked by TMS in a representative awake healthy subject. The black traces 
in the figure are the time-series for the Global Mean Field Power (GMFP) (Lehmann and 
Skrandies, 1980) calculated from the multichannel average signals as: 
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where k is the number of channels, Vi is the voltage measured with channel i, and V  is the 
mean of the measured voltages across channels (average reference). The significant current 
distributions (SCD) are exhibited at latencies corresponding to high values of GMFP. TMS 
was targeted to BAs 6 (A), 7 (B) and 19 (C) at 100V/m. In all cases, TMS evoked a 
qualitatively complex spatiotemporal pattern of cortical currents: a series of low-amplitude 
waves of activity associated with cortical activations that propagated along long-range 
ipsilateral and transcallosal connections, lasting for around 300ms, and in which activity 
shifted through cortical areas in different times. 
What does happen to these complex patterns of TMS-evoked activity when 
consciousness fades? Alterations in the membrane properties of subsets of cortical and 
subcortical (especially thalamic) neurons, as well as alterations in their patterns of 
connectivity may result in distinctive and detectable changes in the oscillatory properties of 
neuronal groups, possibly resulting in altered patterns of response to TMS. Hence, we ask in 
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the following sections whether this complexity of neuronal response to TMS due to the 
integration of oscillators with different site-specific natural frequencies is preserved in states 
where consciousness is lost, such as during sleep, anesthesia and in patients suffering from 
disorders of consciousness. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: TMS evoked a balanced, long-range differentiated pattern of activation 
during wakefulness.  hd-EEG GMFP (black traces) and SCD (cortical maps) are shown for 
a representative healthy subject during alert wakefulness with TMS (green star) target to 
BAs 6 (A), 7 (B) and 19 (C) at 100V/m. In all cases, TMS evoked a widespread activation 
pattern which lasted for more than 300ms and in which the maximum significant current 
(blue circle) shifted through different cortical areas at different latencies.  
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3.2 – Sleep 
The most common situation in which the level of consciousness changes is early 
NREM sleep, when subjects, if awakened, report no or little conscious experience (Hobson 
and Pace-Schott, 2002), despite the fact that their brain remains highly active (Steriade et al., 
2001). In a series of studies Massimini et al. (2005, 2007, 2010) described the TMS-evoked 
responses during the transition from wakefulness into different stages of sleep. While during 
wakefulness, TMS evoked an initial local cortical activation which invariably engaged distant 
cortical areas in a complex and differentiated way, the exactly same stimulation, applied 15 
min later, during sleep stages 2 and 3, triggered a larger, low-frequency wave, associated with 
a strong initial cortical activation that did not propagate to connected brain regions, 
dissipating rapidly (Massimini et al., 2005). Increasing intensities of stimulation during 
NREM sleep may result in long-range bursts of cortical activity, but always associated to 
simple stereotypical and nonspecific responses (Massimini et al., 2007). Interestingly, during 
REM sleep, TMS triggered more complex patterns of cortical activation, resembling those 
observed in wakefulness (Massimini et al., 2010). 
 
3.2.1 – Slow-wave Sleep 
Figure 3.6 shows our results reproducing the experiment of Massimini et al. (2005, 
2007) for a subject submitted to TMS targeted to the sensory-motor cortex at 90V/m. A first 
TMS-EEG session (180 stimuli) was collected while the subject was awake. Subject was then 
allowed to fall asleep and after entering a consolidated period (>5 min) of NREM sleep stage 
2, a second TMS-EEG session was collected using the same stimulation parameters. As 
expected, during wakefulness, averaging the TMS-locked responses revealed low-amplitude, 
high-frequency waves of activity associated with cortical activations that propagate along 
long-range ipsilateral and transcallosal connections (Figure 3.6 A). The same stimulation 
however produced a slow, brief and local response during NREM sleep (Figure 3.6 B). This 
finding is general and can be reproduced after the stimulation of different cortical areas, as 
long as the subjects are in slow-wave sleep stages.  
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Figure 3.6: The balanced, long-range, differentiated pattern of activation observed in 
wakefulness was impaired during slow-wave sleep. hd-EEG GMFP (black traces) and 
SCD (cortical maps) are shown for a representative subject in whom the sensory-motor 
cortex was stimulated with TMS (green star). A) During waking, the stimulation intensity of 
90V/m evoked an activation pattern lasting for more than 300ms and spreading from near 
the stimulation site to other cortical locations, recruiting different cortical areas at 
different latencies. B) During slow-wave sleep, the same stimulation evoked a response that 
remained local, fading shortly (<100ms). C) Higher stimulation intensity (160V/m) during 
slow-wave sleep evoked strong and global but yet stereotypical responses, in which the 
maximum significant current (blue circles) remained fixed near the TMS target.  
 
Thus, TMS/hd-EEG revealed a clear-cut reduction of cortico-cortical integration 
occurring during sleep early in the night: while the cortical area that is directly engaged by 
TMS reacted to the stimulation, it generally behaved as an isolated module. Moreover, 
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TMS/hd-EEG measurements not only indicated that during slow-wave sleep the 
thalamocortical system tends to break down into isolated modules, but also showed that the 
ability of thalamocortical circuits to produce differentiated responses is impaired. We targeted 
TMS to premotor cortex (BA 6) and to the visual cortex (BA 19) of a healthy subject during 
wakefulness and slow-wave sleep. Figure 3.7 displays, for each condition, the significant 
current evoked by TMS as cumulated over the entire post-stimulus interval and plotted on the 
cortical surface; on the right side of each cortical surface, the time course of the currents 
recorded from three selected areas are depicted. This example, as the one reported in the 
previous figure, confirms a clear-cut loss of integration during slow-wave sleep by showing 
that distant cortical areas ceased to be causally affected by the initial perturbation. On the 
other hand, it also reveals a clear loss of response specificity. While during wakefulness 
cortical areas reacted to the stimulus with a specific activation pattern which had a 
characteristic shape and frequency content (section 3.1), this distinction was clearly 
obliterated during sleep; the local response to TMS became, in both cases, a stereotypical 
response: a positive wave followed by a negative rebound.  
The stereotypical pattern of the response to TMS during slow-wave sleep was not 
caused by an effect of local activation thresholds. As described by Massimini et al. (2007), 
increasing the intensity of TMS up to saturation levels (160V/m) during slow-wave sleep did 
not produce a recovering of the balanced widespread activity observed in wakefulness. 
Instead, the slow positive–negative component may be amplified, developing towards a full-
fledged sleep slow wave (figure 3.6 C).  
Altogether, these TMS/hd-EEG measurements suggest that, during slow-wave sleep, 
the thalamocortical system, despite being active and reactive, either breaks down in causally 
independent modules or bursts into an explosive and non-specific response. In no case, during 
slow-wave sleep, does TMS result in a balanced, long-range, differentiated pattern of 
activation. 
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Figure 3.7: The ability of thalamocortical circuits to produce differentiated 
responses was impaired during slow-wave sleep. TMS was applied to premotor cortex 
(A) and to visual cortex (B) during wakefulness (the left panels) and during slow-wave 
sleep (the right panels). For each condition, the significant current distribution (SCD) 
recorded during the entire post-stimulus interval are plotted on the cortical surface. On the 
right side of each cortical surface, the time series of the currents recorded from three 
selected areas (BAs 8, 6 and 19) are depicted (the time of stimulation is marked by a red 
line). With the transition from wakefulness to slow-wave sleep, distant cortical areas 
ceased to be causally affected by the initial perturbation and cortical responses to TMS 
became stereotypical (adapted from Massimini et al., 2009). 
 
3.2.2 – REM Sleep 
Following Massimini et al. (2010), we were able to observe the gradual change of 
activity evoked by TMS during the transition from wakefulness through stage 1 to NREM 
(stages 2 and 3) and REM sleep. TMS was targeted to the rostral portion of the right premotor 
cortex with a maximum electrical field of 90V/m at the cortex surface while the subject, lying 
with eyes closed on a reclining chair, was allowed to sleep. After the experiment, trials were 
assorted by sleep stage, and four TMS sessions were constructed with a total of 258 trials 
during wakefulness, 274 at stage 1, 247 at stage 2-3 and 322 during REM sleep. Figure 3.8 
displays how the widespread differentiated pattern observed during wakefulness (A) gradually 
shifted through sleep stage 1 (B) to a short-lived local and stereotypical response during 
stages 2 and 3 (C).  Interestingly, during REM sleep (D), late in the night, when dreams 
become long and vivid and the level of consciousness is likely to return to levels close to 
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wakefulness (Kahan and Laberge, 2011), thalamocortical integration partially recovered and 
TMS triggered a more widespread and differentiated pattern of activation (Massimini et al., 
2010). 
 
 
Figure 3.8: The widespread differentiated pattern of TMS-evoked activation observed 
in wakefulness was gradually impaired upon falling into NREM sleep and partially 
recovered during REM sleep. hd-EEG GMFP (black traces) and SCD (cortical maps) are 
shown for a subject in whom the premotor cortex was stimulated (green star) while 
transiting from wakefulness (A) through sleep stage 1 (B), NREM sleep stages 2-3 (C) to 
REM sleep (D). Duration and spreading of TMS-evoked currents observed during 
wakefulness were lost in sleep stages 2-3 but recovered during REM sleep.  
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3.3 – Anesthesia 
In addition to sleep, the most common condition in which consciousness can be lost is 
general anesthesia. Although several anesthetics can induce states with behavioral and 
electrophysiological features not unlike those of deep NREM sleep, pharmacological 
anesthesia and sleep are not identical and differ in terms of both neurophysiology and 
neurochemistry (Van Dort et al. 2008). Moreover, general anesthesia offers several 
advantages for investigating the neural correlates of LOC (Franks, 2008). Specifically, in 
sleep studies it is not feasible to evaluate an individual’s level of alertness repeatedly and 
reliably, because the depth of sleep varies unpredictably and subjects awakened to assess 
consciousness cannot rapidly return to sleep. By contrast, during general anesthesia, a 
subject’s level of alertness may be assessed repeatedly without reversing the 
pharmacologically induced LOC.  
In Ferrarelli et al. (2010) we described the patterns of TMS-evoked responses during 
loss of consciousness induced by anesthesia. In this first study of TMS/hd-EEG during 
anesthesia-induced LOC we chose to use the benzodiazepine midazolam, an agent that has a 
marked anticonvulsant effect, since TMS can, although rarely, induce seizures in epileptic 
patients. Also, the clinical tool used to evaluate the subjects’ alertness throughout the 
experimental procedure, the Observer's Assessment of Alertness/Sedation (OAA/S) scale, was 
initially tested in subjects who received titrated doses of midazolam (Chernik et al., 1990). 
Finally, unlike most anesthetic agents midazolam targets GABAA receptors exclusively, 
leading to increased inhibitory postsynaptic currents that presumably underlie its 
behavioral/cognitive effects (Tanelian et al., 1993). Other general anesthetics, such as volatile 
and i.v. drugs, have effects that are more difficult to interpret because of multiple interactions 
with several proteins, such as voltage-gated and leak channels (Verbny et al., 2005). One 
potential drawback of midazolam is its pharmacokinetic profile, which leads to slower 
recovery compared with shorter-acting induction agents (Gan, 2006). Because of this slow 
recovery, we were able to measure TMS-evoked EEG responses after full recovery of 
vigilance (Level 5 OAA/S) in just one subject within the limited time frame of the TMS/hd-
EEG recordings. 
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3.3.1 – Experimental Protocol 
Six male subjects received i.v. midazolam at doses up to 0.2mg/kg, with OAA/S 
reaching scores of “1” (unresponsive to verbal and mild physical stimulus) for a sufficient 
period that hd-EEG responses to TMS could be measured. A 20-gauge i.v. catheter was 
placed for anesthetic drug delivery, and participants were given supplemental oxygen at 3 
L/min via nasal cannula and anantacid (Bicitra) to minimize possible complications in the 
event of nausea and vomiting caused by the anesthetic drug. During the TMS procedure, the 
participant’s electrocardiogram, noninvasive blood pressure, SaO2, exhaled CO2, and axillary 
skin temperature were continuously monitored by an anesthesiologist. Additionally, the 
subject’s level of consciousness was evaluated before and after each TMS session with the 
OAA/S.  
TMS was targeted to the right premotor cortex and a first 8- to 10-min TMS/hd-EEG 
session (∼250 stimuli, with a 2,000-ms period and a ±250-ms jitter) was collected in each 
subject before midazolam injection (level5 responsiveness of the OAA/S). Midazolam was 
then given at an initial dose of 0.1mg/kg, followed by additional doses of 0.02mg/kg each 2–3 
min until the subject was unresponsive (level 1 of the OAA/S), up to a maximal dose of 0.2 
mg/kg. During midazolam administration, 3-min TMS blocks at 0.2 Hz interleaved by 
alertness assessments with the OAA/S were performed and a longer TMS session mirroring 
the preinjection TMS session was collected. 
 
3.3.2 – Results 
Compared with wakefulness, we found a marked change in TMS-evoked brain 
responses during midazolam-induced LOC (Figure 3.9). Before the injection of the anesthetic 
(level 5 alertness, OAA/S), TMS pulses to premotor cortex evoked a complex spatiotemporal 
pattern of low-amplitude, fast-frequency scalp waves, associated to cortical currents which 
lasted for at least 300ms following the stimulation and shifted among cortical areas distant 
from the TMS-targeted brain area (panels A and B). Conversely, following midazolam-
induced LOC (level 1 OAA/S), TMS pulses gave rise to high-amplitude, low-frequency EEG 
voltages, produced by cortical currents which faded within 150ms and remained more 
localized to the stimulated site (panels A’ and B’). 
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Figure 3.9: The balanced, long-range, differentiated pattern of activation observed in 
wakefulness was impaired during anesthesia-induced LOC. A and A′: Averaged TMS-
evoked potentials at all electrodes, superimposed in butterfly plots (the blue traces for 
waking, red traces for anesthesia). B and B′: Cortical currents calculated on individual 
cortical meshes are shown from minimal (dark red) to maximal (white) values. During 
wakefulness, TMS of premotor cortex determined low-amplitude, complex scalp waves 
corresponding to cortical currents that lasted >300 ms and shifted among distant cortical 
areas. Conversely, during anesthesia, TMS gave rise to high-amplitude, short-lasting scalp 
voltages reflecting cortical currents that remained local, and faded within 150 ms. The gray 
stars represent the TMS target (premotor cortex); the black arrows represent the local 
maxima in periods of significant TMS-evoked activation (adapted from Ferrareli et al., 
2010). 
 
Although the activity evoked by TMS at the stimulation site, the premotor cortex (BA 
6), was similar across conditions, its time course was markedly different. While during 
wakefulness, the immediate response to TMS consisted of oscillations on the  range, during 
anesthesia, the oscillatory frequency of the premotor cortex was altered and TMS-evoked 
slower responses, consisting of a large positive wave followed by a negative deflection. This 
local slow response was found in all subjects during LOC. Moreover, the initial response 
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remained largely restricted to the premotor cortices and affected only marginally the activity 
of other cortical areas. This breakdown of cortico-cortical effective connectivity was also 
evident when inspecting the time courses of the TMS-evoked cortical currents on other areas. 
For instance, the time course of cortical currents in BA 8 (prefrontal cortex), which is 
anatomically connected to BA 6 (premotor cortex), was not affected by the strong activation 
evoked by TMS in the premotor cortex (Figure 3.10). 
 
 
Figure 3.10. TMS during anesthesia evoked a large positive–negative wave in the 
stimulation site but little activation in distant areas. SCD cumulated in a 0–500 ms post-
TMS interval and displayed on the corresponding BA in wakefulness (Left) and anesthesia 
(Right). To the right of each topographic plot are time courses of currents recorded from the 
stimulated area, premotor cortex (BA 6), and from a more anterior cortical area (BA 8). 
During anesthesia, TMS-evoked SCD in BA6 was similar to the SCD recorded in 
wakefulness, as reflective of an initial stronger but shorter-lived response during anesthesia 
compared to wakefulness. Conversely, SCD from BA 8, which is anatomically connected to 
BA 6, were markedly reduced in anesthesia compared to wakefulness, suggesting a marked 
decrease in cortical effective connectivity (adapted from Ferrareli et al., 2010). 
 
These results bear a striking resemblance with those obtained during early NREM 
sleep discussed in the precedent section. The depth of sleep, however, can vary unpredictably, 
and if awakened to assess consciousness, subjects cannot rapidly return to sleep. In this study, 
subjects could be repeatedly assessed for LOC. In one subject, we could also evaluate the 
effects of progressively reduced arousal, from level 3 (sedation) to level 1 (LOC). The results 
show that at sedation level, the TMS-evoked initial activity became stronger than in 
wakefulness (Figure 3.11) but was followed by smaller and shorter-lived oscillations. This 
initial response to TMS was even larger during LOC, with a positive–negative wave similar to 
the spontaneous sleep slow oscillation, while subsequent activity was obliterated, 
demonstrating that brain responses to TMS became progressively shorter and sleep-like while 
transitioning into pharmacologic LOC. 
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Figure 3.11. TMS-evoked brain responses gradually changed while transitioning from 
high (OAA/S = 5) to low (OAA/S = 1) levels of vigilance. Left: single trials recorded from 
one channel located under the TMS coil, color-coded for voltage. Right: averaged TMS-
evoked responses obtained during the three levels of vigilance. Both single and average 
EEG responses showed a progressive increase in the amplitude and latency of an early 
evoked component (positive peak), followed by the obliteration of succeeding oscillations 
when reaching low levels of vigilance  (adapted from Ferrareli et al., 2010). 
In order to further quantify changes in strength (activity) and propagation 
(connectivity) of TMS-evoked cortical responses during LOC, SCD and SCS were calculated 
for each subject in wakefulness and anesthesia. The time course of SCD revealed that, in each 
subject, the initial TMS-evoked cortical activity, related to the large positive–negative wave, 
was higher in the anesthesia condition, whereas subsequent cortical activity was stronger 
during wakefulness. When cumulating SCD in two post-TMS time ranges, respectively, 0–50 
and 50–500 ms, we found that in the 0–50 ms interval, SCD was significantly higher during 
anesthesia (p = 0.016, Mann–Whitney), whereas in the 50–500 ms range, SCD was 
significantly higher during wakefulness ( p = 0.016, Mann–Whitney). The average SCD in the 
entire poststimulus interval was reduced during anesthesia, indicating a diminished response 
to the TMS, although the two conditions differed only at trend level (p = 0.1, Mann–
Whitney). By contrast, SCS discriminated effectively between the two conditions (Figure 
3.12). Specifically, in each subject, mean SCS was significantly higher in wakefulness 
compared to anesthesia (p = 0.009, Mann–Whitney). Furthermore, the time course of SCS 
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showed that, in each subject, SCS during wakefulness was significantly increased compared 
to baseline for >200ms, whereas during anesthesia, SCS returned to baseline within 100 ms of 
TMS.  
 
 
Figure 3.12: Cortical connectivity (SCS), but not reactivity (SCD), captured cortical 
changes during LOC. SCD and SCS were computed for each subject in wakefulness (blue 
line) and anesthesia (red line) following TMS of the premotor cortex. Left: Time course of 
SCD for individual and average data, and mean SCD over the entire post-TMS time interval 
(0–500ms). In each subject, SCD values were initially higher (first 50ms after TMS) during 
anesthesia but tended to dissipate shortly thereafter, consistent with a TMS-evoked larger 
initial response during anesthesia that was, however, short-lived. Mean SCD over the entire 
post-TMS period were not significantly different between wakefulness and anesthesia. 
Right: Time course of SCS for individual and average data, and mean SCS over the entire 
post-TMS interval. In each subject, during wakefulness, SCS was present for>200ms, 
whereas during anesthesia it faded after 100ms. Notably, mean SCS values in the 0–500ms 
post-TMS interval were significantly higher (p = 0.009, Mann–Whitney) in wakefulness 
relative to anesthesia, (adapted from Ferrareli et al., 2010). 
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Thus, during loss of consciousness induced by midazolam, the effective connectivity 
in the corticothalamic system was markedly reduced. Moreover, specific local oscillatory 
properties of neural circuits, as the natural frequencies of corticothalamic circuits of healthy 
awake subjects, were lost under LOC. Altogether these results suggest that when 
consciousness is absent the thalamocortical system responds to TMS with qualitatively 
simpler, slow and non-specific patterns of activation.  
 
3.4 – Disorders of Consciousness 
The results exposed in the previous sections demonstrate that in healthy awake and 
alert subjects TMS induced a sustained EEG response involving the sequential activation of 
different brain areas and affecting much of the cortex. By contrast, during NREM sleep and 
after loss of consciousness induced by general anesthesia, TMS pulses invariably produced a 
simple stereotyped response that either remained localized to the site of stimulation or bursted 
into an explosive and non-specific activation. Moreover, during REM sleep, when subjects are 
unresponsive to sensory stimuli and virtually paralyzed but report vivid dreams upon 
awakening, the cortical response to TMS recovered its complexity and became similar to that 
observed during wakefulness. If the complexity of the responses to TMS is supposed to 
correlate to the level of consciousness, what should we expect from the patterns of TMS-
evoked cortical activity collected in patients suffering from disorders of consciousness? 
 
3.4.1 – TMS/hd-EEG in DOC Patients: Experimental Protocol 
 In Rosanova et al. (2012) we described the results of employing TMS/hd-EEG at the 
bedside of 17 patients who evolved from coma into different clinical states: vegetative state 
(VS), minimally conscious state (MCS), emergence from MCS (EMCS) and locked-in 
syndrome (LIS). During each TMS/hd-EEG session, patients were lying on their beds, awake 
and with their eyes open. If signs of drowsiness appeared, recordings were momentarily 
interrupted and subjects were stimulated using the CRS-R arousal facilitation protocols 
(Giacino et al., 2004). Throughout every recording session the stability of stimulation 
coordinates was continuously monitored. If the virtual aiming device was signaling a 
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displacement >4 mm, session was interrupted and the coil was repositioned. At the end of the 
experiment, the stimulation coordinates were recorded and the electrode positions were 
digitized. 
Cortical targets were identified on computerized tomography (CT) scans acquired with 
a Siemens Senatom Sensation 16 from all patients. Stimulation was delivered with an 
interstimulus interval jittering randomly between 2000 and 2300 ms (0.4-0.5 Hz), at an 
intensity ranging from 140 V/m up to 200 V/m on the cortical surface. The CT-guided 
intracranial electric field estimation was a crucial step during the experimental procedure; due 
to shifts of intracranial volumes in brain-injured patients, it is difficult to assess whether TMS 
is on target and effective based on extra-cranial landmarks alone and this may result in false-
negatives (absence of EEG response due to missed target, or sub-threshold stimulation).  
TMS was targeted to four cortical sites: the left and right medial third of the superior 
parietal gyrus and the left and right medial third of the superior frontal gyrus. These cortical 
targets were selected for several reasons: i) they are easily accessible and far from major head 
or facial muscles whose unwanted activation may affect EEG recordings; ii) the posterior 
parietal cortex, as well as its interactions with more frontal areas, is thought to be particularly 
relevant for consciousness (Laureys et al., 2004); iii) our previous TMS/EEG studies have 
been successfully performed in these areas during wakefulness (Rosanova et al., 2009), sleep 
(Massimini et al., 2005, 2007) and anesthesia (Ferrarelli et al., 2010). In practice, all four 
cortical sites were not always accessible in all subjects due to skull breaches, external drain 
derivations. In all cases, we avoided stimulating over focal cortical lesions that were clearly 
visible in CT scans, since the EEG response of these areas may be absent or unreliable.  
 
3.4.2 – Data Analysis and Results 
We performed a first set of TMS/hd-EEG experiments (one single session) in a group 
of 12 patients (Group I: 5 females; mean age±standard deviation: 50.3±26.21, for more 
details see Appendix - Table A.1). These patients were repeatedly evaluated (4 times, every 
other day) for a period of one week by means the CRS-R, in order to avoid diagnostic errors 
due to fluctuations in responsiveness and to obtain a stable clinical diagnosis. Five patients of 
Group I (Patients 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5), showed only reflexive behavior and were diagnosed as VS 
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during the 4 behavioral evaluations. Five patients (Patients 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10) showed non-
reflexive behaviours, such as visual tracking or responding to simple commands, satisfying 
the CRS-R criteria for MCS in at least 3 evaluations, including the one performed on the day 
of the TMS/EEG session. The two remaining patients (Patient 11 and Patient 12) could 
communicate reliably and were diagnosed as LIS. The VS and MCS subgroups did not differ 
systematically in etiology and time from injury (reported in Appendix - Table A.1). In 
particular, Group I included three chronic patients, one VS (Patient 5: 172 days from injury), 
one MCS (Patient 8: 1334 days from injury) and one LIS (Patient 12: 1399 days from injury).  
Figure 3.13 displays examples of the cortical response evoked by TMS in VS, MCS 
and LIS patients. VS patients exhibited local, stereotypical evoked responses, closely 
resembling the cortical activations previously observed during deep sleep and anesthesia 
(Figures 3.6 and 3.9). In MCS, TMS invariably triggered a complex response associated with 
a rapidly changing pattern of cortical activation, contrasting starkly with the local, simple 
wave recorded in VS patients and being, instead, comparable to the one obtained in locked-in 
subjects. Thus, a clear-cut difference in the cortical response to TMS seems to discriminate 
reliably between patients who were considered VS after repeated behavioral evaluations and 
subjects who showed signs of consciousness.  
In order to quantify this difference, we applied a statistical measure to extract latencies 
with significant GMFP activations and count the number of sources involved by maximal 
currents at these latencies. A bootstrap method (Lv et al., 2007, McCubbin et al., 2008) was 
applied by shuffling the time samples of GMFP pre-stimulus activity (from -300 to -50 ms) at 
the single-trial level and by calculating 500 surrogated pre-stimulus GMFPs. From each 
random realization, the maximum value across all latencies was selected to obtain a maximum 
distribution (control for type I error) and significance level was set at p<0.01. At each 
significant latency of the post-stimulus GMFP, the location of maximum neuronal current (10 
most active sources) was detected on the cortical surface. Plotting and counting the sources 
involved by maximum neuronal currents across all significant time points in the first 300 ms 
post-stimulus resulted in the cortical maps and in the values reported in Figure 3.14.  
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Figure 3.13: Examples of TMS-evoked cortical responses of patients who evolved from 
coma into different clinical states. hd-EEG GMFPs (black traces) and SCD (cortical 
maps) are shown for TMS/EEG sessions performed in three patients in different clinical 
states. A) TMS evoked a slow, short-lived and simple response on a patient diagnosed in 
vegetative state (CRS-R = 4); B) A patient who showed fluctuating signs of non-reflexive 
reactions to external stimuli but were unable to communicate reliably with the examiners, 
diagnosed in minimally conscious state (CSR-R=14), responded to TMS with a complex, 
long-lasting changing pattern of cortical activation, where maximum neuronal currents (blue 
circle) shifted over time across different areas; C) A similar complex response was observed 
in a locked-in subject (LIS) who, though being largely paralyzed at the time of recording, 
could signal full awareness through vertical eye movements. The green stars mark the site 
of stimulation (left parietal cortex). 
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Figure 3.14. TMS-evoked cortical responses in Group I patients. A group of  five VS 
(A), five MCS (B), and two LIS patients (C) underwent one TMS/hd-EEG session after 7 
days of repeated evaluations by means of the CRS-R. For each patient, the averaged 
TMS-evoked potentials recorded at one electrode under the stimulator (black trace) and 
the respective significance threshold (upper and lower boundaries of the pink bands; 
bootstrap statistics, p<0.01) are shown. The sources involved by maximum cortical 
currents (10 most active sources) during the significant post-stimulus period of the GMFP 
are plotted on the cortical surface and color-coded according to their location in six 
anatomical macro-areas as indicated in the legend at the bottom-right end of the figure; 
the number of detected sources is indicated at the top-right end of each map. The time-
series represent TMS-evoked cortical currents recorded from an array of 6 sources (black 
circles on the bottom-right cortical map) located about 2 cm lateral to the midline, one for 
each macro-area. The white crosses mark the sites of stimulation. For all patients the 
responses to the left parietal cortex stimulation are shown, except for one patient (Patient 
5) in whom a significant response could only be detected in the right hemisphere (adapted 
from Rosanova et al., 2012). 
 
 
According to this procedure, the number of detected sources is small if TMS triggers 
stable primary neuronal currents that remain confined to the stimulated area during the entire 
post-stimulus period. On the contrary, the number of detected sources is large if TMS triggers 
primary cortical currents that involve different cortical areas at different times. In order to 
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describe the time-course of TMS-evoked cortical activation in different areas the currents 
from a grid of six cortical sources (black circles plotted on the bottom-right cortical map in 
Figure 3.14) were extracted and auto-scaled to the maximum value of each session. Sources 
and time-series of cortical currents were color-coded according to their anatomical location in 
6 arbitrary macro-areas (see colors legend in Figure 3.14).  
In all VS patients, except for one anoxic patient (Patient 4) in whom no response could 
be elicited even when TMS was delivered at high intensity (200 V/m) in both hemispheres, 
TMS elicited maximum cortical currents that remained localized during the entire significant 
post-stimulus period, involving a small number of sources around the stimulated area (Figure 
3.14A). Conversely, in all MCS patients, maximum neuronal currents shifted over time from 
the stimulated site to a large number of distant sources (Figure 3.14B). This pattern was 
comparable to the one obtained in two locked-in (LIS) subjects (Figure 3.14C). Notably, this 
difference allowed for a single-subject discrimination between VS and MCS patients (see also 
Figure 3.17). 
We also performed longitudinal TMS/hd-EEG measurements (session 1, session 2 and 
session 3) in a group of five patients (Group II: 3 females; mean age±standard deviation: 
51.2±23.05, see the Appendix - Table A.2 for more detail) as they awakened from coma and 
progressed towards different clinical states (Figure 3.15). As assessed by the CRS-R, three of 
these patients (Patients 13, 14 and 15) regained functional communication evolving from VS, 
through MCS to EMCS, while two patients (Patients 16 and 17) remained VS. In all cases the 
first TMS/hd-EEG session (session 1) was performed at least 48 hours after withdrawal of 
sedation, when patients opened their eyes and were diagnosed VS. At this time, similar to the 
VS patients of Group I, TMS evoked a simple wave and a local pattern of activation or no 
response at all. Following session 1, two additional TMS/hd-EEG measurements were 
performed in the three patients who eventually recovered consciousness: session 2 was 
recorded as soon as they satisfied the CRS-R criteria for MCS and session 3 when they 
recovered functional communication and emerged from the minimally conscious state 
(EMCS). In these patients, TMS triggered a complex pattern of activation that sequentially 
involved a large set of cortical areas already during session 2; this response was substantially 
different from the simple, local activation of session 1 and was instead comparable to the one 
obtained in session 3, when subjects had recovered their ability to communicate (Figure 
3.15A). In the two patients who did not show any clinical improvement beyond VS, a second 
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TMS/hd-EEG measurement (session 2) was performed more than a month after session 1 and 
showed either a local, simple wave of activation (Patient 16) or no response (Patient 17, 
anoxic), although subjects were awake and open-eyed when their brains were stimulated 
(Figure 3.15B).  
 
Figure 3.15. Clinical evaluation and TMS-evoked cortical responses in Group II 
patients. CRS-R total scores are plotted for the patients who were studied longitudinally 
(Group II) and eventually emerged from MCS (A) or remained VS (B); the first 
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assessment (session 1) was carried out 48 hours after withdrawal of sedation, as patients 
exited from coma. The symbols indicate the associated clinical diagnosis (circles=VS; 
triangles=MCS; squares=EMCS). Colored arrow tips mark the days when TMS/EEG 
recordings were performed and the time of TMS delivery (black=session 1; blue=session 
2; red=session 3). For every patient and session, averaged potentials triggered by TMS 
(vertical dashed lines) of parietal cortex and recorded from the electrode under the 
stimulator are shown. The sources involved by maximum neuronal currents during the 
significant post-stimulus period are plotted on the cortical surface and color-coded 
according to their location in six anatomical macro-areas (see Figure 3.14); the number of 
detected sources is indicated at the top-right end of each map. The time-series represent 
TMS-evoked cortical currents recorded from an array of 6 sources (see their locations in 
Figure 3.14) located about 2 cm lateral to the midline, one for each macro-area. The 
white crosses mark the sites of stimulation; in each patient, the left parietal cortex was 
stimulated when patients entered VS from coma (session 1), soon after transition to MCS 
or at least 30 days of permanence in VS (session 2) and after emergence from MCS 
(EMCS; session 3), when subjects recovered functional communication (adapted from 
Rosanova et al., 2012). 
 
These results with Group II indicate that the breakdown of the widespread balanced 
pattern of cortical activation observed in VS patients can be reversible and that a substantial 
improvement in the brain’s ability to sustain internal communication occurred at an early 
stage during recovery of consciousness, before reliable communication could be established 
with the patient.  
Are these changes in the activation pattern evoked by TMS associated to changes in 
electrophysiological arousal (EEG activation)? Spectral analysis of spontaneous EEG showed 
a consistent increase of high-frequency (> 7Hz) oscillations in LIS compared to MCS (Group 
I) and in EMCS compared to MCS (Group II). By contrast, in spite of a clear-cut change in 
the electrical response to TMS, no systematic changes of the background EEG could be 
detected between VS and MCS (Figure 3.16) consistent with previous reports (Kotchoubey et 
al., 2005). These results suggest that the transition from VS to MCS involves a substantial 
improvement of cortical integration that is not necessarily associated with an obvious change 
in the level of activation of the ongoing EEG.  
Figure 3.17 summarizes the results obtained after applying TMS in all 17 patients, 
showing that it was possible to discriminate reliably between VS and MCS at the single-
subject level. Crucially, this discrimination was achieved in a way that is completely 
independent on the patient’s ability to exchange information with the surrounding 
environment.  
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Figure 3.16. EEG spectra showed evident changes from MCS to EMCS but not from 
VS to MCS. Spontaneous EEG traces (5 seconds) and EEG spectra (calculated on 2 
minutes) are shown for the 5 subjects who underwent longitudinal recording sessions 
(Group II); in these patients, changes in the EEG spectrum were assessed statistically by 
means of a two tailed paired t-test. The dotted lines at the bottom of each plot indicate the 
frequency bins that show statistically significant differences of power (t-test, p<0.01) 
(adapted from Rosanova et al., 2012). 
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Figure 3.17. Effective connectivity for all patients and TMS/EEG measurements. A) 
For each patient and TMS/EEG measurement (parietal stimulation, same measurements 
of Figures 3.14 and 3.15), the number of sources involved by TMS-evoked currents are 
plotted. The circles indicate the clinical diagnosis at the time of recording (open black 
circles for VS; open blue circles for MCS; open red circles for EMCS and filled red 
circles for LIS). B) The number of cortical sources involved by maximum cortical 
currents detected in all TMS/EEG measurements (n=72) is plotted for all patients (Group 
I on the left and Group II on the right). Each value refers to one cortical target and is 
marked according to both the site of stimulation (the correspondence between symbols 
and stimulation sites is graphically reported on the cortical map in the left upper corner of 
the panel) and the CRS-R diagnosis at the time of recording (black for VS; blue for MCS; 
red for LIS in Group I and EMCS in Group II). In all cases, effective connectivity was 
higher in patients who showed some level of consciousness (MCS, EMCS and LIS) 
compared to VS patients. An exception is represented by the 3 measurements (left 
parietal, left frontal, right frontal) performed in Patient 15 during session 2 (open black 
circles indicated by arrows). This patient was diagnosed MCS the day before the 
measurement, slipped back into a behavioral VS on the day of session 2 and, within days, 
was reassessed clinically as MCS and then EMCS (during session 3). Effective 
connectivity was null in the two anoxic subjects (Patients 4 from Group I and Patient 17 
from Group II) (adapted from Rosanova et al., 2012). 
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The quantitative measure employed in this section - the number of different sources 
involved in the maximum neural current at latencies where the GMFP was statistically 
significant - was able to detect a clear-cut difference between VS and MCS. This is a 
particularly relevant distinction if one considers that the most challenging task at the bedside 
is distinguishing between VS patients and non-communicating MCS patients (Majerus et al., 
2005). However, this measure, designed to grasp the increase of complexity in the cortical 
activation pattern evoked by TMS in MCS patients (Figure 3.13A), was not able to quantify 
distinctions between lower versus higher levels of consciousness, such as between MCS and 
patients suffering from locked-in syndrome. We should therefore expect that a more suitable 
measure of the complexity of the cortical activity evoked by TMS could be devised. In 
particular, as we saw in the previous two chapters, a measure of the brain’s capacity for 
sustaining causal interactions between specialized cortical areas - a measure of its capacity 
for internal communication - should rely on statistics constructed from single-trial sources to 
take into account only primary currents causally related to the perturbation. Volume 
conduction may cause GMFP to be significant when primary currents are not. For this 
reason, the measure employed in the previous chapter may overestimate the ability of the 
thalamocortical system to sustain internal communications in some intermediate conditions, 
such as MCS. Whereas this bias may favor the sensitivity of the measure for detecting 
differences from VS, it may also undermine the distinction between MCS and healthy, alert 
subjects. Moreover, there is no indication that the ability for internal communication, which 
is supposedly relevant for consciousness, should depend only on those currents that are most 
strongly activated at a particular time. If the activity of a cortical area is causally linked to the 
stimulus, it should contribute to a measure that is sensitive to the amount of internal 
communication in the thalamocortical system, independent of the strength of its 
corresponding evoked current.  
Therefore, although the results presented thus far and the phenomenological 
considerations discussed in the first chapter qualitatively indicate that the brain’s capacity for 
consciousness depends on its ability to sustain complex patterns of causal interactions 
between specialized cortical areas, there is still a need for a quantifiable measure of such a 
peculiar capability. We address this task in the next chapter.  
 Chapter 4. 
The Perturbational Complexity Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the brain is supposed to be the vehicle for the content of consciousness, if it is 
responsible for sustaining our access to the objects of intentionality, then, as we argued in the 
first chapter, different specialized cortical areas should be allowed to causally interact with 
each other through complex feedforward-feedback circuitry. Our results in the previous 
chapter strongly support the notion that when this capacity to sustain causal interactions is 
present, the thalamocortical system should respond to an effective perturbation with a 
complex pattern of neural activation, involving different cortical areas at different times. 
Conversely, the system should react with a simple stereotypical response if the circuitry is no 
longer integrated or if any specialized module has lost its dynamical specificity. How can we 
quantify the complexity of the cortical activation pattern evoked by TMS? 
 
4.1 – Calculating the complexity of the cortical activity evoked by TMS 
We begin by using NREM sleep as a model of unconsciousness and developing a 
measure of the complexity of cortical responses to external perturbation. TMS evoked simple 
stereotypical cortical responses during NREM sleep and a balanced, long-range and 
differentiated activation pattern during wakefulness, with different cortical areas responding 
to the stimulation at different times (Figure 3.6). This qualitative notion of the spatiotemporal 
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complexity of the activation pattern evoked by TMS can be understood from the significant 
sources binary matrix (SS(x,t), section 2.4), which indicates where and when cortical activity 
is significantly related to the stimulation. Indeed, observing the SS matrix plots (Figure 4.1) 
calculated for the conditions displayed in Figure 3.6 immediately reveals that the complexity 
of the SS matrices, rather than the strength, duration or extent of the response to TMS, is 
what distinguishes alert wakefulness (Figure 4.1 A), when consciousness is unambiguously 
present, from slow-wave sleep, when consciousness fades (Figure 4.1 B and C).  
The SS matrix displayed in Figure 4.1A is intuitively said to be more complex in that 
it is more difficult to describe: significant activity occurred at different times and at different 
places following no simple rule. By contrast, SS matrices exhibited in Figure 4.1 B and C are 
less complex in that they are easier to portray. In general, there is a clear and intuitive 
relationship between the complexity of a pattern and its information content. This idea 
motivated Andrei Kolmogorov and others in the 1960s (Chaitin, 1966; Kolmogorov, 1965; 
Solomonoff, 1964) to define the algorithmic complexity of a string as the length of the 
shortest computer program that could generate the string. The Kolmogorov complexity, 
however, was quickly deemed impossible to be effectively computed (Li and Vitányi, 2008; 
Solomonoff, 1964), and approximate measures were developed to reliably quantify 
algorithmic complexity.  
One of the most popular complexity measures of the Kolmogorov class was 
introduced by Lempel and Ziv (1976). This measure approximates the amount of non-
redundant information contained in a string by estimating the minimal size of the 
“vocabulary” necessary to describe the string. Strings with high Lempel-Ziv complexity 
require a large number of different patterns (“words”) to be reproduced, while strings with 
low Lempel-Ziv complexity can be largely compressed with a few patterns employed to 
eliminate redundancy with no loss of information. After being implemented in a universal 
lossless data compression algorithm (Ziv and Lempel, 1977; Welch, 1984), the Lempel-Ziv 
routine has become the standard basis for major data compression methods, such as those 
used to generate TIFF images and ZIP files. 
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Figure 4.1: Significant sources (SS) binary matrices manifested the reduction of the 
spatiotemporal complexity of TMS-evoked cortical activation during slow-wave sleep. 
For each condition described in Figure 3.6 (A, B and C), matrix plots of SS(x, t) are shown 
(large squares in the center) with sources (rows) sorted by their number of significant 
samples. TMS-evoked currents for some representative sources are shown on the left (time-
series in black). Statistical thresholds (gray areas) applied to each source activity show 
when sources were significantly activated by the stimulation. The temporal patterns of 
significant cortical activations comprise the horizontal dimension (lines) of SS (the black 
area in the rectangles below TMS-evoked currents). The vertical dimension (columns) of 
SS contains the spatial distributions of the significant cortical activations (cortical 
topographical maps on the bottom right). Red rectangular areas of SS, with an equal 
number of vertical and horizontal elements (100 sources × 100 time samples), are displayed 
in the red squares on the top right after scaling for enlargement. SS, when calculated during 
alert wakefulness (A), appears as a complex binary matrix formed by a balanced 
spatiotemporal pattern of different activated and non-activated sources at different times. 
The same stimulation during slow-wave sleep generated a simple binary pattern, with some 
local sources activated earlier (< 100 ms) and no activity later (B). Increasing the intensity 
of stimulation during slow-wave sleep produced a global but stereotypical response, with a 
simple spatiotemporal pattern of activation, in which a large number of sources were 
steadily activated for a long period of time (C) (adapted from Casali et. al, 2012). 
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Because the qualitative differences observed in the spatiotemporal patterns of causal 
activity evoked by TMS between healthy alert wakefulness (Figure 4.1A) and NREM sleep 
(Figure 4.1B and C) are intuitively related to the notion of complexity in the Kolmogorov 
sense, the Lempel-Ziv measure is a natural candidate to quantify the patterns of cortical 
activity appearing to be correlated with the brain’s capacity for consciousness. Moreover, the 
inverse solution and statistics provide the extraction of deterministic patterns of cortical 
activation, generated by non-linear causal processes, in response to TMS. Therefore, the tools 
for the analysis of nonlinear dynamics, such as Lempel-Ziv complexity, are best suited to 
characterize the degree of organization of the activity produced by this class of processes. 
Other nonlinear tools, such as Lyapunov exponents, depend on the reconstruction of the 
phase space, the estimation of several parameters and require long time computations, while 
Lempel-Ziv complexity may be computed with relatively low-cost algorithms. 
 
4.1.1 – The Lempel-Ziv Algorithm for Binary Matrices  
A simple routine can easily be implemented to calculate the Lempel-Ziv measure for 
a binary sequence with arbitrary length n (Kaspar and Schuster, 1987). The algorithm scans 
the sequence searching for subsequences of consecutive characters, or “words”. The Lempel-
Ziv complexity c(n) accounts for the number of times a new subsequence is encountered: 
c(n) is a measure related to the number of different “words” necessary to describe the content 
of the string. We implemented a straightforward generalization of this routine in order to 
apply it to binary matrices, such as SS(x,t), instead of one-dimensional strings. Our algorithm 
runs in the vertical dimension of the input matrix (columns), searching for patterns and 
repeats this search along the horizontal dimension (rows), tracking the patterns encountered 
in previous columns (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix for a diagram of the algorithm).  
The asymptotic behavior of c(n) for random strings generated from a source with 
entropy H is nH/log2(n)  (Lempel and Ziv, 1976). Therefore, deviations from maximum 
complexity may be due to the fact that the “source entropy” H differs from 1 and not to the 
formation of a pattern in the string (the string is still as random as possible). For this reason, 
the normalized Lempel-Ziv complexity )(nc  is usually taken into consideration (Kaspar and 
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Schuster, 1987) where nHnncnc /)(log)()( 2 . Asymptotically in n, )(nc  = 1 for strictly 
random sequences. 
 
4.1.2 – The Lempel-Ziv Perturbational Complexity Index (PCILZ) 
The qualitative features of TMS-evoked responses encountered in the previous 
chapters intuitively suggest that the distinction between alert wakefulness and LOC may be 
quantified by applying a complexity measure of the Kolmogorov class to the spatiotemporal 
distributions of significant cortical activity (Figure 4.1). Based on these considerations, we 
define the Lempel-Ziv perturbational complexity index (PCILZ) of significant TMS-evoked 
spatiotemporal activations as the normalized Lempel-Ziv complexity ( )(nc ) of the binary 
matrix SS. 
With SS as the input of our algorithm, PCILZ is a measure that increases with the 
number of different spatial patterns occurring in a given time sample that do not occur in 
previous samples. In addition, normalizing the Lempel-Ziv measure by the source entropy of 
SS,  
H = – p1log2(p1) – (1– p1) log2(1– p1),       (4.1) 
where p1 is the fraction of significant spatiotemporal samples contained in SS, results in a 
complexity measure that is minimally dependent on the total amount of significant activity 
and maximally dependent on the number of different patterns necessary to describe the data. 
This normalization is justified by the observation that the level of consciousness does not 
correlate with the fraction of statistically significant sources in the post-stimulus period, 
which instead depends crucially on external factors such as the stimulation intensity (Figure 
4.1 B and C, see also Figure A.2 in the Appendix). 
In theory, the complexity of spatial patterns depends on the arbitrary ordination of SS 
rows (sources) and the proper complexity of SS(x, t) should be equated with the minimal 
complexity across all permutations of all sources. Because searching for all permutations 
may be computationally unfeasible, we approximate the optimal ordination by calculating 
PCILZ from SS after sorting sources by their number of significant samples (as depicted in 
Figure 4.1). Therefore, whereas PCILZ values will be high for systems that respond with the 
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activation of different areas at different times, systems that respond with a small number of 
different spatial patterns will have lower values of PCILZ, independently of the total amount 
of significant activity in the post-stimulus period, provided that the stimulation is effective in 
producing a cortical response. Calculating the PCILZ for the sessions exhibited in Figure 4.1 
confirms this theoretical prediction: during wakefulness, PCILZ = 0.51 for the SS exhibited in 
panel A, and during slow-wave sleep, PCILZ = 0.23 and 0.21 for the matrices exhibited in 
panels B and C, respectively. 
PCI is calculated from the binary spatiotemporal distribution SS(xj,t), which 
represents where and when the average cortical response to TMS is significantly different 
from pre-stimulus source activity. Because random noise affecting the EEG signal is 
considerably attenuated after stimulus-locked averaging and statistics, in contrast to most 
attempts to quantify physiological data with algorithmic complexity, PCI is not significantly 
susceptible to confusing complexity with randomness. Still, the correct interpretation of 
results requires a rigorous control of false positives: SS matrices were computed by means of 
a non-parametric statistics corrected for multiple comparisons, with significance level α = 
0.01 (see section 2.4). Furthermore, the interpretation of the values of PCI depends on 
calculation of this measure only when the TMS is able to engage the thalamocortical system 
effectively. By ensuring that all SS matrices in which PCI was calculated had a percentage of 
spatiotemporal samples (p1) greater than the rate of false positives of the statistics (1%), 
corresponding to an entropy H> 0.08, we also avoided falsely elevated complexity values due 
to the division by a number close to zero (H, Eq. 4.1). In general, this control for the signal 
strength can be achieved at the sensors level by calculating the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). 
All TMS sessions in which PCI was calculated had SNR > 1.5 (see Figure A.2 in the 
Appendix). 
 
4.1.3 – The Transposed Lempel-Ziv Perturbational Complexity Index (PCITLZ) 
One can also define perturbational complexity in terms of the transpose of SS(x,t), 
SST(t,x). This measure will instead increase with the number of temporal patterns occurring 
in a given source that do not occur in other sources. Theoretically, PCITLZ and PCILZ are 
distinct measures: a single source with completely random binary activity may produce high 
PCITLZ values due to the high number of temporal patterns contained in the random series but 
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very low values of PCILZ (the activation of a single random source has only two spatial 
patterns). However, because the Lempel-Ziv complexity is combined with a perturbational 
approach, PCITLZ and PCILZ may be predicted to be strongly correlated. As showed by 
Kaspar and Schuster (1987), when computed in spatially correlated deterministic systems the 
“spatial” Lempel-Ziv complexity, which amounts to the number of different spatial “words” 
across different time-samples, is also sensitive to the number of temporal patterns: if activity 
in one part of the system is caused by activity in other parts of the system, the Lempel-Ziv 
complexity c(n) will naturally allow for an analysis of both spatial and temporal patterns. As 
described in the previous chapters, SS contains only those components of cortical activity 
that are time-locked to the stimulus onset. Therefore, the system responding to TMS is likely 
to behave as a spatially correlated, deterministic causal system and we expect that when the 
Lempel-Ziv complexity is applied to the significant sources binary activity, the spatial and 
temporal versions of the measure will be correlated. In fact, our results obtained from 116 
TMS sessions (see Figure 4.9 below) demonstrate that both versions of PCI estimate the 
same measure of spatiotemporal complexity of the TMS-evoked cortical activity. When this 
correlation is observed, PCI is high only if many regions of the cerebral cortex react to the 
initial perturbation quickly and in different ways.   
 
4.1.4 – The Conditional Entropy Perturbational Complexity Index (PCICE) 
We implemented a second and independent measure of complexity to test whether 
our results were crucially affected by the specific manner in which complexity was 
calculated. The complexity of a string can also be understood statistically, in terms of the 
entropic information content of the string. Such measures are based on the conditional 
entropy or entropy rate, i.e., the average information required to specify a new state with 
respect to the information content of previous states. For a binary string of n bits s = 
s(1)s(2)s(3)…s(n), patterns of length L are sequences of L bits sL(i) = s(i)s(i+1)…s(i+L-1). If 
pL(i) is the joint probability of the occurrence of pattern sL(i), and H(pL) is the Shannon 
entropy calculated from the probabilities pL, the conditional entropy at length L is calculated 
as the variation of the Shannon entropy with respect to L: CE(L) = H(pL) - H(pL-1). We 
estimated the probabilities pL from the binary matrix SS, using the second dimension 
(samples) as the “string dimension” and counting the temporal patterns sL(i) in all sources 
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(first dimension). Conditional entropy was then calculated for 1 < L < 10, correcting the bias 
introduced in the CE estimation due to the limited number of samples (Porta, 1998), and the 
complexity was equated with the minimal CE (which occurred between L = 3 and L = 6 for 
all TMS/hd-EEG sessions analyzed). Because strictly random strings of length n have a 
constant conditional entropy equal to their source entropy H, we then defined the Conditional 
Entropy Perturbational Complexity Index (PCICE) as the minimal estimated conditional 
entropy of SS, normalized by H as given by Eq. (4.1).  
 
4.2 – Testing PCI  
PCI, as a measure of the information content of the spatiotemporal cortical activity 
significantly evoked by TMS, is low if causal interactions among cortical areas are reduced 
because the matrix of activation triggered by TMS will be reduced. PCI is also low if all 
cortical areas react to the perturbation in a similar way because in this case the large matrix 
of activation is highly redundant and can be compressed using little information. PCI will 
only be high if many regions of the cerebral cortex react to the initial perturbation quickly 
and in different ways. Therefore, the considerations and results discussed in the previous 
chapters support PCILZ as a possible index correlated with the brain’s capacity for 
consciousness. In this section, we test this hypothesis, calculating PCILZ in a total of 116 
TMS sessions obtained across 36 subjects under the following different conditions: alert 
wakefulness, slow-wave sleep, REM sleep and anesthesia in healthy subjects and vegetative 
state (VS), minimally conscious state (MCS), emergence from the minimally conscious state 
(EMCS) and locked-in syndrome (LIS) in brain-injured patients. PCI values were computed 
for SS matrices obtained from the first 300 ms of the post-TMS interval (matrix dimension of 
3004 sources x 106 time samples), for all subjects in all conditions.  
 
4.2.1 – PCI allowed the discrimination of alert wakefulness from NREM sleep and 
anesthesia-LOC, independent of the strength and the extent of cortical activation 
We calculated PCILZ from 13 TMS/hd-EEG sessions recorded in 5 healthy subjects 
progressing from wakefulness to NREM sleep. The first TMS-EEG session was collected 
while subjects were awake, with stimuli targeted to the rostral portion of the right premotor 
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cortex and a maximum electrical field at the cortical target of 90 V/m. The second TMS-EEG 
session was collected after subjects entered a consolidated period (> 5 min) of NREM stage 2 
sleep. In three of the five subjects, we were able to register a third session, where TMS, 
targeted to the midline sensorimotor area with a maximum electric field of 160 V/m, induced 
responses resembling complete slow waves.   
PCILZ was also calculated from 12 TMS/hd-EEG sessions performed in 6 healthy 
subjects during anesthesia. The first TMS-EEG session was collected in each subject before 
midazolam injection, with stimuli targeted to the rostral portion of the right premotor cortex 
at an intensity of 120V/m. Midazolam was then given until the subject was unresponsive 
(level 1 of the OAA/S), with a maximum dose of 0.2 mg/kg. A second TMS session was then 
collected during deep unresponsiveness (see section 3.3 for details of the experimental 
protocol). 
In addition to PCI, SCD and SCS were calculated for each subject in all conditions. 
Neither SCD nor SCS unambiguously captured the cortical changes during loss of 
consciousness. While SCS performed better and discriminated between wakefulness and 
LOC induced by anesthesia (Figure 3.12), it failed to do so when TMS induced a global 
cortical slow wave during NREM sleep (Figure 4.2 B). PCI, however, was able to 
unambiguously distinguish between consciousness and unconsciousness (Figure 4.2 C). 
During alert wakefulness, all subjects responded to TMS with a complex pattern of cortical 
activation corresponding to a PCILZ ranging between 0.45 and 0.61 (mean = 0.52  0.04), 
whereas during NREM sleep and unconsciousness induced by anesthesia, all subjects 
responded to TMS with a PCILZ below 0.30 (mean = 0.22  0.03). Moreover, as a measure of 
complexity normalized by the source entropy of the binary data, PCILZ treated the global, 
long-lasting stereotypical response observed during the induction of slow waves in NREM 
sleep in the same manner as the local, short-lasting responses observed during sleep and 
anesthesia. High PCI values were seen only if the activation evoked by TMS was a balanced, 
long-lasting and widespread spatiotemporal pattern, such as those observed during alert 
wakefulness. 
The Perturbational Complexity Index  
 98
 
Figure 4.2: Complexity of the cortical activity evoked by TMS (PCILZ) but not 
reactivity (SCD) or connectivity (SCS) unambiguously discriminated alert 
wakefulness from NREM sleep and anesthesia-LOC. The individual values of 
significant current density (A), significant current scattering (B) - both cumulative over 
the post-stimulus interval (0-300 ms) - and perturbational complexity (C) are shown for 
11 healthy subjects during alert wakefulness, NREM sleep and anesthesia. The panels on 
the right display the distributions of SCD, SCS and PCILZ across subjects during alert 
wakefulness (dark gray bars) and loss of consciousness (light gray bars). PCI 
distributions reliably discriminated between consciousness and unconsciousness, 
independent of the strength and the extent of cortical activation (p < 0.00005, Wilcoxon 
rank sum test). 
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4.2.2 – PCI allowed a clear-cut distinction between conscious and unconscious healthy 
subjects, independent of the stimulated area and stimulation intensity 
To test the variability of PCI with respect to the stimulation parameters, TMS was 
targeted to different cortical areas with different stimulation intensities in 7 awake, healthy 
subjects. Sessions of 200 stimuli were collected while subjects were lying on an ergonomic 
chair, relaxed and with eyes open, looking at a fixed point on a screen. The maximum 
electrical field at the cortical target ranged from 80 to 160 V/m. The coil was targeted to the 
superior occipital gyrus (BA19), middle superior frontal gyrus (BA08), superior parietal 
gyrus (BA07) and the left hand motor area (BA06). Data corrupted by muscular artifacts or 
with a low signal-to-noise ratio were excluded, resulting in a total of 47 TMS sessions 
Figure 4.3 exhibits the PCILZ results for these 47 sessions collected during 
wakefulness together with the results of the sleep/anesthesia protocols (Figure 4.2 C). 
Applying TMS to different cortical areas with different intensities in different subjects did 
not have a reductive impact on the ability of PCI to discriminate between consciousness and 
unconsciousness. In fact, if the stimulation parameters were effective in producing a cortical 
response to TMS, PCI was not sensitive to specific targets or the stimulation intensity. While 
the maximum PCILZ was 0.3 during NREM sleep and anesthesia, the PCILZ for all TMS 
sessions during alert wakefulness were in the same range observed previously. Altogether, 58 
TMS sessions from 18 subjects during alert wakefulness presented a markedly higher PCI 
(PCILZ in the range of 0.44-0.65 with a mean value of 0.55  0.05) relative to the 14 TMS 
sessions from 11 subjects during sleep/anesthesia-LOC (PCILZ in the range of 0.17-0.30 with 
a mean value of 0.22  0.03). The p-value for the comparison between the PCILZ values for 
the conscious and unconscious groups was less than 10-8 (Wilcoxon rank sum test). 
 
4.2.3 – The discrimination of PCI between consciousness and unconsciousness did not 
depend on the particular method used to calculate complexity 
We calculated the perturbational complexity based on conditional entropy (PCICE) 
(see section 4.1.4) for all 72 TMS sessions displayed in Figure 4.3 to confirm that our results, 
which allowed a distinction between conscious and unconscious subjects, remained valid for 
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changes in the method used for calculating the informational content of significant activity 
evoked by TMS (SS(x,t)).  
 
 
Figure 4.3: PCILZ discriminated between conscious and unconscious healthy 
subjects, independently of the stimulated area and the stimulation intensity. The 
results of Figure 4.2 C (subjects 1-11) are displayed together with PCILZ values of an 
additional 47 TMS sessions collected from 7 healthy subjects with stimulations of 
different intensities (color scale on the left) targeted to different areas (BA 19, 08, 07 and 
06) during alert wakefulness (subjects 12-18). As shown on the right, PCILZ generated 
disjoint distributions between conscious (dark gray bars) and unconscious subjects (light 
gray bars). The PCILZ calculated in conscious subjects ranged between 0.44 and 0.65 
(mean value of 0.55  0.05), whereas the PCILZ calculated after loss of consciousness 
ranged between 0.17 and 0.30 (mean value of 0.22  0.03). The p-value for the 
comparison (Wilcoxon rank sum test) between the PCILZ values for the conscious and 
unconscious groups was less than 10-8 (adapted from Casali et. al, 2012). 
 
Figure 4.4 demonstrates how the reliable discrimination between alert wakefulness 
and sleep/anesthesia-LOC was also achieved using the conditional entropy index. The 
correlation between PCICE and PCILZ across all sessions was near 90%. PCICE ranged from 
0.3 to 0.48 during alert wakefulness (mean value of 0.39  0.04) and from 0.1 to 0.25 during 
sleep/anesthesia-LOC (mean value of 0.19  0.04). The p-value for the comparison of PCICE 
between the conscious and unconscious groups had the same order of magnitude as the p-
value for the comparison of PCILZ (p < 10-8, Wilcoxon rank sum test).     
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Figure 4.4: The discrimination between conscious and unconscious healthy subjects 
was preserved using the PCI calculated based on conditional entropy (PCICE). Left: 
The linear correlation between PCICE and PCILZ across all sessions displayed in Figure 
4.3 is shown (correlation coefficient = 88.7%). Right: The distributions of PCILZ (top) 
and PCICE (bottom) in wakefulness and sleep/anesthesia-LOC. Both PCI measures 
generated disjoint distributions between conditions (p < 10-8, Wilcoxon rank sum test; 
figure adapted from Casali et al., 2012). 
 
4.2.4 – The PCI time-course revealed a reproducible time-scale related to the emergence of 
complex TMS-evoked cortical activation during alert wakefulness 
PCILZ increases with the number of spatial patterns occurring at a given time that 
have not occurred previously. By keeping track of the Lempel-Ziv complexity (c(n)) at each 
sample time, we constructed a time-series for the complexity during both wakefulness and 
sleep/anesthesia-LOC (Figure 4.5).   
For each condition, the rate at which complexity increased was reproducible across 
subjects. During sleep and anesthesia, c(n) reached its maximum value in less than 120 ms 
for all subjects. PCILZ during wakefulness continued to increase after these latencies, rising 
to maximum values at times beyond 200 ms. We used the maximum complexity observed 
during unconsciousness (PCILZ = 0.30) as the threshold above which complex patterns of 
cortical activation were only observed during alert wakefulness. PCILZ exceeded this 
complexity level in all subjects during wakefulness after a time-scale  ranging from 80 to 
115 ms (mean  = 102  11 ms). These results demonstrate that the high spatiotemporal 
complexity observed in cortical activations evoked by TMS during wakefulness is the result 
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of causal processes in the thalamocortical system occurring later than the processes involved 
in the immediate local response to TMS. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: The complexity time-course indicates a reproducible time-scale related 
to the emergence of complex TMS-evoked cortical activations during alert 
wakefulness. The Lempel-Ziv complexity time-courses are displayed for all subjects in 
the sleep/anesthesia protocols (section 4.2.1). The temporal evolution of complexity was 
highly reproducible across subjects in both conditions: wakefulness (dark gray areas) and 
sleep/anesthesia-LOC (light gray areas). Red dashed lines indicate the maximum PCILZ 
(0.30) observed across all subjects during sleep/anesthesia-LOC. Black dashed lines 
mark the latency () above which an individual’s PCILZ calculated during alert 
wakefulness exceeds the maximum complexity during unconsciousness, resulting in an 
average time-scale across subjects of  = 102 ms  13 ms (adapted from Casali et al., 
2012).  
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4.2.5 – PCI increased progressively, in parallel with the level of consciousness 
The results obtained thus far demonstrate that by measuring the complexity of the 
cortical response to an external perturbation, it is possible to objectively probe the capacity of 
the thalamocortical system to dynamically engage different cortical areas in an integrated 
process of causal interactions. This objective and quantifiable attribute of cortical activation 
reliably discriminates between conditions in which consciousness is clearly present and 
conditions in which it is unambiguously absent. All healthy subjects submitted to TMS/hd-
EEG during loss of consciousness presented cortical responses to the stimulation with a 
PCILZ  0.3, whereas all awake and alert healthy subjects responded to TMS with a 
significantly more complex spatiotemporal pattern of cortical activation (PCILZ > 0.44; 
Figure 4.3).  
What should we expect when the levels of consciousness are vague and uncertain? 
For instance, during REM sleep, subjects are not awake and are almost paralyzed but they 
usually experience long and vivid dreams, which suggests that consciousness levels are close 
to wakefulness. We calculated the PCILZ from the four TMS sessions described in section 
3.2.2 that were collected while the subject transitioned from wakefulness through stage 1 
sleep to NREM (stages 2-3) and REM sleep. Figure 4.6 shows the significant sources binary 
matrix (SS(x,t)) and the corresponding PCILZ values during wakefulness (A), sleep stage 1 
(B), sleep stages 2-3 (C) and REM sleep (D). Complexity gradually decreased from 
wakefulness to NREM sleep and rose to wakefulness levels during REM sleep. 
In addition to healthy subjects during REM sleep, patients affected by consciousness 
disorders expose an important instance of clinical ambiguity, where the level of 
consciousness is not easily evaluated. Perturbational complexity was calculated from 40 
TMS sessions with 17 patients (12 patients displayed in Figure 3.14 and five additional 
patients who were diagnosed as EMCS) who evolved from coma into different clinical states.  
Figure 4.7 shows the PCILZ results for the brain injured patients, together with data 
from the 19 healthy subjects exhibited in Figures 4.6 (one subject in distinct sleep stages) and 
4.3 (PCI distributions during wakefulness and sleep/anesthesia–LOC for 18 subjects). The 
dashed line, transecting all panels of the figure horizontally, marks the maximum PCILZ 
observed during loss of consciousness in healthy subjects (PCILZ = 0.3). When PCI was 
calculated for VS patients who were aroused but unaware, the results were in the range of
  
 
Figure 4.6: Perturbational complexity was progressively reduced during the 
transition to NREM sleep and partially recovered during REM sleep. For each 
condition described in Figure 3.8 (A, B, C and D), matrix plots of SS(x, t) are shown (large 
squares) with TMS-evoked currents for some representative sources (time-series on the 
left), temporal patterns of significant cortical activations (black area in the rectangles below 
TMS-evoked currents) and spatial distributions of significant cortical activations (cortical 
topographical maps on the bottom right – see also Figure 4.1). SS(x,t), when calculated 
during alert wakefulness (A), appeared as a complex binary matrix with PCILZ = 0.48. 
Complexity progressively decreased when the subject was allowed to sleep, from PCILZ = 
0.39 during sleep stage 1 (B) to PCILZ = 0.29 during sleep stages 2-3 (C). Finally, during 
REM sleep (D), complexity recovered to wakefulness levels (PCILZ = 0.46). 
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sleep/anesthesia-LOC (PCILZ for VS patients ranged from 0.19 to 0.29 with a mean value of 
0.25  0.04). At the other extreme, the two patients who could communicate reliably but 
were diagnosed with LIS responded with a PCI in the range of the wakefulness distribution 
(mean value of 0.52  0.06). 
When PCI was calculated for the intermediate levels, corresponding to MCS and 
EMCS, the results followed the trends of the CRS-R, remaining between the complexity 
distributions obtained when consciousness was unambiguously present and when 
consciousness was unambiguously absent. The PCILZ calculated for MCS patients ranged 
from 0.22 to 0.49 (mean = 0.38  0.07), and all MCS patients exhibited TMS/hd-EEG 
sessions with a complexity above the maximum value observed during loss of consciousness. 
Finally, all sessions collected from patients diagnosed with EMCS were above the 
sleep/anesthesia-LOC distribution, with PCILZ ranging from 0.37 to 0.52 (mean = 0.43  
0.05). Therefore, PCI was able to reliably discriminate intermediate but highly ambiguous 
states of consciousness (MCS and EMCS) from both lower (VS and unconscious healthy 
subjects) and higher levels of consciousness (LIS and alert healthy subjects) (Figure 4.8). 
 
 
Figure 4.7: PCILZ increased progressively in parallel with the level of 
consciousness. The Lempel-Ziv perturbational complexity results are shown when 
calculated for all 116 TMS sessions collected from 17 brain-injured patients and 19 
healthy subjects. PCILZ produced disjoint distributions between alert wakefulness (dark 
red) and sleep/anesthesia-LOC (light gray) for healthy subjects (Right) (see also 
Figure 4.3). Unconscious healthy subjects responded to TMS with a PCILZ  0.3 
(dashed horizontal line). When calculated in a healthy subject transitioning from 
wakefulness to NREM and REM sleep, PCI gradually dropped to unconscious levels 
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during sleep stages 2-3, and increased again during REM sleep (see also Figure 4.6). In 
brain-injured patients who progressed from coma to different clinical states (Left), 
PCILZ increased progressively, following the CRS-R trend from VS through MCS and 
EMCS, attaining similar levels to healthy awake subjects when calculated for LIS 
patients (adapted from Casali et al., 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4.8: PCI discriminated intermediate levels of consciousness (MCS and 
EMCS) from both lower (VS) and higher (LIS) levels of consciousness in brain-
injured patients. The group averages and standard deviations for PCILZ for each 
condition are presented with their statistical significance. * Wilcoxon rank sum test p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.0005 (adapted from Casali et al., 2012).  
 
 
4.2.6 – PCI is a measure of the spatiotemporal complexity of the cortical activity evoked by 
TMS 
PCILZ increases with the number of different spatial patterns occurring in a given time 
sample (the vertical SS dimension) that do not occur in previous samples (the horizontal SS 
dimension). In order to test for the sensitivity of PCILZ to temporal complexity, we calculated 
the transposed Lempel-Ziv complexity, PCITLZ, which measures the number of different 
temporal patterns contained in the spatiotemporal binary distribution SS(x,t). Figure 4.9 
shows the strong correlation between PCITLZ and PCILZ when calculated for all 116 TMS/hd-
EEG sessions (correlation coefficient > 97%). These results confirm the sensitivity of the 
Lempel-Ziv complexity to both spatial and temporal patterns of cortical activity evoked by 
TMS (see section 4.1.3).  
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Figure 4.9: PCITLZ and PCILZ are strongly correlated. The linear correlation of PCITLZ 
and PCILZ across all 116 TMS sessions is displayed (correlation coefficient = 97.9%). 
These results show that PCITLZ and PCILZ are equally sensitive to the spatiotemporal 
complexity of the cortical activity evoked by TMS (adapted from Casali et al., 2012). 
 
 
While PCILZ is capable of providing an estimate of the complexity time-course, 
PCITLZ can be calculated with a computation time significantly shorter than the time required 
by PCILZ, without influencing the potential of PCI to discriminate between consciousness 
and unconsciousness. All unconscious subjects exhibited a PCITLZ  0.15 (mean = 0.09  
0.02), whereas during alert wakefulness, PCITLZ ranged from 0.22 to 0.31 (mean = 0.27  
0.02) (see also figure A.3 in the Appendix).  Finally, the correlation between PCILZ and 
PCITLZ was preserved when the measures were calculated from brain-injured patients: 
similarly to PCILZ, PCITLZ also increased progressively in parallel with the level of 
consciousness (see also figure A.4 in the Appendix). 
 
Together, the results of this chapter demonstrate that PCI, a measure of the 
spatiotemporal complexity of the cortical activity evoked by transcranial magnetic 
stimulation, was able to reliably and robustly discriminate between conscious and 
unconscious healthy subjects, producing disjoint distributions that were independent of the 
stimulation parameters or the specific method used to calculate the complexity. Moreover, 
PCI was able to detect progressive changes in consciousness, such as those that occur while a 
subject is falling asleep, and to discriminate between intermediate consciousness levels in 
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patients suffering from DOC (MCS and EMCS) versus both lower (VS, slow-wave 
sleep/anesthesia-LOC) and higher (LIS, healthy alert wakefulness) levels of consciousness. It 
is worth highlighting that PCI is a single number that can be calculated at the bedside with 
little a priori information. This technique bypasses sensory pathways and subcortical 
structures and directly probes the thalamocortical system, independent of the integrity of the 
sensory and motor systems. In addition, PCI does not depend on the willingness of the 
patient to participate, estimating the capacity of thalamocortical circuits to sustain causal 
activity independent of behavior. All of these considerations support PCI as an appropriate 
tool to approximate an objective measure of the neural correlate of consciousness, with the 
potential to assist the diagnosis and prognosis in patients with disorders of consciousness. 
 
 
 Chapter 5. 
Complexity and the Brain’s Capacity for 
Consciousness 
 
 
“Hay ríos metafísicos, ella los nada como  esa 
golondrina está nadando en el aire, girando 
alucinada en torno al campanario, dejándose caer 
para levantarse mejor con el impulso. Yo describo 
y defino y deseo esos ríos, ella los nada. Yo los 
busco, los encuentro, los  miro desde el puente, 
ella los nada. Y no lo sabe, igualita a la 
golondrina. No necesita saber como yo, puede 
vivir en el desorden sin que ninguna conciencia de 
orden la  retenga. Ese desorden que es su orden 
misterioso, esa bohemia del cuerpo y el  alma que 
le abre de par en par las verdaderas 
puertas.”(Julio Cortazar, “Rayuela”) 
 
 
Neuroscience faces the challenging task of developing and implementing objective 
measures of consciousness that can be applied to patients who are unable to interact with 
their external environment. Here, we approached this difficult problem from a novel 
perspective. General considerations about what constitutes the content of conscious 
experience and the assumption that the brain must be involved in sustaining consciousness 
led us to hypothesize that consciousness depends on the brain’s capacity to sustain causal 
interactions between different areas of the thalamocortical system. To investigate this 
hypothesis, we employed TMS/hd-EEG to directly perturb the cortex and measure the 
cortical response generated exclusively by causal interactions. We found that when 
consciousness was absent, such as during slow-wave sleep (section 3.2) and deep anesthesia 
(section 3.3), the thalamocortical system responded to TMS with qualitatively simpler, 
slower and non-specific patterns of activation as compared to alert wakefulness (section 3.1). 
Moreover, employing TMS/hd-EEG at the bedside of patients emerging from coma after 
severe brain-injury allowed for the reliable discrimination between VS and MCS patients in 
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terms of the qualitative complexity of their responses to the perturbation (section 3.4). To 
create an objective evaluation of this capacity for consciousness, we developed and tested the 
Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI), a measure of spatiotemporal complexity of cortical 
activity evoked by TMS that is high only if many regions of the cerebral cortex react to the 
initial perturbation quickly and in different ways. Figures 4.3 and 4.7 summarize the results 
obtained from calculating PCI on 19 healthy subjects and 17 brain-injured patients. PCI 
values were remarkably reproducible across subjects in the same group, and the difference 
between consciousness and unconsciousness was not affected by varying stimulation 
parameters (Figure 4.3). The results of this objective measure applied to brain-injured 
patients (Figure 4.7) indicate that it is possible to reliably discriminate between different 
levels of consciousness in a way that is completely independent of the subject’s ability to 
exchange information with the external world. 
The complexity of cortical activity was considered to be a possible correlate of 
consciousness in a number of other studies. Lyapunov exponents (Fell et al., 1993), mutual 
information (Tononi and Edelman, 1994), Granger causality (Seth, 2005), approximate 
entropy and algorithmic complexity of spontaneous EEG (Gu 2003) have all been used to 
estimate the complexity of cortical activity. However, our measure allows, for the first time 
to our knowledge, the unambiguous empirical distinction, at the single subject level, of 
consciousness and different models of unconsciousness. Furthermore, the technique 
implemented here does not suffer from the major theoretical and practical limitations that 
affect previously developed measures. Because PCI is based on the significant response 
evoked by TMS, random noise is considerably reduced by using stimulus-locked averaging 
and statistics and, therefore, in contrast to most attempts to evaluate algorithmic complexity, 
our index is not significantly susceptible to confusing complexity with randomness. 
Additionally, instead of measuring activity that is indirectly related to complexity in the 
thalamocortical system, such as high-frequency coherence of spontaneous EEGs, which can 
occur even when the underlying causal cortical activity is spatiotemporally simple, PCI is a 
direct measure of brain complexity. Finally, PCI measures causality instead of correlation 
and is capable of distinguishing complex activity generated by interactions between parts of 
the system from the activity generated by a common exterior input. Thus, because PCI is a 
complexity measure associated with a perturbational approach, it can be employed to directly 
investigate and quantify the patterns of causal interactions in the thalamocortical system that 
Complexity and the Brain’s Capacity for Consciousness  
 111
are relevant for consciousness, instead of random noise or activity originating from sources 
others than causal interactions between cortical areas.  
Figure 4.9 prove that PCI is a measure that shows sensitivity to the complexity of 
both the spatial and temporal components of the response to TMS. This result reinforces the 
causal origin of the significant response to TMS: activity complex in time can not fail to 
involve several areas of the thalamocortical system, and a response complex in space can not 
fail to extend in time. Because PCI is calculated on data obtained after stimulus-locked 
averaging from multiple trials, cortical activity produced by a non-deterministic process does 
not contribute to complexity as measured by PCI. Considering then the known difficulties in 
generating a random-like signal from deterministic causal processes, it is reasonable to 
expect that temporally complex, pseudorandom activations will depend on a complex 
network of interactions with other regions of the thalamocortical system: temporal patterns 
contributing to PCI require the involvement of spatially distributed areas. On the other hand, 
the cortical activity which is time-locked to the stimulus onset can only be statistically 
significant directly in the area stimulated or, indirectly, through causal connections with the 
area stimulated. Therefore, considering the time of neural conduction and synaptic 
transmission, a complex pattern in space should also depend on an activity that is extensive 
in time: there is no instantaneous spatial complexity of causal origin.  
The results displayed in Figure 4.5 also support this relationship between space and 
time: the time-course of complexity clearly suggests a reproducible temporal scale 
(approximately 100 ms), above which causal interactions in the brain account for the 
complex spatial patterns of cortical activity observed during alert wakefulness. This figure 
also illustrates how we can extract characteristics of the dynamic processes relevant to 
consciousness from the complexity of the cortical activity evoked by TMS. Since the works 
of Libet (Libet, 1982) we know that conscious perception requires processes in the brain that 
are extended in time. Our results support this finding and those of other recent studies 
indicating that conscious perception is based on information processing lasting beyond 100 
ms (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Harrison et al., 2007; Huang et al. 2007). In this type of 
longer delay, recurrent connections are likely involved, possibly via cortico-thalamo-cortical 
re-entries (Garrido et al., 2007; Guillery and Sherman, 2002; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000), 
once the feedforward sweep of activity is completed in the first 100 ms. Interestingly, Boly 
and colleagues (Boly et al., 2011)  recently observed that the impairment of feedback 
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processes involved in the generation of long-latency electrophysiological responses may be a 
reliable correlate of consciousness in severely brain-damaged patients. Figure 4.5 suggests 
that PCI may be capable of detecting this type of impairment.  
Furthermore, our results indicate a correlation between consciousness and causal 
interactions in the brain and strongly support recent clinical evidence suggesting that 
consciousness depends less on specific circuits and more on the capacity of distributed 
regions of the brain to interact through divergent cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamo-cortical 
connections. For instance, studies of patients with frontal brain injuries of both traumatic 
(Mataro et al., 2001) and non-traumatic (Markowitsch and Kessler, 2000) etiologies have 
reported clear evidence that specific lesions of the frontal cortex, which is an association area 
related to superior cognitive capacities, may produce neuropsychological deficits in 
executive functioning, memory and visuo-constructive domains while preserving intact gross 
cognitive functioning. Consistent with these results, other studies report intact functional 
modules with impaired cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamo-cortical communication in 
vegetative patients who do not exhibit evidence of superior cognitive function (Schiff, 2002; 
Laureys 2004).  
High complexity values, as measured by PCI, are only possible if the activity of a 
specific cortical area is capable of causally inducing activity in another cortical area in an 
effective and recursive way. Therefore, the ability to attain high PCI values in response to 
TMS requires the integrity of cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamo-cortical pathways and a 
balanced level of neuronal excitability in the thalamocortical system. We hypothesize that 
alterations in any one of these properties may inhibit the brain’s ability to sustain the degree 
of cortical communication required for consciousness.  
 
5.1 – Possible Physiological Mechanisms Underlying Changes in the 
Spatiotemporal Complexity of Cortical Activity 
The complexity of cortical activity evoked by TMS was reduced when subjects 
transited from alert wakefulness to slow-wave sleep or during midazolam-induced LOC 
(Figure 4.2) and rose to higher levels during REM sleep (Figure 4.6). These results suggest 
that the cortical mechanisms that underlie the loss of complexity in healthy subjects may be 
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related to mechanisms that dissociate wakefulness and awareness and underlie slow-wave 
sleep and GABAA-mediated anesthesia.  
The first intracellular sign of the transition from waking to slow-wave sleep is the 
appearance of cyclic, long-lasting, high-amplitude hyperpolarization periods in all types of 
neocortical neurons, during which cortical neurons stop firing (Steriade et al., 1993; 2001). 
The transition from slow-wave sleep to either REM sleep or wakefulness is invariably 
associated with the abolition of these long-lasting hyperpolarizing potentials. Several studies 
based on computer simulations (Bazhenov et al., 2002) or on in vivo (Steriade et al., 2001; 
Timofeev et al., 2001) and in vitro recordings (Sanchez-Vives and McCormick, 2000) have 
shed light on the mechanisms involved in the generation and interruption of the 
hyperpolarized states associated with slow EEG rhythms (<1 Hz) and other thalamocortical 
rhythms that are particularly prominent during sleep (McCormick and Bal, 1997). 
The long-lasted hyperpolarization, also called the down-state, observed during slow-
wave sleep (Steriade et al., 2001) and under specific anesthetic drugs (Steriade et al., 1993), 
is not produced by active inhibitory post-synaptic currents. Instead, intracellular recordings 
indicate that these potentials are probably due to the activity of K+ leak currents dominating 
the membrane potential when synaptic currents are largely absent, a form of inhibition 
known as disfacilitation (Timofeev et al., 2001). It has been suggested that the diminished 
responsiveness of cortical neurons during long-lasting hyperpolarization is related to an 
altered balance between excitation and inhibition, which ultimately originates from the 
hyperpolarization of thalamic relays that do not transfer pre-thalamic information to further 
relays under conditions such as low cholinergic activity (Timofeev et al., 1996; Gil et al., 
1997; Timofeev et al., 2001). During this condition, cortical, thalamocortical, and reticular 
thalamic neurons are hyperpolarized, and the combination of intrinsic (e.g., 
hyperpolarization-activated and transient cation currents) and extrinsic (reticulo-thalamo-
cortical, cortico-cortical, and cortico-thalamo-cortical interactions) neuronal properties 
sustain synchronized rhythmic activity in the form of delta, spindle, and other slow waves 
observed in the EEG (McCorkmick and Bal, 1997; Sherman and Guillery, 2002).  
In the particular case of slow oscillations, the hyperpolarized down-state of 
neocortical neurons is associated with very strong synaptic and intrinsic depolarizing 
pressures, which ultimately produce depolarized or up-states (Timofeev et al., 2001). During 
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the down-state, intrinsic neuronal properties, such as the presence of hyperpolarization-
activated channels, limit membrane polarization and the summation of random miniature 
excitatory post-synaptic potentials originating from cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamo-
cortical connections ultimately produce strong discharges associated with an increase in the 
input resistance of cortical cells (Steriade et al., 2001). During these up-states, both 
excitatory and inhibitory neurons fire synchronously at extremely high firing rates. The 
amplitude of the depolarization is locally controlled by the activation of GABAergic 
inhibitory neurons. When outward conductances, such as Na+-activated K+ currents, 
overcome positive feedback from cortical circuits, the depolarized network rapidly fails, 
returning to a silent hyperpolarized phase (Sanchez-Vives and McCormick, 2000). This 
cortical bi-stability – where cortical neurons oscillate between an “up” state produced by 
recurrent cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamo-cortical networks of excitatory and inhibitory 
connections, followed by a long-lasting (>0.5 s) down-state where synaptic barrages cease – 
is reflected in the low frequency (<1 Hz) synchronous activity observed in the EEG during 
slow-wave sleep and during the maintenance period of GABAA-mediated anesthesia (Franks, 
2008).  
It is likely that the reversible loss in the capacity to sustain communication in the 
thalamocortical system during slow-wave sleep and midazolam-induced anesthesia may be 
caused by the bi-stability of neocortical neurons. During the bi-stable period, local activation 
may either be ineffective in overcoming the hyperpolarization of connected neighbors or may 
trigger an up-state, which invariably will be followed by a long-lasting period of silence, thus 
disrupting effective communication between cortical areas. Moreover, in conditions of 
cortical bi-stability, thalamic cells are likely to be found in the burst mode of oscillation, 
blocking the trans-thalamic pathways proposed to be crucial for cortico-cortical 
communications (Sherman and Guillery, 2002). Therefore, the hyperpolarization of 
neocortical and thalamic cells that occurs during slow-wave sleep and in conditions of 
GABAA-mediated inhibition is likely to prevent effective and specific communication 
between different cortical areas, thus obstructing the emergence of complex patterns of 
activity in response to TMS. In fact, when TMS-hd/EEG was applied to healthy subjects 
during slow-wave sleep (section 3.2.1) or midazolam-induced LOC (section 3.3), cortical 
responses to the stimulation either remained limited to the target area or evolved into a full-
fledged stereotypical slow wave. In both cases, PCI values were significantly lower than 
values measured during alert wakefulness (Figure 4.2). Other qualitative characteristics of 
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cortical responses evoked by TMS during LOC, beside the late breakdown of long-range 
interactions among cortical areas, also point to mechanisms that may involve the bi-stability 
of cortical neurons and changes in the corticothalamocortical dynamics. The initial, large 
positive–negative wave evoked by TMS in sleep and midazolam-induced anesthesia may be 
accounted by the strong depolarizing pressure exerted on neocortical neurons during a bi-
stable condition. Finally, the responses with low PCI values, both during NREM sleep 
(Figure 3.7) and midazolam-induced anesthesia (Figure 3.10), are associated to an 
obliteration of the characteristic natural frequencies observed in healthy alert subjects 
(section 3.1), which suggests that alterations in corticothalamic modules may also underlie 
the loss of spatiotemporal complexity.  
In conditions in which wakefulness is lost, but the ascending cholinergic systems are 
active, as during REM sleep, communication in the thalamocortical system is partially 
recovered. The activation of components of the cholinergic system during REM sleep 
invariably results in the depolarization of thalamic neurons and an increase in the excitability 
of cortical networks, thereby suppressing disfacilitation and setting both thalamic and 
neocortical cells back to excitable tonic mode (McCormick and Bal, 1997, Steriade et al., 
1993b; 1993c; 2001). In this condition, TMS evoked a long-range balanced pattern of 
cortical activation, similar to that observed in alert wakefulness (section 3.2.2, Massimini et 
al., 2010). Our results indicate that the complexity of cortical responses to the stimulation 
may be at least partially recovered during this condition (Figure 4.6). Data suggest that the 
selectivity of cortical inhibition may play a significant role in the differences between REM 
sleep and wakefulness (Steriade et al., 1979; Llinás and Paré, 1991; Timofeev et al., 2001), 
and we speculate that the less selective action of inhibitory currents in the neocortex during 
REM sleep as compared to the waking state may be responsible for possible differences in 
complexity between these conditions.  
This mechanism involving long-lasting silent periods that inhibit cortico-cortical and 
thalamo-cortical communication could explain why PCI is high during both alert 
wakefulness and REM sleep in healthy subjects but low during slow-wave sleep and 
midazolam-induced anesthesia. However, because the complexity of cortical activity mainly 
depends on the availability of rapid causal interactions between different cortical areas 
through feedforward and feedback sweeps, we also expect PCI to detect conditions in which 
cortical communication is impaired by other pharmacological and pathological mechanisms. 
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The main structural abnormalities of brain-injured VS patients, e.g., diffuse axonal injuries 
and thalamic lesions, are related to alterations in causal interactions within the 
thalamocortical system (Adams et al., 2000). In particular, the thalamus is likely to play an 
essential role in cortical activation, not only by promoting the fine-tuning of excitation and 
inhibition required for balanced neuronal excitability in the neocortex but also by actively 
participating in the mutual connections between cortical areas (Adams et al., 2000; Guillery 
and Scherman, 2002). For this reason, we expect severe thalamic lesions to yield low PCI 
values in response to TMS. In addition, activation deficits in association centers of the 
cortex, such as those observed in permanent VS patients who retain isolated remnants of 
functional networks (Schiff et al., 2002) or those predicted to be associated with complex 
partial seizures (Blumenfeld et al., 2003), may block both bottom-up and top-down 
pathways, impairing the causal processes involved in complex responses to TMS. Finally, in 
addition to the suppression of cortical activity, the hyper-activation of specific cortical areas 
can be expected to produce simple patterns of causal responses to controlled cortical 
stimulation in conditions such as generalized tonic-clonic seizures (Blumenfeld and Taylor, 
2003) or in response to specific anesthetics (i.e., the NMDA-antagonist ketamine (Maksimow 
et al., 2006; Franks, 2008)) due to the presence of stereotyped patterns of cortical activity that 
impede normal communication in the thalamocortical system. 
The loss of the ability to sustain conscious experience can be caused by diverse 
physiological (slow-wave sleep), pharmacological (anesthesia) or pathological (coma, 
vegetative state, seizures) mechanisms. As these mechanisms appear to be all related to the 
impairment or alterations of the feedforward and feedback circuits that integrate specialized 
modules in the thalamocortical system, we suggest that a measure of the complexity of the 
cortical activity evoked by an effective perturbation of the system may be sensitive to all 
these conditions in which consciousness is lost. To better interpret the underlying 
mechanisms related to changes in the complexity of cortical activity, it is crucial that future 
studies calculate PCI under different anesthetic agents (ketamine, xenon, opioids) and on a 
greater number of patients with different neuropathological conditions.  
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5.2 – Limitations of the Study and Future Developments 
The results summarized in Figure 4.7 comply with what is required by a quantitative 
measure of consciousness: PCI is high during alert conscious wakefulness and low during 
unconscious states such as slow-wave sleep, anesthesia and vegetative state. Although PCI 
values fall into disjointed distributions between consciousness and unconsciousness and a 
single value (PCILZ = 0.3) appears to represent a threshold above which signs of 
consciousness are present in all subjects and patients, this measure still needs to be tested on 
a greater number of subjects and patients under different conditions before conclusions about 
the potential clinical applications of PCI can be drawn. In this work, we tested PCI under 
anesthesia induced by midazolam, which exclusively targets GABAA receptors. It will be 
essential to replicate these findings with other anesthetics, including volatile and i.v. agents, 
which are commonly used in surgical procedures and are likely to have different mechanisms 
of action than increased GABAergic receptor activity. In addition, the interpretation and 
possible clinical application of the measure require our results to be replicated in a greater 
number of subjects in intermediate levels of vigilance, such as in different sleep stages and 
intermediate levels of anesthesia. It may also be interesting to test PCI as a function of the 
behavioral state (e.g., as effective connectivity was found to correlate with specific task-
related paradigms during alert wakefulness (Johnson et al., 2011)). 
Testing PCI on a greater number of patients recovering from coma will be essential to 
explore the potential of employing PCI in the diagnosis of brain-injured patients. Our results 
obtained from 17 critically ill patients indicate that this measure is capable of reliably 
discriminating intermediate states of consciousness (MCS and EMCS) from both lower (VS 
and unconscious healthy subjects) and higher levels of consciousness (LIS and alert healthy 
subjects). However, PCI was not able to distinguish between MCS and EMCS, suggesting 
that patients in these conditions present similar capacities to sustain cortical communication 
in the thalamocortical system. In addition to address this issue with a greater number of 
patients, future studies could also consider calculating complexity on a higher order basis. 
PCI, as introduced in this work, is calculated on a binary basis (on/off source activity), and it 
is possible that relevant information needed to accurately distinguish between similar but 
unequal conditions is lost in such a paradigm. Moreover, even if PCI is not sensitive to 
specific targets or to the stimulation intensity, systematic studies aimed at optimizing the 
measure, possibly by integrating PCI with high-resolution structural neuroimaging 
Complexity and the Brain’s Capacity for Consciousness  
 118
techniques to control for differences in the coil’s orientation with respect to the direction of 
axons, may uncover optimal stimulation parameters that increase the specificity and 
sensitivity with which the measure discriminates between consciousness levels.  
Absolute values of PCI should not be considered, regardless of the parameters 
employed in the analysis. The data presented in this work have specific temporal (2.75 ms) 
and spatial (20 mm2) resolutions, corresponding to a matrix SS(xj, t) with dimensions of 
3004 x 106. The dimensions of the input matrix for the complexity algorithm affect the 
normalization and the absolute value of the measure and the clarification of the exact 
dependence of relative values of PCI on spatial and temporal resolutions requires further 
investigation. In particular, given the intrinsic limitations of EEG for spatial resolution, the 
patterns of connectivity detected by TMS/hd-EEG are necessarily coarse. However, coarse 
resolution does not necessarily mean worse resolution: as with any measure of 
spatiotemporal complexity, resolutions that are too fine may impair the identification of 
similarities between conditions. On the other hand, a resolution that is too coarse may be 
insufficient to retain the amount of information needed to distinguish distinct patterns. 
Because the accurate activation of small areas is not as relevant for PCI as the activity 
produced by large-scale interactions between functional cortical regions, we opted to adopt a 
coarse spatial resolution that was previously tested in studies of large-scale interactions 
between thalamocortical areas (Casali et al., 2010; Ferrarelli et al., 2010). Finally, a better 
comprehension of the complexity measure will likely require a detailed study of PCI’s 
dependence on the forward model and on the accuracy of the inverse solution, which will 
help to clarify the index’s dependence on spatial resolution. In particular, qualitative 
comparisons between different conditions at the sensor level suggest that PCI could be 
calculated directly from the EEG. Further studies may explore this possibility, considering 
that volume conduction and spatial smoothing affecting the EEG may require new ways to 
calculate complexity at the sensor level.  
PCI is calculated from significant cortical activity, and the index is therefore not 
significantly affected by biases confounding complexity with randomness. However, random 
fluctuations around the statistical threshold may cause over-estimation of the complexity of 
cortical activity evoked by TMS under specific conditions. In particular, when a noisy signal 
(corrupted by strong harmonic distortions or with an insufficient number of trials) is 
modulated by a slow wave in response to TMS, as observed during slow-wave sleep (Figure 
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3.6C), the slow return to baseline accompanied by fast random oscillations above and below 
the statistical threshold may introduce noise into the SS matrix, resulting in false positives for 
complexity. When this type of modulation of noisy data is present, it may be advisable to use 
lowpass filters, thus removing those components that are normally disregarded in TMS-
evoked potentials (>40 Hz). 
In this work, we employed PCI in combination with TMS, but the measure introduced 
here may also be calculated from data acquired from somatosensory stimulation. However, as 
we will discuss in the next section, the unique and unprecedented interpretation of PCI 
combined with direct cortical perturbation implies profound theoretical, technical and 
practical advantages of this measure as a possible complement to other ERP and fMRI 
protocols in the diagnosis of brain-injured patients.  
 
5.3 – The Brain’s Capacity for Consciousness and the Science of the Mind 
This work is not a thesis about the ultimate nature of consciousness, or the essence of 
intentionality, but rather about a quantifiable ability of the brain without which, by 
hypothesis, consciousness as we normally understand it can not be sustained. Nevertheless, 
the possibility explored here of an empirical investigation of the brain's capacity for 
consciousness, rather than the neural correlates of specific contents, fits naturally into the 
more general debate about the possibility of a scientific search for the ultimate nature of 
consciousness. This last section is reserved for a discussion of some theoretical aspects 
implicit in our study and highly overlooked in the scientific approach to the question, but 
which are likely to receive special attention with the development of empirical measures like 
the one proposed here. 
 
5.3.1 – The Search for the Contents of Consciousness 
The question of the level of consciousness of critically ill patients diagnosed in VS or 
MCS and who are incapable of functional communications is ultimately the question for 
what it is like to be in such states. Facing a patient lying with eyes open, staring at the 
ceiling, but unable to communicate and with no signs of voluntary movement, the family and 
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the clinicians are puzzled and without answers to their concerns about the world experienced 
by that person under their care, about the possibility and quality of what could be defined as 
his “point of view”, his own perspective: what it is like to be him? When looking at the 
ceiling, dos he see something, is the roof something to him? And pain, is he able to feel it as 
we do? And music, the image of his family, the sound of his name, are really part of 
something we might call his experience? Can we tell if he has some kind of experience at all?  
Can we actually assume that one day we will have the answers to these questions? 
Most cognitive scientists believe that an affirmative answer must be based on a definite and a 
priori position about the ultimate nature of the content of consciousness. In particular, the 
majority of researchers in the field expect some progress only if we agree on the ontological 
identification of mental contents as internal representations, formed ultimately by neural 
states. Assuming that the content of our thinking is in fact a neural state, by observing 
relevant properties of such neural states we could then envisage the possibility of to identify 
whether the patient has an experience associated with pain, if the music sound is something 
that he is actually experiencing, if the reaction to his name is more than an automatic reaction 
and even if the ceiling above his bed is actually something for him. It would then be possible 
to identify categorically, from the “third-person” perspective of science, the situations in 
which, from the point of view of the patient himself, there is something that corresponds to 
what it is like to be him, a self perspective of “first-person”, full of intentional content. 
But could we really make this unambiguous transition between what is objective (the 
neural activity) and what is subjective (the quality of the conscious content)? That is unlikely 
to happen. It is conceivable that an “internal representation” associated with an intentional 
content (a representation that is “something for” the subject) is formed, caused or made by 
neural states. But it is very difficult to justify that such a subjective intentional content can be 
ontologically reduced to objective neural states (Searle, 2004; Putnam, 1988; Nagel, 1974; 
Wittgenstein, 1953). Even if this is the case, however, even if we admit the existence of a 
wide bridge linking the two huge gaps implicit in the argument - that the content of 
consciousness is an internal representation and that this representation can be identified with 
a neural state - if the question to be made refers to the content of experience as an internal 
representation, then the answer is in essence accessible only to the subject himself. A 
practical epistemological problem remains (Nagel, 1974): the distinct nature of the third- and 
first-person speech seems to preclude the determination of the necessary and sufficient link 
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between a specific property of a certain neural state and a specific qualitative property of the 
subjective experience. There is an “explanatory gap” (Levine, 1983) between the different 
modes of access to such content of consciousness that, assuming the fundamental separation 
between internal representation and the objects in the world, seems to be insurmountable. In 
fact, although techniques based on fMRI and ERP protocols significantly advance our 
empirical knowledge about what is associated with conscious perception, the problems of 
interpretation, coupled with the ambiguity of the results, reinforce the idea that there is an 
epistemological impasse at the basis of such empirical research. 
Let us then step back. Why an empirical investigation of consciousness should start 
from the problematic reduction of the content of consciousness to certain internal neural 
states? Historically, this “internalist” paradigm appears as a natural reaction to the mind/body 
dualism of Descartes: the mind is also part of the body and everything related to 
consciousness has also a material basis. Particularly since the second half of the twentieth 
century, however, it has been understood that the reduction of the content of consciousness to 
neural states is not the only way to combat the Cartesian dualism. Recent empirical studies 
(Wexler, B., 2006; O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Libedinsky and Livingstone, 2011) reinforce an  
“externalist” paradigm, which finds its theoretical basis in the different but converging 
philosophies of Martin Heidegger (1927) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) and aims to 
combat dualism in its bases3. In this scenario, consciousness, rather than a representation, 
would consist more precisely in a disclosure, a “disclosing activity” which is not necessarily 
representational, but concerns primarily real external objects that, only then, could be 
“internalized” and, in a similar but unequal way, “revealed” in imagination or memory 
(Rowlands, 2010; Noë, 2004). Amid this debate, it is reasonable to expect that a science of 
consciousness that lives up to its name might consider the ultimate nature of the content of 
the experience not as a matter of principle, but as an open question to be clarified by 
empirical research itself. 
                                                 
3 In fact, the “internalism” can be seen as a remnant of Descartes' dualistic paradigm. The “internalist” program 
intends to eliminate the dualism between res extensa and res cogitans by acceptance of the starting point of the 
Cartesian argument in defense of such metaphysical dichotomy: the dualism between mental states as internal 
representations and the objects of the outside world. The “externalist” position does not accept the Cartesian 
premise affirming that the fundamental domain of thought is formed by internal “representations” or mental 
states, which are linked to the external environment causally but not cognitively, while the world, in principle, 
is “out” of our direct reach and accessible only through inference from the perceived “impressions”. This idea 
that there has to be an interface between our cognitive capabilities and the external world, whether in the 
Cartesian version or in the version of contemporary cognitive sciences, is likely to be at least partially 
responsible for all the major metaphysical and epistemological problems of Western philosophy since the 
seventeenth century (Putnam, 1999; McDowell, 1996).   
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This question about the ultimate nature of the objects of consciousness, whether 
essentially internal representations or including also real objects of the world, leads us to an 
aspect of particular theoretical importance to which our results are noteworthy. In the present 
thesis, we intend to address the problem of implementing objective ways to evaluate the level 
of consciousness in patients unable to communicate functionally, searching for neural 
correlates not of specific contents of consciousness, but directly of the level of 
consciousness. From general considerations about the phenomenological properties of the 
intentional content of consciousness, we set a reference to the object of study without 
committing ourselves to one or another paradigm about the ultimate nature of such contents4. 
We could then formulate a hypothesis that is justified from an empirical point of view: the 
brain must be able to sustain a balanced level of causal interactions between parts of the 
thalamocortical system to give access to the contents of consciousness. This path led us 
finally to a direct measure of causal interactions in the thalamocortical system that was 
sensitive to the level of consciousness under the conditions tested here. The relative success 
of this attempt to directly investigate the possible conditions that support awareness suggests 
that the search for neural correlates of consciousness should not necessarily be initiated by an 
investigation of the nature of the contents of consciousness. Instead, rather than based upon 
the awkward reduction of something that has a subjective and private character to something 
that is objective in nature, a science of the mind should start with the objective aspects of 
consciousness itself. And if there is a fundamental objective aspect with regard to the 
intentionality of consciousness, it does not relate so much to its content, but to the vehicles 
that provide such content. 
 
5.3.2 – The Objective Character of Intentionality  
The consideration of intentionality as the realm of subjectivity is very popular among 
some philosophers and scientists. Those who are attracted by such subjective realm can use 
                                                 
4 The basic aspects of phenomenology considered in our argument (section 1.2) are largely consistent with most 
of the “internalist” and “externalist” paradigms. It should be noted, however, that these aspects of intentionality 
are obviously incompatible with a specific “internalist” paradigm, not treated here, that intends to delete or deny 
the intentional content of consciousness. Without a phenomenological guide to fix reference to the object under 
study, this “eliminativism” can only result in a science of some kind of information processing in the brain, but 
not in a science of what we usually understand as consciousness. Citing Nagel (1974) “any reductionist 
program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the 
problem will be falsely posed.”  
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this identification to establish a radical dualism between mind and matter and a skepticism 
about the prospects for a science of consciousness. On the other hand, scientists who consider 
such subjectivity as repulsive end up by flirting with the radical idea of denying the existence 
of intentional phenomena as if they were mere illusions, which results only in changing the 
name of the search for the correlates of consciousness – instead of asking whether the patient 
is conscious or not, we would then ask whether he/she is “deluded” or not –, without any 
simplification of the challenges involved in obtaining the answer. Possibly, perhaps even 
likely, there is a core of subjectivity that can not be eliminated in the content of 
consciousness, but at the same time, it does not follow that everything essentially involved 
with consciousness is subjective and accessible by introspection.  
For what is likely the most relevant contribution of the discussion between 
externalists and internalists for a science of consciousness, that has gone largely unnoticed in 
most scientific discourse, refers to a constitutive aspect of intentionality that is decidedly not 
of private and introspective access, but requires a scientific, third-person approach. This 
aspect refers to the fact that the contents of consciousness - whether internal or external - 
depend on a component that is not part of the experienced content but, instead, is that by 
virtue of which we experience it. This idea, which echoes from an insight of Gottlob Frege 
(1892) and was developed in both philosophical traditions of the twentieth century, points to 
consciousness as involving a kind of movement toward its content that, as a condition of 
possibility for such content, can not itself be an object of consciousness. 
We can illustrate this idea by considering the activity of a pianist. As a student of 
piano, the execution of a piece of music is marked by concentration on the position of the 
fingers, in the sequence of keys that must be played and other characteristics of this activity 
that is not yet mastered. It is only when the pianist is able to completely transcend these 
points, and precisely because he is able to do so, that his conscience, “travelling through” 
what was once opaque, gives him a content that is unique to the master: the particular 
experience of being engaged in the masterful execution of a piece. During the performance, 
keys and the fingers are no longer the objects of consciousness, they “disappear”: the 
consciousness of him who gained the expertise to use them “goes through them”. Still, there 
is a sense in which the keys are present: the pianist does not play them as being incapable of 
knowing that they are where they are. Instead, even without being the object of 
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consciousness, they are present in consciousness as the vehicles that enable access of the 
pianist to what it is like to perform a play. 
If what characterizes an object of consciousness is its intentional character associated 
with a “what-it-is-like-ness”, this phenomenological analysis suggests that such intentional 
character should be seen as the vehicle for the contents of consciousness and, as such, must 
be at the same time understood as a noneliminable component of conscious experience. First, 
vehicles, as conditions of possibility for their content, are not secondary, but, as stated by 
Martin Heidegger (1927), are “primordial”: they found the phenomenon5. Second, any 
attempt to turn inward to the alleged internal representations and search for the vehicle of our 
thoughts inevitably turn it into the content of consciousness. This is how the phenomenology 
of intentionality itself points to a structure that is out of phenomenological access: the 
vehicle, as something opposed to the content, necessarily escapes the kind of knowledge 
accessible to the first-person perspective6. It is then suggested that the fundamental 
characteristic of consciousness, as opposed to its objects, is, from a first-person perspective, 
the movement present in the intentional act which is absent of what we are aware of, but is 
part of what it is like to be conscious of it. Intentionality itself, as something distinct from its 
object, appears as that “metaphysical river” where the character in Cortazar's novel swims: in 
the river of consciousness one swims without knowing and without needing to know; one 
finds themself so dipped in it that it is impossible to see the river from the swimmer’s 
perspective, and therefore describe or much less define it. On the basis of intentionality there 
is something which, paraphrasing the poet, can be said an “unknowing” that, exactly for 
being unknown, is able to provide the “door opening” of consciousness. 
In this scenario, all intentional content, whether or not accessible by exclusively 
introspective roads, presupposes an activity external to such content, not eliminable and 
that can not be accessed by introspection. That is, consciousness as an intentional act, as a 
                                                 
5 This primordial character depends essentially on the observation that it is possible to form a representation of 
something from the use we make of it, but the use can not be derived from the mere representation. This point 
appears in Heidegger (1927; see also Hall, 1993), and is also explored by Wittgenstein (1953). In particular, the 
author of the “Philosophical Investigations” observed how we are not able to give a definition for simple words, 
such as “game” (“Spiele”), that can explain all the uses we make of them in common language. This however is 
not a problem: we do not need such definitions precisely insofar as we are able to use the words correctly. The 
use, which is more fundamental, depends on a learning of rules that is irreducible to the formation of a set of 
internal representations, but involves, instead, a “grasping” in an “open texture” of external criteria: “an 'inner 
process' stands in need of outward criteria”(Wittgenstein, 1953, § 580). 
6 It is likely that this pointing of phenomenology to something that is external to introspection is precisely what 
lies at the convergence of analytical and continental traditions in the second half of the twentieth century. 
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“go-to”, is not primarily characterized by that to which it is addressed, but by the way 
through which it goes. But precisely because such vehicles of experience are inaccessible to 
introspection, the search for them can not in any way be answered by the first-person speech 
and it becomes a clear question for the scientist: what supports this “unknowing”, the 
essential movement of intentionality toward its object? 
If science largely ignored this objective character of intentionality, focusing instead 
on the search for correlates of specific contents of consciousness, it is probably because the 
empirical investigation of this characteristic that is out of the mental content would depend 
on a technique previously unavailable. In general, it is not possible to establish the properties 
of the vehicle based on the properties of the content to which it lead us (Dennett, 1991), and 
this makes the distinction between vehicle and content crucial to claims of an empirical 
science of consciousness. John Searle points out this important aspect with regard to 
investigating the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC):  
“Most of the discussions that I have seen of the NCC are confused because the 
researchers are looking for an NCC for a particular element of the conscious field, 
such as, for example, the experience of the color red. But that experience occurs in a 
subject who is already conscious. So the NCC could not possibly give us sufficient 
conditions for consciousness because the subject has to be already conscious in order 
that the NCC in question can cause a particular perceptual experience. The basic 
insight is this: we should not think of perception as creating consciousness, but as 
modifying the preexisting conscious field. That is why most of the research that I have 
seen does not give an NCC but what we might call us a NCPP – a neural correlate of 
a particular perception, given that the subject is already conscious” (Searle, 2004b).  
Clearly, the empirical research of this objective character of intentionality, which is 
separate from the content of experience, requires a technique capable of distinguishing the 
presence or absence of consciousness in a way that does not depend significantly on the 
presence or absence of specific mental contents in the subject observed. As discussed below, 
this practical independence of the technique on the content experienced by the subject is 
exactly what we suggest to have found by measuring the complexity of cortical activation 
evoked by TMS. 
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5.3.3 – PCI and the Science of the Mind  
PCI, combined with TMS/hd-EEG, can measure a possible condition for conscious 
experience in general and can be applied to the human thalamocortical system without a 
need for the subject to be engaged in a specific representational content. Unlike studies based 
on ERP or fMRI protocols, the response evoked by TMS in a conscious subject is not 
characterized by the awareness of a particular stimulus, much less awareness of the magnetic 
stimulation itself. In some specific circumstances, TMS can cause phosphenes (Kastner et al., 
1998; Meyer et al., 1991) or motor activation (Barker et al., 1985), but with the stimulation 
parameters described herein, TMS is not accompanied by any conscious experience directly 
related to the magnetic stimulus in the cortex. In addition, the use of “noise masking” 
(section 2.1) prevents the formation of time-locked auditory potentials (Massimini et al., 
2005), and the only experience that can be indirectly locked to the stimulus is a weak 
somatosensory stimulation on the surface of the scalp due to electrical current induced by the 
magnetic pulse. It is unlikely, however, that the intensity of this potential can be comparable 
to the response evoked by TMS to a point that it determines the differences observed 
between consciousness and unconsciousness. On the contrary, several studies combining 
TMS with PET and fMRI suggest that the neural activation induced by TMS is 
fundamentally characterized by the spreading of activity to specific brain regions that are 
connected with the stimulation site (Paus et al., 1997; 2001, Siebner et al., 1998) instead of 
an invariant event-related potential. Indeed, our results, after a systematic investigation of the 
potential evoked by TMS with different stimulation parameters, strongly suggest that the 
presence of a SEP in the scalp does not interfere significantly in the signal evoked by TMS 
(Casarotto et al., 2010; Casali et al., 2010). While the SEP does not depend significantly on 
the angle of stimulation or the stimulated area, having little variation even in relation to the 
intensity of stimulation, the potential evoked by TMS is highly sensitive to each of these 
variables (section 2.2). We found that stimuli in different areas during alert wakefulness 
produce responses with completely different characteristics (Figure 3.1 and 3.4) and engage 
different circuits at different times (Figure 2.11). These characteristics of effective 
connectivity in the thalamocortical system are precisely the properties of the response evoked 
by TMS that have decisive influence on what PCI was designed to measure. 
Therefore, it is likely that PCI, combined with TMS/hd-EEG, can open an as yet 
unexplored path toward a neuroscience of consciousness, by allowing the empirical 
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investigation of the integrity of causal processes in the thalamocortical system that are 
supposedly required for awareness in general and not for the consciousness of this or that 
stimulus. If there is a characteristic directedness of intentionality towards its contents, our 
results suggest that this dynamic access of the conscious subject to the world formed by the 
contents of consciousness depends on the support to complex spatiotemporal cortical activity 
originated causally in the brain. This measure of the brain's capacity for consciousness would 
brings us closer to what can be properly understood as neural correlates of consciousness: we 
are not dealing any more with the reduction of something subjective into something 
objective, but with the direct investigation of the nature of an essentially objective character 
of the intentionality of consciousness. 
It is worth noting at this point that some recent theoretical formulations about 
consciousness also pointed to certain aspects involved in the measure as implemented here, 
such as the necessity of engaging diverse areas of the thalamocortical system (Dehaene and 
Naccache, 2001), the complexity of cortical activation (Edelman and Tononi, 1994), or even 
the possibility of quantifying an objective condition of conscious experience through the 
“integration of information”7( Tononi, 2004; 2008). However, such formulations have not 
been able to propose an objective measure capable of being tested, in a non-ambiguous and 
                                                 
7 In particular, the Information Integration Theory of Consciousness (IITC) (Tononi, 2004; 2008) is an attempt 
to propose an objective measure of consciousness, regardless of specific mental contents and based on the 
integration of information in the thalamocortical system. However, the similarities with our work are 
superficial: such formulation presupposes a sense of the word “information” that is distinct from the sense 
implied by its use in the phenomenology of consciousness. We refer to the “informative” characteristics of 
consciousness when we say that it is the vehicle that provides us with a particular degree of access to certain 
contents and objects experienced. The theory, however, defines “information” as the reduction of the 
uncertainty about the possible states of the system: it is therefore information about the internal (neural) states 
of the conscious subject and not about the objects of experience. These two things, internal states and what is 
represented by such states, can only contain the same “information” if a certain internal state is equivalent to a 
given content of consciousness. However, this further depends on a “theory of meaning”: on how a given 
internal representation is able to refer to things or states of affairs outside of it. The intentional relationship 
between representation and represented, which is the core of the “informativeness” property of consciousness 
and which can not be formalized (Searle, 2004; Putnam, 1999), is precisely what should be aimed at in 
attempting to solve the theoretical problem of consciousness (Putnam, 1988; Edelman, 2006; Rowlands, 2010). 
In the absence of a proper “theory of meaning”, there is no convincing evidence, whether of a 
phenomenological or empirical basis, to justify the identification of consciousness with the ability to integrate 
“information” in the purely “syntactical” sense advocated by IITC. Moreover, beside the fact that this definition 
of “information” corresponds to an undesirable petitio principii, the proposed measure is in practice impossible 
to be calculated, for it depends on all the internal states that are available to the system via causal interactions 
among its parts. And finally, the double reduction present in the theory (from the content of consciousness to its 
neural representation, and from consciousness itself to a measure of the “syntactical” information contained in 
such representations) eventually leads to serious difficulties of interpretation, such as the confusion between the 
“amount of consciousness of one thing” and the “consciousness of a number of things” and the problematic 
identification of consciousness as a capacity, implying the attribution of consciousness to a subject even when, 
in his brain, “no neurons were activated” (Tononi, 2004). 
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successful way, on different models of unconsciousness, independent of the subject's 
engagement in specific mental contents. Moreover, it is crucial to note that these 
formulations turn out to have limited impact in the theoretical debate for a science of 
consciousness, since they do not describe clearly the kind of theoretical paradigm that such a 
science must presuppose. On the contrary, they usually rely on theoretical hypotheses based 
in a reductionist paradigm, begging the question not only about the nature of the contents of 
consciousness, by identifying them with internal representations of the subject, but also about 
the peculiar relationship between representation and represented that can give support to the 
phenomenal properties of intentionality. 
The object of our empirical study, on the other hand, is not a specific mental content, 
but the brain’s vehicles that give access to any conscious content. It is this crucial feature of 
the technique here implemented that provides the practical, technical and theoretical 
possibilities that have no precedent in the protocols generally used in the empirical study of 
consciousness. Just because this technique is potentially capable of empirically overpassing 
the content of consciousness, and therefore can directly test what is allegedly required to 
sustain such content, it is possible to avoid the problems of interpretation that affect the 
protocols based on ERP and fMRI: we do not measure something that can be considered an 
object of introspection, something supposedly accessible only by means purely subjective, 
but something that can only be accessed through an objective third-person perspective. For 
the same reason, several practical problems related to the application of the measure in cases 
of major clinical relevance, as in brain-injured patients, are overcome: this technique does 
not require the integrity of sensory pathways and the subject's ability or willingness to 
participate in the cognitive task associated with the experiment, because there is no specific 
cognitive task associated with the measure. Finally, if future developments confirm the 
potential of PCI and TMS in the investigation of neural processes relevant to consciousness, 
to the same extent that understanding the vehicle can clarify the nature of what it may lead us 
to, the complexity of cortical activation may establish new paradigms in the empirical 
investigation of the ultimate nature of the content of consciousness, contributing distinctly to 
the enormous challenge of establishing a science of the mind. 
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Appendix                
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1: Diagram of the algorithm used to calculate the Lempel-Ziv complexity of 
a binary matrix. The input of the algorithm is a binary n1 × n2 matrix “Data”, formed by 
entries s(i, j) = 0 or 1 for rows i = 1… n1 and columns j = 1… n2. Patterns of length k are 
sequences of k bits, Data(i:k, j) = s(i+1, j)s(i+2, j)…s(i+k, j), with 0 < j+k  n1. The 
algorithm outputs the Lempel-Ziv complexity c of the matrix (adapted from Casali et al., 
2012). 
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Figure A.2: Source Entropy (H) and Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) are displayed for 
all sessions in which PCI was calculated. SNR is a measure of the quality of response 
to TMS calculated at the sensors level as the ratio of mean absolute amplitude of EEG in 
post-stimulus over the range of pre-stimulus. H is the average information contained in 
the spatial and temporal distribution of the response to TMS statistically significant 
relative to pre-stimulus (see Eq. 4.1). SNR and H were calculated based on the post-TMS 
interval of 0-300 ms. SNR> 1.5 (horizontal dashed line) and H > 0.08 (vertical dashed 
line) for all sessions. Neither the amplitude of the response (SNR) nor the total amount of 
statistical significance (H) seem to be correlated with the level of awareness in both 
healthy subjects (circle) and in brain injured patients (squares) (adapted from Casali et 
al., 2012). 
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Figure A.3: PCITLZ discriminated between conscious and unconscious healthy 
subjects, independently of the stimulated area and the stimulation intensity. PCITLZ 
values for the same TMS sessions displayed in Figure 4.3. Similarly to PCILZ, PCITLZ 
generated disjoint distributions between conscious (dark gray bars) and unconscious 
subjects (light gray bars). The PCITLZ calculated in conscious subjects ranged between 
0.22 and 0.31 (mean value of 0.27  0.02), whereas the PCITLZ calculated after loss of 
consciousness ranged between 0.06 and 0.15 (mean value of 0.09  0.02). The p-value 
for the comparison between the PCITLZ values for the conscious and unconscious groups 
was less than 10-8 (Wilcoxon rank sum test). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.4: PCITLZ increased progressively in parallel with the level of 
consciousness. PCITLZ values are shown for all TMS sessions displayed in Figure 4.7.  
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            Table A.1: Patients recovering from coma - Group I 
 
  CRS-R 
Sex  
(age;   
cause) 
Time of 
TMS/EEG 
(days after 
insult) 
Diagnosis at 
time of 
TMS/EEG 
Auditory  
Function 
Visual 
Function 
Motor 
Function 
Oromotor and 
Verbal 
Function 
Communication Arousal Total score 
 
Male 
(81; 
CVA) 
19 VS None None Flexion to pain Oral reflexes None 
Without 
stimulation 5 
Male 
(68; 
trauma) 
21 VS None None Flexion to pain None None 
Without 
stimulation 4 
Female 
(83; 
trauma) 
14 VS Startle reflex None Abnormal posturing None None 
With 
stimulation 3 
Female 
(15;  
CRA) 
23 VS Startle reflex None Abnormal posturing Oral reflexes None 
Without 
stimulation 5 
Male 
(19; 
trauma) 
172 VS Startle reflex None Abnormal posturing Oral reflexes None 
With 
stimulation 4 
Female 
(76; 
SaHem) 
28 MCS Startle reflex Visual pursuit 
Flexion to 
pain 
Vocalization 
and oral 
movements 
None Without stimulation 10 
Male 
(72; 
CVA) 
38 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Object 
Recognition 
Flexion to 
pain 
Vocalization 
and oral 
movements 
Non-functional: 
intentional 
With 
stimulation 14 
Male 
(20; 
trauma) 
1334 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Visual 
pursuit 
Abnormal 
posturing Oral reflexes None 
Without 
stimulation 10 
Female 
(38; 
trauma) 
12 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Visual 
pursuit 
Automatic 
motor 
response 
Vocalization 
and oral 
movements 
Non-functional: 
intentional 
With 
stimulation 15 
  
 
 
1
3
4
 
Male 
(62; 
SaHem) 
20 MCS Startle reflex Visual pursuit 
Flexion to 
pain Oral reflexes None 
Without 
stimulation 9 
Male 
(45; 
CVA) 
35 LIS 
Systematic 
movement to 
command 
Object 
recognition None Oral reflexes 
Functional 
accurate Attention 15 
Female 
(25; 
CVA) 
62 VS 
Systematic 
movement to 
command 
Object 
recognition 
Flexion to 
pain 
Vocalization 
and oral 
movements 
Functional 
accurate Attention 18 
                     
                  CRA: cardio respiratory arrest; CVA: cerebrovascular accident; SaHem: Subarachnoid Hemorrhage (adapted from Rosanova et al., 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1
3
5
 
      Table A.2: Patients recovering from coma - Group II 
 
   CRS-R 
Sex  
(age;   
cause) 
TMS/EEG 
session 
number 
Time of 
TMS/EEG 
(days after 
insult) 
Diagnosis 
at time of 
TMS/EEG 
Auditory  
Function 
Visual 
Function 
Motor 
Function 
Oromotor and 
Verbal 
Function 
Communication Arousal Total score 
1 15 VS None None Flexion to pain 
Vocalization 
and oral 
movements 
None With stimulation 5 
2 23 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
None Flexion to pain Oral reflexes Functional intention 
With 
stimulation 8 
 
Female 
(60; 
trauma) 
3 30 EMCS 
Systematic 
movement to 
command 
Object 
Recognition 
Functional use 
of objects 
Vocalization 
and oral 
movements 
Functional 
Accurate 
With 
stimulation 20 
1 12 VS None None Flexion to pain None None With stimulation 3 
2 19 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
None Automatic motor reaction 
Vocalization 
and oral 
movements 
None With stimulation 12 
Male 
(16; 
trauma) 
3 40 EMCS 
Systematic 
movement to 
command 
Object 
Recognition 
Automatic 
motor reaction 
Vocalization 
and oral 
movements 
Functional 
Accurate Attention 21 
1 35 VS None None Abnormal posturing Oral reflexes None 
With 
stimulation 3 
2 46 VS* None Blink to threat Flexion to pain Oral reflexes None 
With 
stimulation 5 
Female 
(60; 
CVA) 
3 56 EMCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Visual 
pursuit 
Object 
manipulation 
Intelligible 
verbalizations 
Functional 
Accurate 
With 
stimulation 16 
1 25 VS Startle reflex None Abnormal posturing Oral reflexes None 
With 
stimulation 3 Female (77; 
SaHem) 2 44 VS Startle reflex None Flexion to pain Oral reflexes  None With stimulation 5 
  
 
 
1
3
6
 1 22 VS None None None Oral reflexes None With stimulation 3 Male 
(43; 
CRA) 2 62 VS Startle reflex None Abnormal posturing Oral reflexes  None 
With 
stimulation 5 
    
        *The day before this patient was diagnosed MCS with reproducible movements and visual pursuit (total score of 9).  
        CRA: cardio respiratory arrest; CVA: cerebrovascular accident; SaHem: Subarachnoid Hemorrhage (adapted from Rosanova et al., 2012).  
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